eighth amendment

Ayers v. Belmontes (05-493)

Fernando Belmontes, a criminal defendant sentenced to death by a California jury, challenges the constitutionality under the Eighth Amendment of California’s jury instruction, arguing that the instruction prevents the jury from considering evidence about his future prospects as a productive member of society. The Court will assess whether there is a reasonable likelihood that this jury instruction will prevent a jury from considering the defendant’s future conduct when determining whether to mitigate the defendant’s punishment to life without parole. If the Court determines that the instruction is insufficient, it will also consider whether its ruling should apply retroactively to other criminal defendants. The case will affect how states draft their capital sentencing jury instructions and will give Justices Roberts and Alito an opportunity to articulate their opinions on the Court’s capital sentencing jurisprudence.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Does Boyde confirm the constitutional sufficiency of California’s "unadorned factor (k)" instruction where a defendant presents mitigating evidence of his background and character which relates to, or has a bearing on, his future prospects as a life prisoner?

2. Does the Ninth Circuit’s holding, that California’s "unadorned factor (k)" instruction is constitutionally inadequate to inform jurors they may consider "forward-looking" mitigation evidence constitute a "new rule" under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)?

The Crime and State Proceedings

On March 15, 1981, Fernando Belmontes burglarized the house of 19-year-old Steacy McConnell. Brief for Petitioner at 2. Upon finding McConnell at home, Belmontes struck her several times in the head with a metal dumbbell bar before stealing her stereo equipment. Id. at 2–3.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professors Sheri Johnson, Stephen Garvey, and John Blume for their insights into this case.

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Bucklew v. Precythe

Issues

When an inmate with a rare and severe medical condition brings an as-applied challenge to a state’s method of execution, should the court assume that the execution will go as planned? And is the inmate constitutionally required to prove an alternative method of execution? Here, did Russell Bucklew meet his burden to prove the procedures of his proposed alternative method and the degree of pain he would likely suffer, and did he show how they compare to the method he challenges?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a death row inmate challenging an execution method must prove a feasible alternative execution method when the challenged method will allegedly inflict an unconstitutional level of pain as applied to the inmate’s medical condition. Russell Bucklew argues that the state should bear the burden of proving an alternative method in such an “as-applied” challenge. He reasons that because there is no risk that the challenged execution method will be outlawed in its entirety and because the state is in the best position to evaluate the effect of existing execution methods on the inmate’s medical condition, the Court should place the burden on the state. The Department of Corrections (“DOC”) argues that the inmate in an “as-applied” challenge case should bear this burden. The DOC notes that the inmate would be able to obtain an exemption from capital punishment and needlessly delay their execution by bringing meritless claims if the Court placed the burden on the state rather than on the inmate. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will impact the ability of inmates to challenge execution methods, the administrability of common execution methods such as lethal injection, and the effect of the capital punishment process on drug regulators, physicians, and state corrections officers.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Whether a court evaluating an as-applied challenge to a state’s method of execution based on an inmate’s rare and severe medical condition should assume that medical personnel are competent to manage his condition and that the procedure will go as intended;
  2. Whether evidence comparing a state’s method of execution with an alternative proposed by an inmate must be offered via a single witness, or whether a court at summary judgment must look to the record as a whole to determine whether a factfinder could conclude that the two methods significantly differ in the risks they pose to the inmate;
  3. Whether the Eighth Amendment requires an inmate to prove an adequate alternative method of execution when raising an as-applied challenge to the state’s proposed method of execution based on his rare and severe medical condition; and
  4. Whether petitioner Russell Bucklew met his burden under Glossip v. Gross to prove what procedures would be used to administer his proposed alternative method of execution, the severity and duration of pain likely to be produced, and how they compare to the state’s method of execution.

In March 1996, Russell Bucklew followed his former girlfriend, Stephanie Ray, to the trailer home of Michael Sanders, where she was living. Bucklew v. Precythe (“Precythe”) at 1–2. Bucklew entered the trailer and shot Sanders. Id. While Sanders bled to death, Bucklew handcuffed Ray, dragged her into his car, and drove away.

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City of Grants Pass, Oregon v.

Issues

Do fines for camping on public land constitute cruel and unusual punishment of homeless people?

This case asks the Supreme Court to resolve a dispute between the City of Grants Pass, Oregon, and a class of homeless residents of Grants Pass represented by Gloria Johnson. Petitioner Grants Pass contends that its anti-camping ordinances do not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Respondent Johnson argues that the city’s ordinances amount to criminalization of the status of homelessness, contravening the Eighth Amendment. This case could impact the balance of power between federal, state, and local government and may clarify the limits on criminalizing conduct like camping outside at night.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the enforcement of generally applicable laws regulating camping on public property constitutes “cruel and unusual punishment” prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.

The homeless population in Grants Pass, Oregon exceeds the available shelter for homeless people. Johnson v.

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civil forfeiture

cruel and unusual punishment

death penalty

Glossip v. Gross

Issues

  1. Does a state violate the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment when the state uses a lethal injection protocol where the first drug does not reliably render the prisoner insensate and or unconscious?
  2. Did Baze v. Rees heighten the standard for obtaining a stay of execution?
  3. Does a prisoner have to establish the availability of an alternative drug protocol when challenging a lethal injection protocol?

The Supreme Court will consider the following three issues: (1) whether a state violates the Eighth Amendment when the state uses a three-drug protocol for executions, where the first drug does not always relieve the prisoner from pain and or put the prisoner in a deep state of unconsciousness; (2) whether Baze v. Rees is the proper standard for obtaining a stay of execution; and (3) whether a prisoner challenging a state’s lethal injection protocol is required to establish the availability of alternative drugs. See Brief for Petitioner, Richard E. Glossip at i. Glossip contends that midazolam is incapable of reliably rendering prisoners unconscious and creates a substantial risk of harm that violates the Eighth Amendment, that the standard for obtaining a stay of execution should continue to be “a significant possibility of success on the merits” as established in Baze, and that prisoners should not be required to establish the availability of alternative drugs. See id. at 28, 39, 46. Gross counters that using midazolam does not create a substantial risk of harm since it is highly likely to render prisoners unconscious and insensate, that Baze clearly established a heightened stay request standard, and that establishing the availability of alternative drugs is required post-Baze. See Brief for Respondent, Kevin J. Gross at 41, 57–58, 61–62. The Supreme Court’s decision will potentially affect the availability of certain execution methods as well as address the acceptability of lethal injection protocols that potentially result in a lingering and painful death. See Brief of Former State Attorneys General, in Support of Petitioners at 23; Brief for National Catholic Reporter, in Support of Petitioner at 8.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Is it constitutionally permissible for a state to carry out an execution using a three-drug protocol where (a) there is a well-established scientific consensus that the first drug has no pain relieving properties and cannot reliably produce deep, comalike unconsciousness, and (b) it is undisputed that there is a substantial, constitutionally unacceptable risk of pain and suffering from the administration of the second and third drugs when a prisoner is conscious?
  2. Does the Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008)-plurality stay standard apply when states are not using a protocol substantially similar to the one that this Court considered in Baze?
  3. Must a prisoner establish the availability of an alternative drug formula even if the state's lethal-injection protocol, as properly administered, will violate the Eighth Amendment?

Oklahoma has effectuated its death penalty for many years by injecting three different chemical compounds into the inmate’s cardiovascular system. See Warner v. Oklahoma, 776 F.3d 721, 724–25 (10th Cir. 2015).

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Graham v. Florida; Sullivan v. Florida

Issues

Is a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole a cruel and unusual punishment when imposed on a juvenile convicted of a non-homicide offense?

 

Appealed from: Florida First District Court of Appeal (Graham v. Florida, Apr. 10, 2008; Sullivan v. Florida, June 17, 2008)​Terrance Jamar Graham ("Graham") committed an armed burglary when he was sixteen years old. Joe Harris Sullivan committed sexual battery when he was thirteen years old. Both men are currently serving life sentences in the State of Florida ("Florida") with no possibility of parole. Graham and Sullivan each argue that sentencing a juvenile to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole violates the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments. Florida counters that such sentences are not constitutionally barred and reflect a state's considered legislative response to the growing problem of juvenile crime. In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court will determine whether juveniles may be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for committing non-homicide offenses.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Graham v. Florida:

1.         Whether the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment prohibits sentencing a juvenile convicted of a non-homicide offense to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

Sullivan v. Florida:

1.         Whether the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment and the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit sentencing a juvenile convicted of a non-homicide offense to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole; and,

2.         Whether the Supreme Court may review a recently evolved Eighth Amendment claim where a state court has refused to do so, and dismissed the post-conviction motion on independent and adequate state law grounds.

Graham v.

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·      Annotated U.S. Constitution: Eighth Amendment: Cruel and Unusual Punishments

·      Wex: Juvenile Justice

·      New York Times: Defining “'Cruel and Unusual”' When the Offender Is 13 (Feb. 2, 2009)

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Hall v. Florida

Issues

Does Florida’s use of a cutoff IQ to establish mental retardation violate Atkins v. Virginia’s ruling that executing mentally retarded criminals violates the Eighth Amendment’s protection against “cruel and unusual” punishment?

Court below

The state of Florida sentenced Freddie Lee Hall to death on September 9, 1982 for murdering Karol Hurst. Hall challenged his sentence multiple times, and the Florida state courts vacated and reinstated the sentence each time. During one resentencing trial, the court found Hall to be mentally retarded. At an evidentiary hearing to determine his mental competence, the court found that Hall’s IQ exceeded the minimum cut-off for mental retardation in Florida. Hall’s most recent challenge therefore involves the 2002 Supreme Court decision in Atkins v. Virginia, which held that executing mentally retarded criminals violates their Eighth Amendment right against “cruel and unusual punishment.” Hall argues that Florida’s measure of mental retardation, which uses an IQ score cutoff, violates Atkins, and that Atkins prohibits Florida from executing him. Florida argues that the state’s definition of mental retardation complies with Atkins. In turn, the state asserts that under its definition of mental retardation, Hall can be executed. This case could determine whether Florida can execute Hall and, more broadly, states’ ability to establish standards for mental retardation based on IQ testing.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Florida scheme for identifying mentally retarded defendants in capital cases violates Atkins v. Virginia.

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Facts

On September 9, 1982, the governor of Florida signed Freddie Lee Hall's death warrant for the murder of Karol Hurst, after Hall was tried and convicted in Putnam County and the Florida Supreme Court upheld the conviction. See Hall v. State,  109 So. 3d 704, 705–706 (Fla. 2012). After his appeals to the Florida state courts failed, Hall filed an appeal in federal court. See id.

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Hurst v. Florida

Issues

Can Florida’s death sentencing scheme be considered constitutional if it does not require jury unanimity in capital cases and it consigns the jury to an advisory role in sentencing?

Court below

The Supreme Court will consider whether Florida’s death sentencing scheme is constitutional in light of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). See Brief for Petitioner, Timothy Lee Hurst at 26-27. Convicted murderer Timothy Lee Hurst argues that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional in light of Ring. See id. at 17-18. Hurst contends that the jury’s advisory verdict does not satisfy the requirements of Ring and violates the Constitution because  the it  minimizes the jury’s sense of responsibility and subverts the jury’s deliberative function by assigning the fact-finding role to the trial court judge. See id. at 26-27, 35-36. Florida argues that its sentencing framework is constitutional because it complies with the requirements of Ring and ensures that a judge’s sole determination will not necessitate a sentence of death for a defendant. See Brief of Respondent, Florida at 58. The Court’s decision will determine the constitutionality of Florida’s death sentencing  scheme,  and may impact the individual cases of prisoners who have been sentenced to death in Florida.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does Florida’s death sentencing scheme violate the Sixth Amendment or the Eighth Amendment in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002)?

On May 2, 1998, Cynthia Lee Harrison was killed at a Popeye’s Fried Chicken restaurant in Escambia County, Florida, where she worked as an assistant manager. See Hurst v. Florida, No. SC12-1947, at 2 (Fla.

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