firearms

Abbott v. United States; Gould v. United States

Issues

Which, if any, federal criminal statute with a mandatory minimum sentence of five years or more can trigger the "except" clause in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)?

 

In two separate and unrelated cases, Kevin Abbott and Carlos Rashad Gould were convicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) by possessing weapons in the furtherance of a violent or drug trafficking crime. Abbott and Gould were also sentenced for their underlying crimes, both of which required a minimum sentence of greater than five years. Abbott's and Gould's respective sentencing judges both included an additional five-year sentence for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), on the grounds that this was a mandatory minimum sentence. Abbott and Gould appealed, arguing that they qualified for an exception to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) because the minimum sentences for their underlying offenses were greater than five years. The appeals courts affirmed the lower courts' decisions. Certiorari was granted to answer which federal criminal statutes that carry a minimum sentence greater than five years, if any, trigger the "except" clause in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Abbott

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) provides, in part, that a person convicted of a drug trafficking crime or crime of violence shall receive an additional sentence of not less than five years whenever he “uses or carries a firearm, or * * * in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm” unless “a greater minimum sentence is * * * provided * * * by any other provision of law.” The questions presented are:

1. Does the term “any other provision of law” include the underlying drug trafficking offense or crime of violence?

2. If not, does it include another offense for possessing the same firearm in the same transaction?

Gould

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) requires a 5-year minimum sentence for possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime – “[e]xcept to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is otherwise provided by . . . any other provision of law.”

3. Did the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit correctly hold, despite this “except” clause, that a defendant is subject to the 5-year minimum sentence for the firearm possession even though another provision of law requires a greater minimum sentence for another count of conviction?

Abbott

In 2004, Petitioner, Kevin Abbott, and Michael Grant were selling drugs out of a house in Philadelphia. See United States v. Abbott, 574 F. 3d 203, 204–05 (3d Cir.

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Additional Resources

· Findlaw.com: No Discretion for Judges with Mandatory Sentences (April 1, 2010)

· United States Sentencing Commission: 1991 Sentencing Commission Report

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Abramski v. United States

Issues

Does the Gun Control Act of 1968 prohibit a lawful gun-purchaser from stating that they are the actual buyer when they are purchasing the gun for another person?

In the fall of 2009, Bruce Abramski purchased a handgun for his uncle and indicated on the required form that he was the “actual buyer” of the gun. Before Abramski made the purchase, the uncle sent Abramski a check to cover the cost of the gun. After buying the gun, Abramski transferred ownership of the firearm to his uncle at a local gun store in a different state. Both Abramski and his uncle are lawful gun owners. After the transfer, the government criminally prosecuted Abramski for making a false statement claiming he was the “actual buyer” of the gun. Abramski argued on appeal that the relevant provisions of the Gun Control Act of 1968 do not apply when the purchaser intends to resell the gun to another lawful purchaser. That argument was rejected by the Fourth Circuit, which held that the identity of the purchaser is always a fact material to the sale and that the gun dealer was required to record the identity of the intended owner. The United States argues for affirmation that the Gun Control Act prohibits Abramski from lying about the identity of the actual purchaser, which makes the sale illegal and undermines the purpose of the law. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will settle a circuit split regarding the lawfulness of this type of intermediary gun purchase. This decision will also establish whether an individual may ever buy a gun on behalf of another buyer.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

When a person buys a gun intending to later sell it to someone else, the government often prosecutes the initial buyer under 18 U.S.C. § 922 (a)(6) for making a false statement about the identity of the buyer that is "material to the lawfulness of the sale." These prosecutions rely on the court-created "straw purchaser" doctrine, a legal fiction that treats the ultimate recipient of a firearm as the "actual buyer," and the immediate purchaser as a mere "straw man."

The lower courts uniformly agree that a buyer's intent to resell a gun to someone who cannot lawfully buy it is a fact "material to the lawfulness of the sale." But the Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have split with the Fifth and Ninth Circuits about whether the same is true when the ultimate recipient can lawfully buy a gun. The questions presented are:

  1. Is a gun buyer's intent to sell a firearm to another lawful buyer in the future a fact "material to the lawfulness of the sale" of the firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922 (a)(6)?
  2. Is a gun buyer's intent to sell a firearm to another lawful buyer in the future a piece of information "required ... to be kept" by a federally licensed firearm dealer under § 924 (a)(I)(A)?

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Facts

In the fall of 2009, Abramski offered to buy a firearm for his uncle, Angel Alvarez, because as a former police officer, Abramski could receive a discount at a local Virginia gun store. See U.S. v. Abramski, 706 3d 307, 310 (4th Cir.

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Alleyne v. United States

A jury found Allen Alleyne guilty of robbery under a federal statue, but the jury did not find him guilty of brandishing a weapon during the robbery. A federal criminal statute provides that a judge can raise the mandatory minimum sentence for robbery with a finding that it was more likely than not that the defendant brandished a firearm. Thus, a judge’s finding can raise the mandatory minimum prison sentence even when a jury was unable to come to that same conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court allowed such findings from judges in Harris v. United States. Now, the court will reconsider that position or have the opportunity to further clarify how much sentencing discretion can be given to judges under federal statutes.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether this Court’s decision in Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002), should be overruled.

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Issue(s)

Should the Supreme Court overrule Harris v. United States and require that a jury find facts beyond a reasonable doubt in order to enhance a sentence beyond the ordinarily prescribed statutory maximum?

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Bailey v. United States

Issues

May police officers, prior to executing a search warrant, follow and detain a person seen leaving the premises after that person leaves the immediate area?

 

Chunon L. Bailey was detained approximately a mile from his residence after two police officers observed him leave his home prior to the execution of a search warrant. The officers brought Bailey back to his home and arrested him after the search turned up drugs and a gun. Bailey seeks to vacate his conviction, arguing that the detention violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure. In this case, the Court must resolve a circuit split surrounding the application of Michigan v. Summers, which held that police may detain an occupant outside of the premises to be searched so long as the detention is reasonable. Bailey argues that Summers should not be extended to situations where the occupant has left the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched, as this expansion would further none of the justifications described by the Court in that case. In response, the United States argues that the reasoning underlying Summers justifies this detention and that any potential Fourth Amendment issues can be resolved by a reasonableness test. If the Supreme Court sides with the United States and affirms the decision below, the scope of police power to detain occupants prior to the execution of a search warrant will be significantly expanded. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, pursuant to Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), police officers may detain an individual incident to the execution of a search warrant when the individual has left the immediate vicinity of the premises before the warrant is executed.

On July 28, 2005, two officers of the Suffolk County Police Department executed a search warrant for a basement apartment at 103 Lake Drive in Wyandanch, New York. United States v. Bailey, 652 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir.

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New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v. City of New York, New York

Issues

Does New York City’s ban on transporting a licensed handgun to a location outside of the City violate the Second Amendment, the Commerce Clause, or the right to travel?

This case asks the U.S. Supreme Court to decide whether New York City’s (the “City”) restrictions on the transportation of handguns is unconstitutional pursuant to the Second Amendment, the Commerce Clause, or the fundamental right to travel. Under a former rule, the City issued premises licenses to qualified individuals. Such licenses permitted a licensee to possess a handgun at the licensee’s City residence but placed restrictions upon the transportation of the handgun to locations outside of the City. Romolo Colantone, Efrain Alvarez, and Tony Irizarry (collectively, “Petitioners”) were issued premises licenses and wanted to use their handguns at shooting ranges and competitions located outside of the City, and Colantone wanted to transport his handgun to and from his second home in upstate New York. Petitioners, joined by the New York State Rifle and Pistol Association, argue that the City’s transportation restrictions violate the Second Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and the fundamental right to travel. The City, joined by the New York City Police Department-License Division, counters that its former rule is a constitutional exercise of its regulatory power and protects public safety. The City recently amended the rule at issue, so the City also argues that this case is moot. In addition to impacting City residents who possess handguns under a premises license, the Court’s decision will have implications for public safety concerns of vulnerable populations and populations living within major urban areas and is likely to inform national debate on gun control.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether New York City’s ban on transporting a licensed, locked and unloaded handgun to a home or shooting range outside city limits is consistent with the Second Amendment, the commerce clause and the constitutional right to travel.

New York State prohibits the unlicensed possession of handguns. New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. City of New York at 52. In New York City (the “City”), licensing officers may issue a handgun license to a City resident pursuant to 38 R.C.N.Y. § 5-23 (the “Rule”). Id.

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Shular v. United States

Issues

Does the categorical approach used in determining whether an offense qualifies as a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act apply to the determination of what constitutes a “serious drug offense” under the Act?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the categorical approach under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) should apply to “serious drug offense” determinations. Petitioner Eddie Lee Shular argues that under the ACCA, a “serious drug offense” must be considered under the same offense-matching categorical approach that is applied to a “violent felony” under the Act. Shular further argues that the “serious drug offense” provision of the statute requires a mens rea element in the prior state offense in order to qualify under the ACCA. Respondent United States counters that the categorical approach is not applicable to the “serious drug offense” provision of the ACCA, and that a mens rea element is not a requirement under the Act. The outcome of this case will affect uniformity in the criminal justice system, constitutional avoidance, and the ability of courts to limit detrimental effects and disparate impacts.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the determination of a “serious drug offense” under the Armed Career Criminal Act requires the same categorical approach used in the determination of a “violent felony” under the act.

Petitioner Eddie Shular pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine and being a felon in possession of a fire arm. U.S. v. Shular at 876. Shular was sentenced to 180-months under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). Id.

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United States v. Rahimi

Issues

Does 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which prohibits people under domestic-violence restraining orders from possessing firearms, violate the Second Amendment?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8), which bans firearm possession for someone under a civil protective order due to domestic violence, violates the Second Amendment on its face. Petitioner United States argues that the ban does not violate the Second Amendment because the history and tradition of firearm regulations in the United States allow Congress to disarm individuals who are not law-abiding, responsible citizens, such as those subject to civil protective orders. In opposition, Respondent Zackey Rahimi contends that § 922(g)(8) violates the Second Amendment on its face because the Second Amendment protects the firearm rights of all United States citizens and § 922(g)(8) bears no resemblance to any firearm regulations in American history. The outcome of this case will affect the constitutionality of laws that address domestic violence, as well as how future gun regulations will be analyzed.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which prohibits the possession of firearms by persons subject to domestic-violence restraining orders, violates the Second Amendment on its face.

Between December 2020 and January 2021, Respondent Zackey Rahimi was involved in five shootings. United States v. Rahimi at 2. On December 1, Rahimi sold drugs to a buyer and, when the buyer talked badly about him, fired multiple shots into the buyer’s residence with an AR-15 rifle.

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Watson v. United States

Issues

Federal law imposes a mandatory five year sentence for the "use" of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, but the meaning of "use" is unclear: does a defendant "use" a firearm when he furnishes drugs to an undercover government agent in exchange for an unloaded firearm?

 

Following a transaction in which he exchanged illegally-obtained prescription drugs for a firearm, Petitioner Watson was prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) for "use" of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. In addition to sentences imposed under other federal statutes, Watson received a mandatory consecutive five year sentence, imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D). Watson pled guilty but reserved the right to challenge whether the agreed-upon facts supported his conviction. The Fifth Circuit confirmed his conviction, finding that receiving a firearm constitutes "use" under the statute and under Supreme Court law set forth in Bailey v. United States, which defined "use" as "active employment" of the firearm. Watson argues that receiving a firearm is insufficient to constitute use, while the United States contends that both receiving and offering a firearm constitute "active employment" and therefore "use" under the statute. The Court's decision will set uniform standards of punishment throughout the country. A finding for Watson could reduce crowding in an already overburdened prison system, while a decision for the United States could reduce the strain on a similarly overburdened court system.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether mere receipt of an unloaded firearm as payment for drugs constitutes "use" of the firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) and this Court's decision in Bailey.

On November 12, 2004, Michael A.

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