Hunter v. United States

    Issues

    Are claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or claims that a sentence is above the statutory maximum the only two permissible exceptions to a general appeal waiver? Does an appeal waiver still apply if the sentencing judge tells the defendant that they can appeal their sentence and the government does not object?

    Oral argument:
    March 03, 2026
    Court below:
    United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

    In this case, the Court will determine whether petitioner Hunter, a criminal defendant, may appeal his sentence, despite agreeing to waive his right to appeal when he entered a plea agreement with the United States government. The lower court determined that Hunter’s waiver prevented his appeal, even though he argues his sentence is unconstitutional. Hunter asserts that because plea agreements are like contracts, the Court should recognize that doctrines which make a contract invalid can also make a plea agreement’s appeal waiver invalid. Additionally, Hunter separately claims that the District Court’s statement during sentencing, which informed him that he retained the right to appeal, should invalidate his appeal waiver because the government did not object. The government argues that applying contract defenses to appeal waivers is not supported by the law, and that none of Hunter’s stated contract doctrines apply in this case. The government also maintains that there is no legal basis for the District Court’s statement to modify the appeal waiver, and that the District Court’s statement pertained to other appealable claims that Hunter did not raise. The outcome of this case will have significant implications for the rights of criminal defendants, their leverage during plea negotiations, and the availability of appeals.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    (1) Whether the only permissible exceptions to a general appeal waiver are for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or that the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum; and (2) whether an appeal waiver applies when the sentencing judge advises the defendant that he has a right to appeal and the government does not object.

    Facts

    The Petitioner, Munson P. Hunter, III, was convicted of wire fraud after he entered a guilty plea in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas (the “District Court”). When Hunter entered the plea agreement with the Respondent, the United States of America (“the government”), he agreed to waive his right to appeal. After Hunter entered the agreement, he met with a probation officer. Hunter informed the probation officer that he was diagnosed with certain mental health conditions as a child. After the meeting, the probation officer drafted a presentence investigation report for the District Court, in which he recommended a requirement that Hunter take any mental health medications prescribed to him if he was on supervised release.

    Hunter was sentenced to over four years in prison and three years of supervision after his prison sentence. When the District Court sentenced Hunter, it added a condition to his supervised release. The condition required that he take mental health medications prescribed to him, but the District Court did not make a factual finding stating why the condition was necessary. The District Court informed Hunter that if he disputed taking any medications prescribed, he could discuss it with his probation officer, and if Hunter could not come to a solution with his probation officer, Hunter could raise his dispute with the District Court. Before Hunter’s sentencing hearing concluded, the District Court stated on the record that Hunter retained the right to appeal the sentence. The District Court then asked the government if it had anything else to add, and the government stated that it did not.

    Hunter appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Hunter argued that the “mandatory-medication condition” violated his Constitutional right to due process and liberty from unwanted medications. However, the Fifth Circuit found that Hunter’s appeal waiver prevented the Fifth Circuit from reviewing the District Court’s sentence. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit rejected Hunter’s appeal of the District Court’s decision to require him to take prescription medications. The Fifth Circuit also rejected Hunter’s argument that the District Court’s oral statement that Hunter retained the right to appeal changed the appeal waiver’s effect. Finally, the Fifth Circuit dismissed Hunter’s argument that he could retain the right to appeal, despite the waiver, if the District Court imposed an unconstitutional sentence.

    Hunter petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for review of the Fifth Circuit’s decision by filing a petition for a writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court granted the petition on October 10, 2025.

    Analysis

    GROUNDS THAT CAN INVALIDATE AN APPEAL WAIVER 

    Hunter argues that the Fifth Circuit wrongly decided that there are only two types of claims that cannot be barred by a plea agreement’s appeal waiver. Under the Fifth Circuit’s precedent, only appeals involving a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel or a claim that a sentence beyond the maximum statutory sentence was imposed are not barred by a general appeal waiver. Hunter contends that plea agreements are like contracts, so the defenses for challenging contracts should apply to challenging plea agreements. Hunter maintains that like contract provisions, appeal waivers can be invalidated for defects in the creation of the agreement or where the agreement results in unreasonable consequences. Hunter contends that it is illogical for the Fifth Circuit to permit appeals for its two exceptions but not for reasons that would make a contract invalid.

    Hunter argues that there are at least four contract doctrines that would allow appeals of plea agreements despite the defendant agreeing to an appeal waiver. First, Hunter contendsthat appeal waivers can be invalid if the plea agreement violates public policy. Hunter argues that an appeal waiver violates public policy if the government’s interests in preventing the appeal are outweighed by the waiver’s negative consequences to society and the criminal defendant. Second, Hunter contends that appeal waivers can also be set aside if the plea agreement is unconscionable. Plea agreements can be unconscionable if they oppress the defendant, contain egregiously unfair terms, or have hidden terms that surprise the defendant. Hunter posits that appeal waivers can also be set aside if the judge’s sentencing decision is unconscionable because it contains a condition or sentence that neither of the parties could have foreseen. Third, Hunter argues that a breach in the parties’ duty of good faith can make a plea agreement appealable despite a waiver. Hunter notes that this issue can arise because the parties leave sentencing up to the judge’s discretion in plea agreements. If the judge’s sentencing decision is unforeseeable and goes against the parties’ reasonable expectations, Hunter argues that the defendant should be able to appeal, an appeal waiver notwithstanding. Hunter notes that this doctrine should apply in his case, where the District Court’s decision requiring him to take prescription medication was not a foreseeable result of his guilty plea to a financial crime. Finally, Hunter argues that plea agreements can be appealable if events after the agreement entirely frustrate the parties’ purposes for entering into the agreement. Hunter asserts that frustration of purpose can occur when parties enter a plea agreement expecting the judge to sentence the defendant to a lawful sentence. If the judge sentences the defendant to an unlawful sentence, the defendant can be relieved of their duty to abide by their appeal waiver.

    The government argues that Hunter’s appeal is barred because he knowingly and voluntarily entered into a plea agreement with the government, which included an appeal waiver. Because plea agreements are like contracts, the government notes that each party obtained a benefit in exchange for something else from the other party. The government states that it often will agree to drop charges against criminal defendants or seek a lesser sentence, benefiting the defendant, in exchange for the defendant agreeing to waive the right to appeal.

    The government counters that Hunter does not provide a strong legal foundation for importing contract doctrines into federal law involving plea agreements. The government also notes that nothing in the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants the right to appeal. Accordingly, the government argues that Hunter’s contract defenses do not apply to appeal waivers. First, the government disputes Hunter’s public policy argument by noting that Congress determines public policy when it legislates. The government asserts that Congress has not limited appeal waivers in plea agreements by statute. Second, the government opposes Hunter’s unconscionability argument because the plea agreement was neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable. Specifically, because Hunter’s plea agreement was entered into knowingly and voluntarily, the government contends that it cannot be procedurally unconscionable. The government also argues that the plea agreement was not substantively unconscionable because it was not completely one-sided. While Hunter focuses on the District Court’s sentence, the government notes that he could foresee the risks and benefits of an appeal waiver when he entered the agreement. Third, the government posits that Hunter’s implied duty of good faith argument fails because that doctrine applies between parties, not a third party like the District Court. Finally, the government argues that the contract doctrine involving a supervening force frustrating parties’ purposes does not apply to the plea agreement. The government asserts that it is a foreseeable risk that a judge could impose a sentence that a defendant believes is unlawful. Plea agreements do not rely upon a foundational understanding between the parties that a defendant will believe that a judge’s sentence will be lawful, the government contends. Instead, the government states that the primary reason for bargaining for an appeal waiver is that Hunter knew he might have a right to claim that his sentence was unlawful on appeal but is forfeiting that right.

    EFFECT OF A JUDGE’S STATEMENT ON APPEAL RIGHTS DURING SENTENCING

    Hunter contends that at least three reasons allow him to appeal after the District Court informed him of his right to appeal, despite his appeal waiver. First, Hunter argues that the government waived its right to invoke the appeal waiver when the prosecutor stated at the sentencing that he did not want to add anything else after the District Court informed Hunter he could appeal. Second, Hunter asserts that the government acquiesced to the District Court’s statement. Hunter claims that the government accepted the District Court’s assertion of Hunter’s right to appeal and thus forfeited any right to object to it. Finally, Hunter asserts that the District Court’s statement, combined with the government’s silence, modified the terms of the plea agreement. Hunter contends that the government’s silence was an acceptance of the District Court’s statement.

    The government contends that the District Court’s statement was a matter of routine required by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and had no effect on the plea agreement’s appeal waiver. The government explains that Hunter retained his right to appeal despite the waiver, but only for a claim that his plea was not voluntary or knowing, that his counsel was ineffective, or that his sentence was beyond the maximum statutory limit. Waivers must be intentional, the government argues, so the government did not waive its right to enforce the appeal waiver because it never intentionally abandoned that right. The government opposes Hunter’s acquiescence claim because the time to invoke the appeal waiver was not at the sentencing hearing, but instead when Hunter filed an appeal. The right time to object was after Hunter filed his notice of appeal, which the government argues it did. Countering Hunter’s modification argument, the government states that modifications to agreements must be agreed upon by both parties. Even if the District Court’s statement was an offer to modify the agreement, the government notes that it did not expressly agree to that modification.

    Discussion

    BALANCING DEFENDANTS’ RIGHTS WITH PLEA BARGAINING POWER 

    The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (“NACDL”) argues that it is fundamentally unjust to prevent a criminal defendant from appealing an unconstitutional sentence. There is a public interest, NACDL claims, in protecting the rights of criminal defendants by providing them with a way to challenge unconstitutional sentences. NACDL argues that to strictly enforce appeal waivers with very limited exceptions would accept too high a risk of subjecting criminal defendants to unconstitutional sentences without recourse to challenging those sentences. As the Cato Institute and five other legal adovacy organizations (“Cato Institute”) put it, denying the opportunity to appeal an unconstitutional sentence negatively affects the public perception of the fairness and legitimacy of the criminal justice system. The Cato Institute points out that the public benefits from direct appeals because the state saves incarceration costs for every successful direct appeal of an unlawful sentence.

    In response, the government argues that the enforcement of appeal waivers provides a significant benefit to criminal defendants because it ensures that defendants maintain bargaining power in plea negotiations with prosecutors. The government also suggests that appeal waivers can serve as a strong incentive for the government to enter into plea agreements. The government points to evidence suggesting that plea agreements containing appeal waivers often lead to more lenient and predictable sentencing. Moreover, in its view, if the government had the responsibility to object to an erroneous judicial statement regarding the right to appeal, it would not be able to rely on its ability to enforce the appeal waiver during plea negotiations. Therefore, the government concludes that to allow a criminal defendant to raise a larger number of challenges to sentences notwithstanding an appeal waiver would reduce the value of an appeal waiver to prosecutors and consequently harm defendants in plea negotiations. Finally, according to the government, cases in which defendants could not appeal unfair sentences would be extremely rare because judges are obligated to apply the Constitution. Furthermore, the government indicates that none of the examples of “egregious” errors cited by the petitioner have occurred and that any such errors could be resolved through other avenues.

    EFFECT ON JUDICIAL RESOURCES AND FINALITY

    The National Association of Federal Defenders (“NAFD”) maintains that, contrary to the position of the government, more flexible exceptions to appeal waivers would not flood the courts with appeals. In support, NAFD points to the fact that other circuit courts have rarely declined to enforce valid appeal waivers despite having broader exceptions than the Fifth Circuit rule challenged in this case. Further, NAFD presents research showing that only four cases over the last ten years—or half of one percent of all federal criminal appeals in a typical year—in those circuits were successful attempts to claim exceptions to appeal waivers. NAFD contends that strictly enforcing appeal waivers might incentivize defendants to go to trial instead of accepting guilty pleas. This, in turn, would impose additional costs and burdens of going to trial on the litigants and the judiciary. Moreover, NAFD argues that direct appeals, rather than later subsequent challenges to sentences, better promote judicial economy, saving time and resources. Finally, in NAFD’s view, strictly enforcing appeal waivers does not support finality because the waiver does not apply to the government.

    The government, in turn, contends that the additional exceptions to the enforcement of appeal waivers that Hunter requests would lack a principled limit and require frequent litigation of the merits of cases to determine whether the waiver should apply. Many defendants, the government suggests, hold sincere beliefs that their sentences are unconstitutional, or might claim that they did not reasonably expect the sentence they received. Therefore, according to the government, more criminal defendants would pursue an appeal despite the waiver if it were subject to more exceptions. This would, the government maintains, expend significant litigation resources and undermine the efficiency of the judicial system because the government would have to expend resources to litigate its ability to enforce the appeal waiver. On the other hand, the government contends, appeal waivers are important because they promote the interest that society shares in the finality of criminal cases and they conserve litigation resources. In fact, the government points out, the value of finality often outweighs the need to correct every mistake in other contexts, for instance when a defendant fails to file a timely notice of appeal or tries to bring a collateral attack after the statute of limitations period has run.

    Conclusion

    Authors

    Written by:    Leonardo Costa Lins Villa-Forte and Keaton J. Klaus

    Edited by:      Andrew Hallowell

    Additional Resources