A.J.T. v. Osseo Area Schools, Independent School District No. 279

LII note: The U.S Supreme Court has now decided A.J.T. v. Osseo Area Schools, Independent School District No. 279

Issues

Do disabled child plaintiffs who claim that a K-12 school discriminated against them based on their disability need to satisfy a higher burden of proof than other types of plaintiffs when bringing a claim of discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act?

Oral argument:
April 28, 2025
Court below:
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine which standard to apply to claims of disability discrimination against students in K-12 schools under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) and Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Currently, multiple federal circuit courts apply the “bad faith or gross misconduct” standard, which is a higher standard than the “deliberate indifference” standard. A.T. and G.T., on behalf of their minor daughter A.J.T., argue that the “deliberate indifference” standard is more consistent with the text of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act and with the meaning of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). Osseo Area Schools, Independent School District No. 279, and Osseo School Board counter that the precedential case that applied the “bad faith or gross misconduct” standard is still good law, and the standard does not rely on IDEA but instead a proper reading of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. The outcome of this case has implications for the protection of students with disabilities against discrimination while in K-12 public schools.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and Rehabilitation Act of 1973 require children with disabilities to satisfy a uniquely stringent “bad faith or gross misjudgment” standard when seeking relief for discrimination relating to their education.

Facts

A.J.T. suffers from Lennox-Gastaut Syndrome , a type of epilepsy that causes seizures and diminished intellectual capacities. A.J.T.’s condition prevents her from attending school in the morning, when her seizure activity is heightened. A.J.T. received accommodations from her public elementary school in Kentucky; the school provided A.J.T. with in-school instruction from 12:00 pm to 6:00 pm and at-home instruction in the evenings. In 2015, A.J.T. moved to Minnesota, where she attended fourth grade at Osseo School District (“Osseo”). In Minnesota, A.J.T. began school at 12:00 pm and ended at 4:15 pm. However, unlike A.J.T.’s school in Kentucky, Osseo did not provide in-home evening instruction, resulting in A.J.T. receiving less than the usual six and a half hours of instruction provided to other students. A.J.T.’s parents expressed concern that Osseo was discriminating against A.J.T. because of her disability. Osseo gave A.J.T.’s parents various explanations as to why it would not provide A.J.T. with evening instruction, including that the district does not provide both in-school and at-home support, that state law does not require such an accommodation, and that providing the service to A.J.T. would create an unwanted precedent. A.J.T. did receive special education services and had an aide with her to provide services while in school.

In 2020, A.J.T., by and through her parents, A.T. and G.T., filed a complaint against Osseo with the State of Minnesota Office of Administrative Hearings for violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). In 2021, the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) determined that Osseo had violated IDEA and subsequently ordered Osseo to provide A.J.T. with in-home instruction from 4:30 pm to 6:30 pm. In 2021, Osseo challenged the ALJ decision by filing suit in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota . Later that same year, A.J.T.’s parents filed suit against Osseo in the same court for, among other claims, discriminating against A.J.T. because of her disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act .

In 2022, the district court upheld the ALJ decision, finding that Osseo did violate IDEA, thus requiring Osseo to extend A.J.T.’s instruction to 6:00 pm. In 2023, the district court ruled that Osseo had not violated the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act because A.J.T.’s parents had not shown that Osseo acted with “bad faith or gross misconduct,” as required by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ’s ruling in the 1982 case Monahan v. State of Nebrask a . Both A.J.T. and Osseo appealed their respective adverse rulings to the Eighth Circuit. The Eighth Circuit affirmed both lower court decisions, ruling that Osseo did violate IDEA, while also ruling that Osseo did not violate the ADA and Rehabilitation Act because Osseo did not act with the “bad faith or gross misconduct” required by Monahan . In June 2024, the Eighth Circuit denied A.J.T.’s parents’ en banc petition for a rehearing on the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claim.

A.J.T.’s parents petitioned for a writ of certiorari on the ADA and Rehabilitation Act decision on September 3, 2024, which the Supreme Court granted on January 17, 2025.

Analysis

JUDICIAL PRECEDENT VERSUS STATUTORY UNIFORMITY

A.J.T. argues that the Court should reverse the Eighth Circuit’s ruling because the  Eighth Circuit erroneously relied on its previous ruling in Monahan . According to A.J.T., the “bad faith or gross misconduct” standard required by Monahan is too atextual and asymmetrical to stand as judicial precedent. A.J.T. defines the “bad faith or gross misconduct” standard as the requirement that, in order to rule that a school discriminated against a student on the basis of their disability, a court must find that the school acted, intentionally or not, with bad faith or gross misconduct when failing to accommodate the student. A.J.T. argues that Monahan strays too far from the plain language of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. A.J.T. contends that the statutory text of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of a disability when that discrimination stems from egregious misconduct or “mere thoughtlessness and indifference” (hereinafter “the ‘deliberate indifference’ standard”) by failing to provide reasonable accommodations. A.J.T. argues that the “deliberate indifference” standard carries a lesser burden of proof than Monahan ’s “bad faith or gross misconduct” standard.

A.J.T. furthers her argument by pointing out that there is no evidence that Congress required education-based discrimination claims affecting children to meet a higher standard than the standard already specified in the statutory text. A.J.T. contends that Monahan ’s level of scrutiny differs from that of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act because the court in Monahan ignored the statutory text of the Rehabilitation Act, erroneously believing that the language in the Rehabilitation Act was not germane enough to the case at hand. Further, A.J.T. claims that the Monahan court established the “bad faith or gross misconduct” standard because the court believed that education-based discrimination claims affecting children should have to meet a higher standard than the one outlined in the Rehabilitation Act. A.J.T. finalizes her claim by comparing the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act to Title VI, showing that because the protections covered by Title VI are applied by courts uniformly, regardless of the context in which the discrimination took place, ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims should be applied in a similar fashion.

Conversely, Osseo argues that the Supreme Court should affirm the Eighth Circuit’s ruling because the circuit court’s reliance on Monahan was the appropriate precedent to use. Osseo argues that A.J.T. erroneously claims that Monahan strays too far from the plain language of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. Osseo contends that the Monahan court relied heavily on the plain language in crafting its ruling. Osseo argues that the “bad faith or gross negligence” standard is the appropriate standard to use in this case because the Monahan court crafted such language to match the statutory text’s intent to prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability. Osseo maintains that Monahan should not have strayed away from the statutory language because in cases like these, a court must interpret the statutory language in the way Congress intended when authoring the text. Moreover, Osseo argues that A.J.T. is incorrect in its argument that Monahan is a unique legal standard meant only for disability-based discrimination in K-12 schools, and thus singled out schoolchildren with disabilities because the Monahan court did not specify that the standard was an exclusive one. Osseo further claims that A.J.T.’s argument is incorrect because there is no flaw in having an exclusive legal standard for schoolchildren with disabilities, if the Court rules that such a legal standard exists. Osseo also claims that the Court has no reason to overrule Monahan ’s standard because the “bad faith or gross misconduct” standard and the “deliberate indifference” standard of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act are akin to one another in terms of level of burden. Osseo asserts that even if the Court agrees with A.J.T.’s argument that the Monahan standard is too high of a statutory burden, the Court has made clear in previous cases that it is the duty of Congress to make such a determination, not the Court. Finally, Osseo disputes A.J.T.’s argument that the Court can still rule that Osseo violated the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act even if Osseo did not intentionally discriminate against her, maintaining that Congress intended for the plain statutory language to require intent.

THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT’S ALLEGED IDEA VIOLATION

A.J.T. argues that the Court should reverse the Eighth Circuit’s decision because of the Eighth Circuit’s reliance on Monahan , a case which A.J.T. argues violates Section 1415(l) of IDEA. According to A.J.T., the court in Monahan erroneously felt a need to reconcile IDEA, formerly the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (“EHA”), with the Rehabilitation Act, noting in its ruling that the EHA was enacted to constrain Rehabilitation Act claims that occurred in schools. A.J.T. contends that Congress amended the EHA into IDEA in 1986 to specifically emphasize that no court should interpret any other statute, including IDEA, to limit any Rehabilitation Act claim a child may have against a school. A.J.T. reasons that when Congress made such amendments Congress essentially overruled Monahan ; and, therefore, courts should no longer rely on it. A.J.T. argues that because the Eighth Circuit relied on Monahan for its decision, the Eighth Circuit violated Section 1415(l), which says that “nothing in [IDEA] shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, the [ADA], [Rehabilitation Act], or other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities.” A.J.T. concludes that because Monahan is in clear violation of Section 1415(l), the Eighth Circuit’s decision must be reversed.

Osseo counters that the Eighth Circuit’s usage of the Monahan decision does not violate Section 1415(l) of IDEA. Osseo explains that Monahan ’s rule does not rely on any provision or rule that stems from IDEA or the EHA. Rather, Osseo argues, the Monahan decision stems from two entirely different statutory schemes: Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“Section 504”), which only prohibits discrimination “solely by reason of … disability”; and Title II of the ADA (“Title II”), which also only prohibits discrimination “by reason of … disability.” Moreover, Osseo argues that because Monahan does not stem from IDEA or the EHA, Monahan can still be considered good law, and the Eighth Circuit was justified in relying on Monahan as precedent. Osseo concedes that Monahan may indeed unlawfully limit the “rights, procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, the [ADA], [Rehabilitation Act], or other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities,” as prohibited by Section 1415(l), but Osseo argues that this potentially unlawful limit does not automatically disqualify Monahan ’s precedential standing. This is because, according to Osseo, Monahan was constructed from Section 504 and Title II only. Osseo details that Section 1415(l) only applies to court rulings that specifically applied IDEA to their ruling. Thus, Osseo concludes that because Monahan did not use any provision of IDEA to construe its ruling, Monahan is exempt from the provisions enacted by Section 1415(l).

Discussion

INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF LIABILITY

Representative Tony Coelho and the Coelho Center for Disability Law, Policy and Innovation (collectively “Coelho”), in support of A.J.T., argue that applying the “bad faith or gross misconduct” standard treats K-12 students differently than other groups bringing claims under Section 504 and the ADA. Therefore, Coelho argues, K-12 students face a unique burden in order to obtain relief under the ADA. Coelho further asserts that applying a higher standard to schoolchildren plaintiffs limits the rights of disabled students compared to other disabled individuals. The United States, in support of A.J.T., argues that it does not make sense to have different standards for schoolchildren plaintiffs compared to other plaintiffs. The United States points out that the goal of ADA and Section 504 claims is to prevent discrimination, and applying different standards based on who the plaintiff is does not make sense when the goal of the claim does not change based on who is bringing the claim.

Osseo argues that the “bad faith or gross misconduct” standard does not unfairly target K-12 students. Osseo maintains that a court has the discretion to apply the higher standard to groups besides schoolchildren, so there is no inconsistent application of liability between schoolchildren plaintiffs and other plaintiffs. In fact, Osseo argues, applying the lower “deliberate indifference” standard to K-12 students would create an inconsistency between the liability of public and private schools. Osseo points out that public schools are liable under Title II of the ADA, which regulates state and local government. By contrast, Osseo asserts, private schools are liable under Title III of the ADA, which regulates places of public accommodations. Osseo maintains that applying a “deliberate indifference” standard to Title II liability would expose public schools to increased liability, but not private schools. As a consequence of this inconsistency, Osseo argues, public schools would face liability for the same action that a private school would not face liability for.

FINANCIAL BURDEN ON PARTIES

The Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates and eleven other disability-rights organizations (collectively “COPAA”), in support of A.J.T., argue that ADA and Section 504 provide essential monetary relief to disabled students who face discrimination from their schools because IDEA cannot award compensatory damages . For example, COPAA points out that IDEA cannot provide damages to address lost income for parents who leave work to care for their disabled children in place of in-school care, or the cost of medical expenses related to the school’s discrimination. COPAA argues that the “bad faith or gross misconduct” standard stops disabled students facing discrimination from obtaining this monetary relief. COPAA maintains that the lower “deliberate indifference” standard is the proper alternative, because this standard allows more students to recover the damages needed to address the monetary consequences of discrimination.

Osseo argues that Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act are not the only methods of obtaining relief for students facing discrimination. Osseo highlights that IDEA, state disability laws, and other sections of the ADA which are not subject to the “bad faith or gross misconduct” standard can provide relief just as well as a Title II or Section 504 claim can. Instead, Osseo argues, applying a lower “deliberate indifference” standard would place a financial burden on public schools. Osseo maintains that the “deliberate indifference” standard does not consider whether schools failed to provide accommodations for nondiscriminatory reasons, including not having the resources to fund certain accommodations. Osseo further asserts that a lower standard would make schools fearful of litigation, causing schools to pay for unnecessary accommodations at the expense of other school programs. Osseo argues that the higher “bad faith or gross misconduct” standard would allow school authorities to make good faith decisions about the needs of disabled students by protecting them from expensive litigation or losing federal funding.

Conclusion

Johanna Hussain and Zachary Jacobson

Nick Sola

Additional Resources