Rico v. United States

LII note: The U.S Supreme Court has now decided Rico v. United States

    Issues

    When an individual on supervised release absconds, does the clock on their supervision time pause, such that the time while missing does not count toward serving the supervised release term?

    Oral argument:
    November 03, 2025
    Court below:
    United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

     

    This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether a term of supervised release automatically extends if a releasee absconds from supervision. Petitioner Isabel Rico absconded while serving a term of supervised release related to a drug trafficking offense. If Rico’s timer for supervised release was paused while in abscondment, her total punishment would be longer than if it were running. The district court applied the fugitive tolling doctrine, which means that the timer stopped when the releasee is missing, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed her extended sentence. Rico argues that the timer on a term of supervised release does not stop while a releasee is missing. Rico claims that the statute authorizing supervised release clearly does not authorize the use of the fugitive tolling doctrine. In response, the United States argues that the fugitive tolling doctrine must extend to absconders like Rico, that supervision only counts when the defendant is actively under oversight, and that the court should not allow for absconders to manipulate their sentence. This case’s outcome has significant implications on the fairness and rehabilitation for supervised releasees.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether the fugitive-tolling doctrine applies in the context of supervised release?

    Facts

    The Sentencing Reform Act replaced the parole system with supervised release, which allows courts to impose a term of supervision to run after a defendant’s prison sentence.  The court has discretion, within guidelines, to decide the length of the term and the conditions which will apply during supervised release. These conditions can include check-ins with parole officers, drug testing, not possessing controlled substances or committing further crimes, and participation in drug treatment programs. The term of supervised release ends when the term expires or the court revokes supervised release because of violations. Violations are classified into three categories, with Class A being the most severe and Class C the least severe. The consequences of violations, generally additional prison time or supervised release, vary based on the severity of the violation.

    In 2010, Rico pled guilty to a drug trafficking offense and was sentenced to eighty-four months in prison and four years of supervised release.   While on supervised release, Rico could not commit another crime or use drugs, had to undergo drug testing, participate in a drug-treatment program, maintain contact with a probation officer, and not change her address without notifying her probation officer first. Several months after her release, Rico violated drug-related conditions of her supervised release, leading to a two-month prison sentence followed by forty-two months of supervised release.

    Rico violated her second term of supervised release by using drugs, ceasing contact with her probation officer, and failing to notify her probation officer about changing her address, so the court issued a bench warrant for her arrest. In January 2023, Rico was arrested pursuant to the warrant and charged with two prior offenses: “evading police and driving without a license” (a Class C violation) in January 2021 and a drug possession-for-sale offense (a Class A violation) in January 2022. The January 2021 offense occurred before Rico’s supervised release was set to end, while the January 2022 offense occurred after it was scheduled to expire.

    The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California applied the fugitive tolling doctrine, which pauses a defendant’s supervised release term when they abscond, or flee from, a probation officer’s supervision.  Thus, the district court paused Rico’s remaining thirty-seven months of supervised release while she avoided contact with her probation officer.  The district court found that it had jurisdiction over the January 2022 offense because Rico’s supervised release terms remained in effect while she was a fugitive, and the time left on her release term did not resume until she was captured. The district court sentenced Rico to sixteen months in prison and two years of supervised release based on the more serious Class A January 2022 offense. She likely would have faced a less severe sentence if the court had not applied the fugitive tolling doctrine and only considered the less serious Class C January 2021 offense.

    The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed this decision, finding that Rico’s term of supervised release tolled while she was a fugitive from May 2018 until January 2023.   The Ninth Circuit asserted that they were bound by clear precedent to apply the fugitive tolling doctrine. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that the terms of Rico’s release applied while she was a fugitive, and because she absconded with thirty-seven months of supervised release remaining, the remaining months of her supervised release term did not resume until she was apprehended in January of 2023.

    Rico petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted on June 30, 2025. 

    Analysis

    INTERPRETING THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT

    Rico argues that the Sentencing Reform Act does not authorize an automatic and indefinite extension to a supervised release term when the releasee absconds from supervision. Rico contends that, because supervised release is a component of a defendant’s prison sentence, extending the term of supervised release increases her punishment. Rico emphasizes that Congress has the sole authority to define punishments, so the fugitive tolling doctrine, without Congressional authorization, cannot operate to extend her sentence. Additionally, Rico highlights that Congress referenced sentence tolling and fugitives in other sections of the Sentencing Reform Act but declined to explicitly authorize fugitive tolling. Rico argues that this omission demonstrates that Congress intentionally withheld such power from the courts to toll a supervised release sentence, and judicially creating it would undermine Congress’s authority to enact criminal penalties.

    Rico further asserts that applying the fugitive tolling doctrine to supervised release contradicts several other parts of the Sentencing Reform Act. Rico points to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b), which sets the maximum terms of supervised release, and § 3583(h), which prevents a releasee who violates a term of supervised release from being sentenced to a second term longer than the term they initially violated. Rico argues that applying the fugitive tolling doctrine violates both of these provisions by allowing releasees to be sentenced to terms longer than the statutory maximum and resentenced to terms longer than their initial supervised release term. Rico emphasizes that her initial supervised release term began in December 2017, and the lower courts found that she was still on supervised release in January 2023, despite the statutory maximum term being only five years. Finally, Rico asserts that, despite not checking in with her parole officer, she was under supervised release while she absconded because the crimes she committed in January 2021 and 2022 were treated as violations of supervised release.

    While the United States concedes that the Sentencing Reform Act does not explicitly authorize the use of the fugitive tolling doctrine, the United States highlights that courts have historically applied fugitive tolling principles to prevent defendants from reducing their sentences, including supervised release, through wrongful acts.  The United States argues that absent clear statutory intent to not apply these historical fugitive tolling principles, courts should presume that Congress intended these traditions to continue. The United States also notes that Congress specified in § 3624(e) that a term of supervised release does not run if a releasee is incarcerated for another crime during the term. According to the United States, this shows that Congress intended for supervised release terms to run only when a releasee is actually being supervised by a probation officer.

    Arguing that Rico would not be subjected to more than the five-year maximum sentence, the United States emphasizes other parts of the Sentencing Reform Act like § 3624(e), which requires that a releasee be supervised by their probation officer, and § 3601, which outlines the obligation of the releasee to remain under supervision. The United States contends that these statutory provisions demonstrate that Rico was not under supervised release when she absconded and was not being supervised. The United States maintains that tolling supervised release is not extending punishment because the mere existence of release conditions, such as the requirement not to commit new crimes, does not substitute for the active supervision of a probation officer. The United States argues that Rico is conflating supervision with release conditions, noting that her January 2022 offense violated those conditions but did not place her under supervision. The United States explains that under the violation classification system, the only violations during abscondment which could impact resentencing are felonies; and, it is both reasonable and just to expect absconders to not refrain from felonies. The United States asserts that by treating felonies as violations, it does not mean the supervised release term is running, just that fugitives remain bound by their release obligations.  

    COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES

    Rico argues that courts cannot use the similarities between supervised release and common lawparole to import the parole fugitive tolling doctrine into the Sentencing Reform Act. First,Rico points out that courts have long forbidden using common law principles in modern criminal statutes, unless a statute specifically invokes an established common law term. When established common law terms are used, Rico emphasizes that the meaning and interpretation of the common law term can be imported, but the common law punishment is not imported. Second, Rico disputes that there is a common law tradition of fugitive tolling for parolees, arguing that the historical record does not show any longstanding and settled fugitive tolling doctrine until Congress enacted a fugitive tolling statute in 1976. Rico underscores that the burden lies with the United States to demonstrate a common law tradition supporting fugitive tolling, yet the government fails to do so because it cannot identify any pre-statutory cases recognizing such a rule. Rico also argues that courts should not rely on probation to establish a common law tradition because unlike with supervised release, probation is served instead of, rather than following, imprisonment. Therefore, supervised release offers no meaningful guidance. Rico stresses that even if probation cases did have relevance, there is still no pre-statutory cases that demonstrate a common law tradition of tolling probation terms. Finally, Rico asserts that even if a common law tradition of fugitive tolling existed and could be imported, Congress ended that tradition in 1984 with the Sentencing Reform Act, which replaced any common law tradition, because Congress declined to enact a provision enabling fugitive tolling.

    The United States first argues that fugitive tolling is not the extension of a sentence, so it can be imported into the statute without violating statutory interpretation principles. Next, the United States contends that the application of fugitive tolling to supervised release follows from a long common law tradition of tolling absconders’ sentences while they are fugitives. The United States emphasizes that there is a clear tradition of not allowing a convict to shorten their sentence through flight, and that sentences historically do not run during a period of time without imprisonment or other restraint. The United States traces these fugitive tolling principles through the development of probation and parole in the twentieth century, arguing that probationers or parolees who absconded from control of the court were treated as failing to discharge their sentence. Finally, the United States argues that Congress incorporated the principle that a fugitive cannot shorten their sentence through flight into the supervised release regime developed in the Sentencing Reform Act. The United States asserts that the default presumption should be that a fugitive cannot reduce their sentence by fleeing, so absent clear Congressional intent to not apply fugitive tolling principles in the Sentencing Reform Act, fugitive tolling should apply to supervised release. The United States explains that the Sentencing Reform Act is also silent as to whether fugitive tolling applies in the context of escape from prison, yet none dispute that a prison sentence does not run while an escapee is at large.

    Discussion

    UNIFORMITY AND PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS

    The National Association of Federal Defenders (“NAFD”), in support of Rico, argues that one of Congress’s main goals when creating supervised release in the Sentencing Reform Act was promoting uniformity and predictability within sentencing.  NAFD asserts that the values of uniformity and predictability would be undermined if the court were to apply fugitive tolling to supervised release. NAFD highlights that given the variety of definitions of absconding, releasees’ sentences may vary widely based on the definition applied by their judges and probation officers. NAFD contends that even with concrete criteria for abscondence, the administration of supervised release is influenced by location and demographics, so applying fugitive tolling would still undermine the uniformity and predictability of sentencing for releasees. The Roderick and Solange MacArthur Justice Center (“RSMJC”), in support of Rico, argues that the challenges releasees face while reintegrating into society can make it difficult to avoid abscondment. RSMJC contends that applying the fugitive tolling doctrine would punish many releasees who did not intend to violate the requirements of their release. Further, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (“NACDL”), in support of Rico, asserts that releasees are unlikely to manipulate their sentence by absconding due to the harsh consequences of doing so.  Specifically, since absconders are typically unable to work, can lose their emotional support systems, and fail to benefit from interrupted rehabilitation programs, NACDL argues that there is little concern that releasees will abscond to gain an advantage of serving less time. 

    The United States counters that applying the fugitive tolling doctrine would promote uniformity for releasees. The United States contends that by tolling a supervised release sentence when the releasee is not being supervised, uniformity increases as everyone will serve the full length of their sentence supervised. The United States asserts that counting the time spent in abscondment towards supervised release sentences creates a windfall towards fugitives while not providing any benefit to those who serve their full term, raising fairness concerns for those that are dedicated to following the rules of their supervised release. The United States argues that those who intentionally evade supervision should not be rewarded by spending less time supervised than those who faithfully comply. Additionally, the United States highlights that releasees do not become absconders for minor violations, such as not attending one appointment with their supervisor. The United States explains that a releasee’s conduct only triggers abscondment if it effectively makes their probation officer’s job impossible, which is a high bar that avoids unintentional abscondment. The United States asserts that knowledge and intent to evade supervision are requirements for abscondment, limiting the potential for inequitable application of the fugitive tolling doctrine and ensuring the doctrine is applied consistently, not arbitrarily. 

    PUBLIC SAFETY AND REHABILITATION

    In support of Rico, NAFD asserts that uniform and fair sentencing reduces the odds of recidivism. NAFD argues that the fugitive tolling doctrine stops and starts the term of supervision without adequate notice, making supervised release sentences less predictable and consistent. NAFD emphasizes empirical research that suggests that releasees are more likely to follow the rules of their supervision if they see those rules as clear guidelines, fair, and consistently applied. Taken together, NAFD contends that not applying the fugitive tolling doctrine promotes rehabilitation and public safety by preserving clarity and fairness, improving compliance, and reducing recidivism. NACDL further argues that the fugitive tolling doctrine undermines the rehabilitative aims of supervised release. According to NACDL, implementing the fugitive tolling doctrine shifts the purpose of supervised release from promoting reintegration to acting as a “backward-looking punishment.” 

    The United States counters that extending the tolling doctrine will discourage recidivism and promote public safety. The United States stresses that failing to apply the tolling doctrine rewards absconders, creating incentives for individuals to evade supervision, which risks additional crime.  The United States points out that the purpose of abscondment is often to commit additional crime, so promoting abscondment would undermine public safety. The United States also notes that promoting supervision also promotes the rehabilitation of releasees, as supervised release programs include training programs and drug testing. The United States explains that fulfilling the complete term of supervised release helps individuals, as these mandatory programs are designed to reduce the likelihood of relapse and provide a stable path towards lawful reintegration. The United States cites a Senate Report which supports that the regular monitoring and testing provided by probation officers is often needed for successful rehabilitation and to avoid additional criminal activity, as probation officers act as the “guiding hand” that holds releasees accountable. 

    Conclusion

    Authors

    Written by:    Sam Schoenberg and Matthew Charles

    Edited by:      Sarah Chang

    Additional Resources