Madison v. State of Alabama

DEFINING AND APPLYING THE FORD/PANETTI STANDARD FOR CATEGORIZING A DEFENDANT AS LEGALLY INCOMPETENT TO BE EXECUTED

Madison argues that Ford v. Wainwright and Panetti v. Quarterman established a legal standard for incompetency that renders a large range of defendants incompetent to be lawfully executedMadison contends that he meets this standard for incompetency because multiple strokes and vascular dementia have left him unable to understand the reason for his execution. Madison asserts that Ford and Panetti clearly communicate that a vital component of the Eighth Amendment is the prevention of an incompetent person’s execution. Madison further claims that the Eighth Amendment intentionally created a broad standard of categorizing a defendant as “incompetent” by declining to delineate which mental states or disabilities would result in the classification of a defendant as incompetent. In Madison’s view, the Court’s imprecise discussion surrounding the status of incompetency is intentional and further underscores his argument that the standard for incompetency should be broad enough to include a diverse range of mental states and disabilities.

Madison further posits that advancements in modern medicine occurring after Ford and Panetti allow for an expanded legal standard that protects a broader range of mental disorders under the Eighth Amendment. Madison asserts that developments in the ease and efficacy of disorder diagnoses are relevant because, under Panetti, the opinion of medical professionals must be considered when analyzing whether a defendant’s medical status qualifies him or her for protection under the Eighth Amendment. Madison cites to Moore v. Texas to note that modern standards of the medical community prevent the government from independently determining a person’s mental disorder. Applying these arguments to his own case, Madison notes that modern medical imaging technology allowed a physician to describe Madison’s brain damage that led to Madison’s memory loss. According to Madison, the advances in medical technological have allowed for a more precise understanding of Madison’s diminished mental capacity, including his ability to rationally understand his surroundings, and have allowed Madison’s neuropsychologist to conclude that Madison is incompetent for the purposes of execution because of his reduced ability to understand his surroundings.

Alabama, in contrast, asserts that to meet the legal standard for incompetency, a defendant’s mental status must prohibit the defendant from rationally understanding the government’s reasons for ordering the defendant’s execution. Citing Panetti, Alabama claims that a defendant is capable of rationally understanding his punishment if his awareness of crime and punishment mirrors the general community’s understanding of these concepts. In other words, Alabama contends that a determination under Panetti of whether a defendant rationally understands his crime and his punishment should not consider whether a defendant remembers committing his crime. Madison, Alabama reasons, rationally understands his punishment because he understands the connection between crime and punishment and he understands that his punishment is the result of his crime. Alabama claims that Madison’s insistence that his punishment is unjust and his denial of his responsibility for murdering Officer Schulte further underscores Madison’s awareness of crime and punishment as they apply to his situation.

Alabama counters that Madison’s interpretation of Ford and Panetti expands the incompetency standard, encouraging manipulation and gamesmanship. Alabama cautions that such an expansion would incentivize defendants to falsely claim a mental disability to avoid execution.Alabama contends that psychiatrists often disagree when classifying mental illness and that Madison’s argument does not reveal the difficulty of diagnosing mental disorders.Additionally, Alabama notes that as the number of federal and state appeals of capital punishments has grown, the average age of a defendant on death row has increased.Thus, Alabama argues, the continued increase in average age would escalate the likelihood that some defendants will falsely assert an age-related mental disability to be classified as incompetent under the broader standard suggested by Madison. Arguing for a narrower standard of incompetency, Alabama counters, would be more in line with Panetti’s imposition of a high burden on a defendant arguing that his mental state should prevent his execution.

UNDER CURRENT STANDARDS OF DECENCY, SHOULD MADISON’S EXECUTION BE CONSIDERED A CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT?

Madison characterizes his mental state as an inability to understand the circumstances of his execution and asserts that modern standards of decency prohibit his execution under the Eighth Amendment. Madison cites Roper v. Simmons and Atkins v. Virginia to claim that standards of decency prohibit the execution of defendants whose cognitive function is impaired due to age or intellectual disability. Madison then claims that society’s standards of decency necessarily prohibit the execution of defendants who lack the capacity to understand why they are being executed. Madison contends that advances in medical testing have allowed his doctors to better assess how his mental disorder impacts his brain function, which in turn has important implications on preventing the enactment of a cruel and unusual punishment in his case.Madison asserts that the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause caused Ford to limit the category of medical testing and diagnoses used as evidence to establish incompetence.In other words, Madison argues, by considering a wider range of mental disorders and evidence when determining if a defendant’s execution would violate the Eighth Amendment, the court has recognized the importance of preventing cruel and unusual punishments that would occur if advances in medical diagnoses were not considered when categorizing a defendant’s disability as eligible to be protected under the Eighth Amendment.

Alabama, focusing on objective indicators of standards of decency, characterizes Madison’s mental state as a memory disorder that does not exempt him from execution under the Eighth Amendment. Alabama asserts that the Eighth Amendment does not prevent the execution of defendants who do not remember committing the crime for which they are being punished.Alabama claims that the Court has provided a clear analysis for determining when a defendant’s execution is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.Alabama notes that standards of decency largely originate from and are best measured by state and federal legislation.Alabama notes that no state has passed a law prohibiting the execution of a defendant suffering from memory loss due to dementia.Therefore, Alabama contends, there is no evidence that executing a defendant with Madison’s condition would violate standards of decency. As an example, Madison notes that Ohio, Mississippi, and Missouri executed defendants with mental conditions similar to Madison’s and, despite public awareness of the executions, none of the executions were followed by legislative action.Alabama concedes that in 2006, the American Psychiatric Association and the American Psychological Association recommended that no defendant with a severe mental disorder should be executed.Alabama further notes, however, that no state legislature, state court, or federal court has followed this recommendation; thus, Alabama asserts, the recommendation does not reflect current standards of decency and should not influence the interpretation of the Eighth Amendment.