Garland v. Cargill

WHETHER A BUMP STOCK IS A “MACHINEGUN”

The government argues that a semi-automatic rifle equipped with a bump stock fires multiple shots by “a single function of the trigger” and “automatically,” thus falling within the statutory definition of a machine gun. Brief for Petitioners, Garland at 16.

First, the government argues that a rifle equipped with a bump stock fires multiple shots by a single function of the trigger when a single deliberate motion, such as a pull, initiates the firing of multiple shots. Id. at 17. The government asserts that dictionaries support its interpretation of “function of the trigger” as a single pull of the trigger. Id. at 18. The government posits that the words of a proposal to Congress by Karl T. Frederick, when he was president of the National Rifle Association (“NRA”), support this position. Id. The government points out that Frederick used “function of the trigger” interchangeably with “pull of the trigger” throughout the Congressional hearing and that Congress eventually adopted Frederick’s proposal, almost word for word, in the National Firearms Act. Id. at 18–19.

The government further contends that the House and Senate Committee Reports reflect a similar understanding of the phrase, as did the subsequent language used by Congress, the Executive Branch, and courts. Id. at 19–21. The government claims that Congress used the term “function” rather than “pull” to ensure that it would cover all automatic firearms, such as the Maxim gun, which used triggers that had to be pushed, not pulled, with a thumb. Id. at 22. The government argues that once a shooter pulls the trigger of a rifle equipped with a bump stock, they need not do anything to continue firing apart from maintaining constant forward pressure on the barrel, and therefore the rifle fires multiple shots “by a single function of the trigger.” Id. at 22–23. The government disputes the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of the term “function” to adopt a “mechanical perspective” rather than a “shooter’s perspective,” arguing that such an interpretation conflicts with the statute’s text, context, and purpose. Id. at 23–25.

Next, the government argues that a rifle equipped with a bump stock fires multiple shots automatically. Id. at 30. The government asserts that dictionaries define “automatically” as “self-acting or self-regulating” and that a rifle equipped with a bump stock uses a self-acting or self-regulating mechanism that allows the rifle to fire multiple rounds through a single function of the trigger. Id. at 31. The government contends that a shooter need only keep their trigger finger stationary on the bump stock’s finger rest and maintain constant forward pressure on the barrel, and the bump stock will “take care of the rest.” Id. at 31–32. The government asserts that the Fifth Circuit’s position that a bump stock does not enable continuous firing because the shooter must maintain manual forward pressure lacks merit because in ordinary usage, the word “automatic” does not require a complete absence of human involvement. Id. at 32–33. The government also argues that Congress did not define machineguns so narrowly as to permit a trivial shift in the shooter’s pressure from the trigger to the barrel. Id. at 36.

Cargill counters that a semi-automatic rifle equipped with a bump stock is not a machinegun because a bump stock does not cause a semi-automatic rifle to fire more than one shot “by a single function of the trigger” or allow such a weapon to fire “automatically.” Brief for Respondent, Cargill at 16.

First, Cargill argues that a bump stock does not cause a semi-automatic rifle to discharge more than one shot “by a single function of the trigger” because the shooter must still disengage the trigger before reactivating it for another shot. Id. at 18–20. Cargill argues that, although a bump stock allows a shooter to fire rapidly through repeated bumps of the trigger, this does not convert a semi-automatic rifle into a machinegun because a shooter without a bump stock could achieve the same with a quick trigger finger. Id. at 21. Cargill contends that the government previously understood this when it issued 15 classification letters between 2008 and 2017 declaring “non-mechanical” bump stocks to be outside the statutory definition of “machinegun.” Id. Cargill asserts that the government changed its mind to equate “function” with “pull” of the trigger based on an inaccurate claim that the drafters of the statute intended to equate the phrases. Id. at 21–22. Cargill argues that the government’s position is flawed because it relies primarily on the statement by Karl T. Frederick, who was the president of the NRA and not a member of Congress. Id. at 22–23.

Cargill argues that even if legislative history supported the government’s position, it cannot substitute the word “function” in the statute with language like “pull” solely because that better supports the government’s position. Id. at 23–24. Cargill contends that the word “function” cannot be equated with “pull” because there are automatic firearms with triggers that are pushed rather than pulled, so the phrases are not interchangeable. Id. at 24–25. Cargill argues that the government’s position is inconsistent because the government admits that Congress intended to use the word “function” rather than “pull” to cover all automatic weapons, including those with push triggers. Id. at 26–27. Finally, Cargill asserts that a bump stock does not alter the “function” of a trigger in any way, because the shooter must still disengage the trigger, allow the trigger to reset, and activate the trigger again before a subsequent shot can be fired. Id. at 28.

Next, Cargill argues that a non-mechanical bump stock does not cause a semi-automatic rifle to shoot more than one shot “automatically” because the shooter must continuously apply pressure on the barrel and maintain a finger on the trigger. Id. at 40–41. Cargill contends that the text of the statute specifies that a rifle must fire multiple shots in order to be a machinegun. Id. at 43. Cargill argues that if a rifle requires any extra help from the shooter after the initial activation of the trigger, then it is not firing more than one shot “automatically.” Id. at 42. Cargill contends that such help includes pushing forward on the barrel of a rifle, which Cargill argues is an act that is separate and distinct from the trigger’s function. Id. at 44.

METHOD OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

The government argues that the Supreme Court should not interpret a statute so as to facilitate evasion of the law. Brief for Petitioners at 38. For example, the government argues that in Abramski v. United States, the Court interpreted the term “transferee” in the Gun Control Act as excluding a middleman who bought a gun on behalf of the real purchaser; otherwise, according to the government, felons could simply direct a middleman to purchase guns on their behalf, undermining the law’s key provision. Id. at 39. The government posits that so too here, Congress intended to prohibit machineguns because their rapid fire poses an immense danger to the public and that bump stocks allow a semi-automatic rifle to reach the same level of firepower and danger through different technological means. Id. at 40–41. The government asserts that if the Court holds that bump stocks are legal because of that technicality, the Court would facilitate evasion of the machinegun ban. Id. at 41–42.

The government also rejects the Fifth Circuit’s use of the rule of lenity to interpret the statute, which requires the Court to interpret a statute in the criminal defendant’s favor. Id. at 44. arguing that the statute contains no grievous ambiguities and read in light of its context and purpose, defines “machinegun” to cover rifles equipped with bump stocks. Id.

Cargill counters that the Court should reject the government’s interpretation of the statute because the cases cited by the government rely on textual ambiguities not present in the National Firearms Act. Id. at 46. For example, Cargill argues that nothing in Abramski suggests that a court can use the statutory purpose to interpret the word “function” as “pull” or “automatically” as requiring additional and ongoing manual human input. Id. Cargill argues that Congress could have enacted a statutory prohibition on weapons that eliminate the manual movements that a shooter would need to make in order to fire continuously, or a prohibition on weapons that can fire hundreds of rounds a minute but chose not to. Id. at 47.

Cargill further argues that the Court should rule against the government because of the rule of lenity. Id. at 48. Cargill contends that the rule of lenity should take precedence over the Government’s interpretation based on legislative history, because ordinary citizens who do not have access to the Congressional testimony of a gun lobbyist, for example, will not have fair notice before being subjected to criminal punishment. Id. at 48–49.