disability

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine which standard to apply to claims of disability discrimination against students in K-12 schools under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) and Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Currently, multiple federal circuit courts apply the “bad faith or gross misconduct” standard, which is a higher standard than the “deliberate indifference” standard. A.T. and G.T., on behalf of their minor daughter A.J.T., argue that the “deliberate indifference” standard is more consistent with the text of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act and with the meaning of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). Osseo Area Schools, Independent School District No. 279, and Osseo School Board counter that the precedential case that applied the “bad faith or gross misconduct” standard is still good law, and the standard does not rely on IDEA but instead a proper reading of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. The outcome of this case has implications for the protection of students with disabilities against discrimination while in K-12 public schools.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide on the Article III standing question where a self-appointed Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) “tester” challenges a hotel reservation website’s failure to disclose information about disability accessibility. Petitioner Acheson Hotels, LLC argues that Respondent Deborah Laufer lacks standing because she failed to assert any concrete, stigmatic, or emotional injury resulting from the missing accessibility information. In opposition, Laufer contends that Acheson’s discrimination against disabled people is the exact type of harm Congress intended to prevent by enacting the ADA. While Acheson further asserts that the case is moot because the website now complies with the ADA regulations, Laufer counters that she suffers continuing injury from third-party websites. The outcome of this case will affect the balance between protecting small businesses from excessive litigation and ensuring tester-plaintiffs’ role in effectively enforcing the ADA regulations.

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In 2000, T.A.'s parents realized that their son was a troubled teenager, and though it was suspected that he might have a learning disability, his school district determined that he was not disabled and therefore not entitled to special education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. T.A.'s problems continued and in 2003 his parents placed him in a private school. In 2004, a hearing officer determined that T.A. was disabled, and that because Forest Grove School District had failed to offer him free appropriate public education, the district had to reimburse T.A.'s parents for the cost of the private school. The school district appealed, and the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that damages were not required because T.A.'s parents removed him unilaterally, without his ever having received special education services from a public agency. In this case, the Court will determine whether parents can unilaterally make this decision and then expect the school district to reimburse them, or if they must wait for action by the school district.

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Respondent Cheryl Perich taught for five years at Petitioner, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School (“Hosanna-Tabor”), including four years as a commissioned minister. In 2004, Hosanna-Tabor hired a new teacher to fill Perich’s position after Perich missed several months of teaching due to narcolepsy. When Hosanna-Tabor did not permit Perich to return to her former position, Perich threatened to sue under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Hosanna-Tabor fired Perich, and Perich initiated legal proceedings with the Respondent Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), alleging that Hosanna-Tabor fired her in retaliation for threatening to sue. Hosanna-Tabor argues that the ministerial exception to the ADA, which prevents employment suits against religious entities by their religious employees, bars Perich's lawsuit because she fulfilled an important religious role. Perich and the EEOC contend that there is no ministerial exception under the anti-retaliation provisions of the ADA, and that the Establishment Clause, freedom of association principles, and Free Exercise Clause do not bar her suit. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit determined that Perich did not fall under the ministerial exception because she taught secular subjects with minimal religious components. The Supreme Court will decide whether the ministerial exception applies to a teacher at a religious school who teaches both secular and religious material.

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Respondent Cheryl Perich taught for five years at Petitioner, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School (“Hosanna-Tabor”), including four years as a commissioned minister. In 2004, Hosanna-Tabor hired a new teacher to fill Perich’s position after Perich missed several months of teaching due to narcolepsy. When Hosanna-Tabor did not permit Perich to return to her former position, Perich threatened to sue under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Hosanna-Tabor fired Perich, and Perich initiated legal proceedings with the Respondent Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), alleging that Hosanna-Tabor fired her in retaliation for threatening to sue. Hosanna-Tabor argues that the ministerial exception to the ADA, which prevents employment suits against religious entities by their religious employees, bars Perich's lawsuit because she fulfilled an important religious role. Perich and the EEOC contend that there is no ministerial exception under the anti-retaliation provisions of the  ADA,  and that the Establishment Clause, freedom of association principles, and Free Exercise Clause do not bar her suit. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit determined that Perich did not fall under the ministerial exception because she taught secular subjects with minimal religious components. The Supreme Court will decide whether the ministerial exception applies to a teacher at a religious school who teaches both secular and religious material.

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After the Supreme Court prohibited the execution of the intellectually disabled in Atkins v. Virginia in 2002, Bobby James Moore petitioned for habeas relief from his death sentence on the grounds of intellectual disability. A Texas habeas court found that Moore was intellectually disabled under the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities’ current definition of intellectual disability. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, however, rejected Moore’s claim and held that Texas courts must apply AAIDD’s 1992 intellectual disability definition, which was adopted in a 2004 Texas case. Moore claims that mandating the use of outdated and non-clinical criteria violates the Eighth Amendment and Supreme Court precedent. Texas maintains that its definition of intellectual disability is within the national consensus and, therefore, does not violate the Eighth Amendment. The Court will determine the breadth of the Eighth Amendment’s protections for intellectually disabled defendants, and the case will have significant consequences for all defendants with intellectual disabilities that are on death row or facing the death penalty in Texas and may have wider effects across the country.

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In 2002, Petitioner Dana Roberts slipped on a patch of ice while working for his employer, Respondent Sea-Land Services. After the fall, Roberts claimed disability and sought compensation under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. Initially, Sea-Land paid Roberts, but, in May 2005, Sea-Land discontinued payments. An administrative law judge ordered Sea-Land to resume payments, but a dispute arose concerning the proper method for calculating payment. In this case, the Supreme Court will decide when Petitioner Roberts was “newly awarded compensation” under the Act. Roberts argues that this occurred in 2007, when the administrative law judge entered the compensation order. However, Sea-Land Services argues that the judge correctly determined that this occurred in 2002, the year Roberts became entitled to compensation. The Court’s decision will determine which fiscal year is used to calculate the maximum compensation owed. The result could substantially increase Roberts’s compensation under the Act, and will determine how such calculations are performed in similar federal compensation programs.

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The Supreme Court will decide whether the Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986 exhaustion requirement applies when a party brings a suit under the American with Disabilities Act or the Rehabilitation Act if the plaintiff is seeking a remedy not contemplated by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). The parties disagree on how to interpret Section 1415(l) of the IDEA and whether the IDEA is even implicated here. Stacy and Brent Fry posit that the plain text and purpose of the IDEA make it so monetary damages are not recoverable under the IDEA and thus neither exhaustion nor the IDEA should apply here. In response, Napoleon Community Schools et al. argues that the text and purpose of the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement require that substantively-the-same claims be exhausted before going to court. Depending on the how the Court rules, the ease of access to courts could be altered, thus impacting the role of school-related administrative proceedings.

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The Supreme Court will have the opportunity to decide whether the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”) requires employers who accommodate certain working limitations of non-pregnant workers to similarly accommodate pregnant workers. Young contends the PDA mandates that an employer must provide pregnant employees with the same accommodations that non-pregnant employees receive when non-pregnant employees are disabled or injured on-the-job. UPS, however, argues that the PDA requires no such accommodations. Additionally, while Young argues that UPS’s actions still constitute pregnancy discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis, UPS maintains that its actions do not constitute pregnancy discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas test. The Supreme Court’s decision will likely impact the safeguards provided to women in the workplace and the efficiency of American businesses in providing such safeguards. 

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