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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether state legislators have a right to intervene in a lawsuit filed against the state of North Carolina concerning the constitutionality of the state’s voter-ID law when the Attorney General is already representing the state in the matter. Petitioners Philip E. Berger, President Pro Tempore of the North Carolina Senate and Timothy K. Moore, Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives argue that Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) and North Carolina law grant state legislators the right to intervene on behalf of the state in judicial proceedings. Petitioners further maintain that Rule 24 only requires state agents to establish a minimum standard of inadequate representation to intervene in litigation involving their state’s interests. Respondents North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP and other North Carolina NAACP branches counter that Rule 24(a)(2) does not allow an additional party to join the case when its interests are identical to the existing party’s interests. Moreover, the Respondents argue that state legislators need to demonstrate a higher standard of inadequacy to show that the Attorney General is inadequately representing the state to join the case. The outcome of this case has important implications for the role of state governments in litigation, future parties that are or will be engaged in litigation with the states, and the judiciary.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether it is appropriate for an attorney general to intervene in a case when no other governmental representative will defend the state law, despite the attorney general’s voluntary dismissal and contradictory stipulations in the case.  After the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to prohibit the enforcement of a Kentucky law, the Secretary of Kentucky's Cabinet for Health and Family chose not to appeal the Sixth Circuit’s decision and Attorney General Daniel Cameron (“Cameron”) moved to intervene as a third-party to continue defending the law. Cameron argues that the court should consider the importance of the state’s legal interests, maintaining that states have the authority to decide who represents them in court, and that the Sixth Circuit abused its discretion by not permitting his intervention.  EMW Women’s Surgical Center (“EMW”) counters that Kentucky’s interests were protected because the Attorney General’s office left the initial suit voluntarily and agreed to be bound by the final judgment.  EMW contends that the Attorney General’s office should not receive unique exemptions from procedural rules, with intervention being appropriate at the appellate level in rare circumstances only.  The outcome of this case has important implications for separation of power between the state and the federal government and for the court’s application of procedural law to state-government litigants.

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Billy Joe Reynolds, a registered sex offender, was convicted for failing to update his registration upon moving from Missouri to Pennsylvania. Under the newly enacted Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”), sex offenders are required to update the federal registry within three days of a change of residence. An Interim Rule issued by the Attorney General applied the statute retroactively to all sex offenders convicted before SORNA’s enactment, including Reynolds. Reynolds challenged the legality of the Interim Rule but the circuit court dismissed his case for lack of standing. In the current suit, Reynolds argues that SORNA’s registration requirements are not applicable to individuals with pre-SORNA convictions. Reynolds adds that the Interim Rule made SORNA’s registration requirements applicable to him, thus giving him standing to challenge the Rule. The Supreme Court's decision will determine whether pre-SORNA sex offenders can state a claim against the Interim Rule, thus potentially delaying the government’s efforts in creating an effective national sex offender registry system. The decision may also prevent the government from issuing harsh new registration requirements without notice to individuals in Reynolds’s situation.

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In 2006, Congress reauthorized the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”) for 25 years. Section 5 of the VRA requires certain “covered” jurisdictions to obtain federal preclearance before making any alterations to their election laws. Section 4(b) sets forth a formula for determining if a jurisdiction is covered. Petitioner Shelby County, Alabama, a covered jurisdiction, asserts that the preclearance regime exceeds Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and violates the Tenth Amendment and Article IV. Other covered jurisdictions, amicihere, complain that the VRA’s restrictions subject them to a double standard and infringe on their state sovereignty rights. Attorney General Holder, the Respondent, contends that these restrictions are necessary to fight regression among states with a history of voting rights abuses. Shelby County argues that current conditions no longer justify preclearance at all, and that the coverage formula is antiquated in any case. Holder argues that preclearance remains a valid exercise of congressional power and that the formula, in combination with the VRA’s “bailout” provision, creates a coverage regime that meets the requirements of the Constitution.

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The Supreme Court will consider whether the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) applies to lawyers, known as “special counsel,” appointed by a state Attorney General to collect debts owed to the state, during the performance of their duties. Various lawyers and their firms, appointed as special counsel by the Ohio Attorney General, argue that special counsel are properly defined as state “officers,” making special counsel exempt from the FDCPA. Pamela Gillie and Hazel Meadows, Ohio debtors, counter that special counsel are not “officers” but independent contractors subject to the FDCPA’s requirements. Gillie and Meadows also argue that use of Attorney General letterhead by special counsel to collect a debt is a “false, deceptive, or misleading representation” in violation of Section 1692e of the FDCPA. The Court’s decision could alter state sovereignty to collect debts and the power of state attorneys general.

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