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MENTAL HEALTH

Chiles v. Salazar

Issues

Considering a state’s regulatory authority over professional conduct, does the First Amendment permit states to regulate the content of certain conversations between counselors and their clients?

 

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether Colorado’s Minor Conversion Therapy Law (“MCTL”), which prohibits mental health professionals from providing LGBTQ+ conversion therapy to minor clients, violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Kaley Chiles, a licensed professional counselor in Colorado, argues that MCTL infringes on constitutionally protected speech by discriminating against certain content and viewpoints. She asserts that Colorado failed to meet its burden of strict scrutiny because the statute does not further a compelling state interest, nor is it narrowly tailored. Patty Salazar, in her official capacity as Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Regulatory Agencies, argues that states have the power to regulate professional conduct, even if doing so incidentally affects speech. Salazar maintains that Chiles’s position undermines a state’s ability to regulate the conduct of mental health professionals. The outcome of this case will also have significant ramifications for the availability of certain treatment methods.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a law that censors certain conversations between counselors and their clients based on the viewpoints expressed regulates conduct or violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.

In 2019, the Colorado legislature added the Minor Conversion Therapy Law (“MCTL”) to the Mental Health Practice Act (“MHPA”), which regulates the practice and conduct of mental health professionals in the state. 

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Michael C. Dorf for his guidance and insights into this case.

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Madison v. State of Alabama

Issues

Does the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment bar the execution of a prisoner with vascular dementia, who has no memory of his crime and the circumstances surrounding his imprisonment?

The Supreme Court will decide if it is lawful to execute a man who—years after committing murder—developed vascular dementia that affects his ability to understand his surroundings and prevents him from remembering the facts of his crime. Petitioner Vernon Madison contends that a broad range of mental conditions can prohibit defendants from understanding the circumstances of their executions and thus should prevent lawful execution of such defendants. The State of Alabama counters that a defendant’s memory of the murder is irrelevant to the analysis of whether the defendant’s execution is unlawful under the Eighth Amendment. The American Psychological Association and the American Psychiatric Association, in support of Madison call for an expansion of the category of mental disabilities that can render a person incompetent to be lawfully executed and contend that the execution of inmates with dementia would not serve deterrence purposes. However, fourteen states writing in support Alabama distinguish dementia and other age-related disabilities from intellectual disability and add that the retributive aspects of the death penalty are important enough to allow the execution of inmates with dementia and other age-related mental disorders. Accordingly, the Court’s decision will affect defendants who are exempt from execution as well as the litigation strategy of death row inmates as they approach the age of onset for age-related mental disorders during the lengthy appeals process.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, consistent with the Eighth Amendment, and the Supreme Court’s decisions in Ford v. Wainwright and Panetti v. Quarterman, a state may execute a prisoner whose mental disability leaves him with no memory of his commission of the capital offense.

Whether evolving standards of decency and the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment bar the execution of a prisoner whose competency has been compromised by vascular dementia and multiple strokes causing severe cognitive dysfunction and a degenerative medical condition that prevents him from remembering the crime for which he was convicted or understanding the circumstances of his scheduled execution.

In 1985, Petitioner Vernon Madison shot and killed Officer Julius Schulte in Mobile, Alabama and was sentenced to death by a jury for capital murder.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor John H. Blume for his insights.

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