United States v. Ali Danial Hemani

    Issues

    Does the Second Amendment prohibit a ban on the possession of firearms by all “unlawful users” of any drug?

    Oral argument:
    March 02, 2026
    Court below:
    United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

    This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether a federal statute that prohibits any “unlawful user” of drugs from possessing firearms, even when not presently intoxicated, provides sufficient notice of the conduct it prohibits and comports with the Second Amendment. The United States argues that the statute comes from a long history of regulations which prohibit dangerous persons from possessing firearms. Ali Danial Hemani counters that the categorical ban goes much further than any historical law. This case presents public safety, gun rights, and government efficiency issues. 

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), the federal statute that prohibits the possession of firearms by a person who “is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance,” violates the Second Amendment as applied to respondent.

    Facts

    In 1968, Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, which, among other provisions, restricted certain categories of persons from possessing firearms.  A 1986 amendment added to those categories anyone who is “an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance,” now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3).

    The Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) obtained a warrant to search Respondent Ali Danial Hemani’s family home, and found a pistol, marijuana, and cocaine. Hemani admitted to using marijuana every other day and stated that the cocaine found in his mother’s room was his. Hemani was subsequently indicted by a federal grand jury on February 8, 2023, for possessing a firearm while being an unlawful user of a controlled substance.  The government alleged that Hemani possessed a handgun while unlawfully using marijuana and cocaine. However, the government did not assert that Hemani was intoxicated at the time he was found in possession of a firearm. Hemani asked the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 922(g)(3) violates his Second Amendment right to bear arms. Chiefly, Hemani contended that § 922(g)(3) was unconstitutional because it was inconsistent with New York State Pistol & Rifle Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, which ruled that gun regulations must be consistent with “the Nation’s historical tradition of firearms regulations” and have a “sufficient historical analogue” to a law at the time of the adoption of the Second Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment. On July 31, 2023, a magistrate judge agreed that § 922(g)(3) was unconstitutional and recommended that the indictment be dismissed.

    While the district court was deciding whether to accept the magistrate judge’s recommendation, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Daniels, held that § 922(g)(3) was unconstitutional as applied to an admitted regular user of marijuana.  Relying on Daniels, Hemani filed an amended motion to dismiss, stating that § 922(g)(3), as applied to him, violated the Second Amendment. The government agreed that, under Daniels, Hemani’s indictment should be dismissed, while reserving the right to appeal on the grounds that Daniels was wrongly decided. Accordingly, the district court dismissed Hemani’s indictment on February 1, 2024. Thereafter, the Supreme Court of the United States, in United States v. Rahimi, rejected a Second Amendment challenge against 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which bars individuals subject to qualifying domestic-violence protective orders from possessing firearms.  Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court vacated the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Daniels and remanded the case to the lower court. The government appealed the dismissal of Hemani’s indictment to the Fifth Circuit; while that appeal was pending, the Fifth Circuit, reaffirming its earlier decision in Daniels and deciding United States v. Connelly, held that § 922(g)(3) was unconstitutional when applied to regular users of marijuana who were not proven to be intoxicated at the time of their arrests.  Conceding that the Connelly and Daniels precedents controlled in the Fifth Circuit, the government agreed that Hemani’s indictment should be dismissed, while reserving the right to appeal on the ground that those decisions are inconsistent with Bruen and Rahimi.

    The government filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court on June 2, 2025.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari on October 20, 2025. 

    Analysis

    STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND VAGUENESS 

    The United States asserts that the “unlawful user” portion of § 922(g)(3) applies to anyone “who habitually takes drugs, without regard to how intoxicated [they] get.” The United States argues that using a “habitual” standard has long been a tool of statutory construction in other criminal statutes; therefore, the United States claims, the same understanding should apply here. The United States maintains that although standards for evaluating habitual use have changed, the underlying definition has always been the same. Relying on this definition, the United States maintains that the statute is not void for vagueness and does not violate the Due Process Clause. Preliminarily, the United States claims that Hemani should not be permitted to make a vagueness argument because he did not address it in his earlier briefs before the Court. The United States also argues that lower courts’ disagreement about how the habitual user test applies “in particular cases” falls below the “pervasive disagreement about the nature of the inquiry” standard that the Supreme Court requires to hold a law as vague. Finally, the United States asserts that even though some edge cases may pose hard questions under § 922(g)(3), this is not one, as Hemani admitted to consuming marijuana “about every day,” and, therefore, Hemani cannot bring a vagueness challenge since his conduct was clearly covered by the law.

    Hemani counters that the government’s attempt to rely on a “habitual” standard is misguided given that the word never appears in the statute.  Hemani claims that allowing the Executive Branch to rewrite the statute would violate the separation of powers. Further, Hemani argues that the government’s definition is superfluous when read with § 922(g)(3)’s companion prohibition, 21 U.S.C § 802(1), which defines a person who is “addicted to” a controlled substance, because anyone who is addicted to something also necessarily uses it habitually. Therefore, Hemani asserts that whether someone constitutes an “unlawful user” is impermissibly vague because it does not give “fair notice of the conduct it punishes” to people who could potentially be charged with violating its terms. Hemani contends that § 922(g)(3) is completely silent on how often one must consume drugs, or how much one must consume, to be considered an “unlawful user.” Various courts of appeal across the country attempting to define what makes someone an unlawful user have come to grossly different outcomes, Hemani argues, exacerbating the problem. Hemani claims that the United States government cannot even agree on what “unlawful user” means, broadening and narrowing its internal guidance of what constitutes a violation of § 922(g)(3) repeatedly.

    HISTORICAL ANALOGUES

    The United States contends that founding-era laws restraining “habitual drunkards” from carrying firearms are sufficiently analogous to § 922(g)(3) to render it constitutional.  The United States claims that to be classified as a drunkard under these laws, a user only needed to have the “habit” of alcohol use, the same standard courts have used to define a “user” under § 922(g)(3). Therefore, the United States asserts that habitual drunkard laws are a useful analog to § 922(g)(3) because they both deal with disarming the same category of dangerous persons: habitually intoxicated individuals.

    The United States asserts that two historical methods of regulating habitual drunkards show that § 922(g)(3) is in line with America’s history of firearm regulations. First, the United States notes that historic vagrancy laws and civil commitment laws permitting the holding of habitual drunkards in jails and asylums, which necessarily resulted in disarming them, were commonplace at the founding. Second, the United States cites surety laws which required habitual drunkards to post bonds due to their future dangerousness. The United States argues that these laws show a tradition of legislation that addresses “the heightened risks posed by individuals who habitually use intoxicating substances.” The United States claims that this tradition particularly supports § 922(g)(3) because drug users pose a greater danger than habitual drunkards. The United States argues that these laws also work in similar ways to § 922(g)(3)—by prophylactically disarming people who may become dangerous once under the influence. If anything, the United States contends, § 922(g)(3) is more permissive than historic habitual drunkard laws because it does not fully confine drug users, it simply takes away their access to firearms.

    The United States also claims that a post-ratification trend of gun restrictions across the country suggests that § 922(g)(3) is constitutional. The United States argues that although states were not aware of the dangers of drugs at the founding, as states started to appreciate their risks, they began to impose gun restrictions tied to drug use. The United States notes that twenty-six different states and the District of Columbia prohibit habitual drug users from possessing firearms. Thus, the United States contends that § 922(g)(3) is just one instance of a long history of identical gun laws, suggesting it comports with the Second Amendment.

    Hemani contends that habitual drunkards at the founding are fundamentally different than the mere users of recreational drugs that § 922(g)(3) covers. Hemani argues that the laws the government relies upon targeted people who abused intoxicants, not people who simply used them, whereas § 922(g)(3) applies to the latter group. If the government’s logic were taken seriously, Hemani explains, then “anyone who regularly has a beer with dinner… could be stripped of the right to keep a firearm.” Therefore, Hemani claims that these historical laws could support a prohibition on drug addicts, but not all regular users.

    Even if the analogy to habitual drunkards is sound, Hemani posits that the two categories of laws the government relies on are inapposite here. Hemani argues that the commitment laws which incidentally stripped habitual drunkards of their access to firearms are not sufficiently similar regulations to justify § 922(g)(3). Specifically, Hemani notes that vagrancy laws were enacted to safeguard the economy, not as gun regulations. Hemani also explains that civil commitment laws entailed individualized hearings, unlike the categorical prohibition in § 922(g)(3). Hemani contends that surety laws are an equally poor analogy because requiring consumers of intoxicants to post bond is a far cry from stripping them of their Second Amendment rights.

    Hemani also counters that drugs (particularly opium) were well understood at the founding, and the lack of regulations similar to § 922(g)(3) until the nineteenth century suggests it is unconstitutional. Hemani argues that the earliest laws restricting access to guns based on drug use only applied to addicts, not all users. Additionally, Hemani maintains that in the twenty-seven jurisdictions the government relies on, only one uses the “habitual user” language of § 922(g)(3)—the others employ a higher showing of drug dependence before individuals may be disarmed.

    Discussion

    PUBLIC SAFETY

    In support of the United States, Illinois, eighteen other states, and the District of Columbia (collectively “Illinois”) emphasize that § 922(g)(3) protects against dangers that armed habitual drug users pose to public safety. Illinois notes that habitual drug users are dangerous, in part, due to the immediate effects of intoxication; for example, marijuana “can cause impaired thinking and movement, and, in large amounts, can cause anxiety and hallucinations,” and cocaine can cause “bizarre, erratic, and violent” behavior. Illinois also argues that habitual drug users can be dangerous even when not intoxicated due to the psychological damage that long-term drug use can cause. Also supporting the United States, Smart Approaches to Marijuana and twenty other interest groups cite research indicating that regular marijuana users were five times more likely to develop schizophrenia than non-users, and that marijuana users are also more likely to develop psychosis. Illinois further notes that regular drug users can be dangerous even when not intoxicated or suffering mental illness, since “a habitual user may be driven to violence or other criminal measures to obtain the substances on which he or she has become dependent.”

    In support of Hemani, the National Organization for Reform of Marijuana Laws (“NORML”) argues that marijuana is not dangerous enough to justify disarming its users. NORML contends that compared to other illegal drugs, marijuana is much less likely to cause acute toxicity or lead to physical dependence. NORML also cites studies indicating that alcohol—not marijuana—is associated with increased aggression and violence. Also supporting Hemani, the Cato Institute and the Reason Foundation cite research showing that the risk of psychosis and cognitive impairment associated with marijuana is lower than that associated with alcohol and tobacco. And the Liberty Justice Center, also supporting Hemani, references studies indicating that states where marijuana was legalized saw “essentially” no increase in crime rates when compared to states where marijuana remained illegal. Summarizing the evidence “since California legalized medical use in 1996,” the Liberty Justice Center concludes that there are neither statistical nor anecdotal bases for believing that “cannabis use alone” has made Americans “significantly more violent or dangerous.”

    ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATABILITY 

    In support of the United States, the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence and the Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence (“Brady and Giffords”) argue that preventing gun possession by illegal drug users as a category is crucial for ensuring the law can be enforced. Specifically, Brady and Giffords note that individual-by-individual determinations of drug users’ dangerousness would be impractical to implement in the national gun background check system, resulting in many dangerous persons being approved for a gun purchase by default.  Brady and Giffords note that this is particularly problematic because since 1993, the national gun background check system has prevented over 5.1 million people who are “legally prohibited from possessing a gun” from purchasing firearms or obtaining a permit to purchase firearms. Brady and Giffords further contend that requiring individualized dangerousness hearings would overwhelm the federal firearm background-check system, potentially leading to fatal mistakes.

    In support of Hemani, the Drug Policy Alliance raises concerns that § 922(g)(3) could ensnare too many Americans and be enforced in a discriminatory manner. The Drug Policy Alliance notes that the majority of adult Americans have used an illicit drug, such as marijuana, in their lifetime and thus could be barred from gun possession.  According to the Drug Policy Alliance, one reason the vast reach of the statute is problematic is that it invites arbitrary and disparate enforcement of the law; in particular, they point to the likelihood of racial disparities in the enforcement of the statute, given already-existing racially disparate rates of drug arrests.  The Drug Policy Alliance further underscores the disconnect between federal firearms law and state marijuana legalization regimes, arguing that individuals who lawfully use marijuana under state law may nevertheless be prohibited from possessing a firearm under federal law, thereby undermining public confidence in the law’s fairness.

    Conclusion

    Authors

    Written by:    Garrett Taylor and Daniel Lempert

    Edited by:      Abigail Breneisen

    Additional Resources