education

A.J.T. v. Osseo Area Schools, Independent School District No. 279

Issues

Do disabled child plaintiffs who claim that a K-12 school discriminated against them based on their disability need to satisfy a higher burden of proof than other types of plaintiffs when bringing a claim of discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine which standard to apply to claims of disability discrimination against students in K-12 schools under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) and Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Currently, multiple federal circuit courts apply the “bad faith or gross misconduct” standard, which is a higher standard than the “deliberate indifference” standard. A.T. and G.T., on behalf of their minor daughter A.J.T., argue that the “deliberate indifference” standard is more consistent with the text of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act and with the meaning of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). Osseo Area Schools, Independent School District No. 279, and Osseo School Board counter that the precedential case that applied the “bad faith or gross misconduct” standard is still good law, and the standard does not rely on IDEA but instead a proper reading of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. The outcome of this case has implications for the protection of students with disabilities against discrimination while in K-12 public schools.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and Rehabilitation Act of 1973 require children with disabilities to satisfy a uniquely stringent “bad faith or gross misjudgment” standard when seeking relief for discrimination relating to their education. 

A.J.T. suffers from Lennox-Gastaut Syndrome, a type of epilepsy that causes seizures and diminished intellectual capacities. A.J.T. v.

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Biden v. Nebraska

Issues

Can six states challenge the Biden administration’s student debt relief plan by arguing that the plan exceeds the Secretary of Education’s authority or is arbitrary and capricious?

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider the legality of the Biden administration's student debt relief plan, which six states have challenged, claiming that the plan exceeds the Secretary of Education’s authority. The Biden administration argues that the six states do not have standing to bring the lawsuit because they do not suffer injuries caused by the student debt relief plan. Further, the Biden administration contends that even if the six states do have standing, the student debt relief plan falls within the statutory power of the Secretary of Education. The six states counter that they can establish standing because the student debt relief plan could cause financial loss to their state-authorized loan entity or reduce state tax revenue. The six states further contend that the student debt relief plan exceeds the statutory authority of the Secretary of Education because the plan is neither necessary nor proportionate to ameliorate the conditions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The outcome of this case will have far-reaching implications for student loan borrowers, state budgets, and the overall economy.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether six states have Article III standing to challenge the Department of Education's student-debt relief plan; and (2) whether the plan exceeds the secretary of education's statutory authority or is arbitrary and capricious.

Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (“Higher Education Act”) grants the Secretary of Education (“Secretary”) the authority to award federal financial aid to eligible students for their postsecondary education. 20 U.S.C.

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Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District

Issues

Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, what level of educational benefit must school districts provide children with disabilities to secure each child’s right to free appropriate public education?

This case will decide what unified standard public schools must provide students under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). IDEA requires schools in receipt of federal funds to provide an Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) for each student with a disability. The IEP must comply with each student’s right to Free Appropriate Public Education (“FAPE”). Should the school district fail to comply, parents are permitted to enroll their child into private school and seek reimbursement from the school district. Endrew F. argued that the Douglas County School District did not provide Endrew, a child with autism, the appropriate level of educational care because Endrew did not make any meaningful progress with his IEP. The Douglas County School District responded that Endrew’s receipt of some educational benefit was sufficient to satisfy the FAPE standard, and thus not a violation of the IDEA. The Supreme Court will likely resolve the Circuit conflict between the “meaningful educational benefit” standard adopted by some courts of appeals and the “merely more than de minimis” educational benefit standard that the Tenth Circuit maintained.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

What is the level of educational benefit that school districts must confer on children with disabilities to provide them with the free appropriate public education guaranteed by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq.? 

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA") dictates that public schools must provide children with disabilities a Free Appropriate Public Education ("FAPE"). See 20 U.S.C.

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Mahmoud v. Taylor

Issues

Does a public school burden a family’s religious exercise when it requires elementary school children to participate in instruction on gender and sexuality, against the family’s religious convictions, without notice or opportunity to opt out?

This case asks whether a public school violates the Free Exercise Clause when it includes books containing LGBTQ characters in its curriculum and does not allow families to exempt their children’s exposure to such books on religious grounds. Petitioners argue that their children’s exposure to books that contain LGBTQ characters and themes burdens their religious exercise and that their claims should be examined under strict scrutiny, a rigorous standard of review. Respondents counter that free exercise claims must be supported by evidence of coercion, not mere exposure to ideas that go against one’s religion, and that their actions need only meet a rational basis standard of review. This case holds major implications for the future of LGBTQ education and the scope of religious and parental rights.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether public schools burden parents’ religious exercise when they compel elementary school children to participate in instruction on gender and sexuality against their parents’ religious convictions and without notice or opportunity to opt out.

The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” Mahmoud v.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Nelson Tebbe for his guidance and insights into this case.

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Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education,

Issues

Can school districts constitutionally use percentage-based range plans to assign students to public schools based on race in order to capture the benefits of educational diversity?

 

The Jefferson County Public School District in Jefferson County, Kentucky, requires that 15 to 50 percent of all students in each school be African-American. Petitioner Crystal Meredith claims that the district violated the Fourteenth Amendment when it rejected her application to enroll her son at a nearby school on the basis of race. To decide this case, the Supreme Court will have to determine whether racial diversity in K–12 public education is a compelling state interest and whether the district’s racial range mandate is narrowly tailored to further that interest. The decision will determine the extent to which schools are permitted to consider race in school assignment policies.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Should Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) and Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) be overturned and/or misapplied by the Respondent, the Jefferson County Board of Education to use race as the sole factor to assign students to the regular (non-traditional) schools in the Jefferson County Public Schools?
  2. Whether the race-conscious Student Assignment Plan with mechanical and inflexible quota systems of not less than 15% nor greater than 50% of African American students without individually or holistic review of any student, meets the Fourteenth Amendment requirement of the use of race which is a compelling interest narrowly tailored with strict scrutiny.
  3. Did the District Court abuse and/or exceed its remedial judicial authority in maintaining desegregative attractiveness in the Public Schools of Jefferson County, Kentucky?

Desegregation of Schools in Jefferson County

The backdrop for this case was set in 1954. In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Supreme Court mandated the desegregation of public schools. Over subsequent decades, federal courts ordered school districts with institutionalized segregation plans to desegregate through a system of redistricting and busing. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professors Sherri Lynn Johnson, Trevor Morrison, and Michael Heise for their insights into this case.

The Supreme Court will hear this case in tandem with a companion case, Parents Involved in Community Sch. v. Seattle Sch. District ,  which involves a student assignment plan that uses race as a tiebreaker to balance high schools that differ by more than 15 percent from the racial  make up  of the Seattle public school system.

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Plyler v. Doe (1982)

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, is a U.S. Supreme Court case in which the Court struck down a Texas statute that denied funding to local school districts for the education of children who were not "legally admitted" into the United States, and which authorized local school districts to deny enrollment to such children.

Rudisill v. McDonough

Issues

Does the post-9/11 GI Bill limit education benefits for a veteran who qualifies for both the Montgomery and Post-9/11 GI Bills, by requiring that the veteran first exhaust their Montgomery benefits or make a 38 U.S.C. § 3327(a) election between educational benefits, or is a veteran entitled to both benefits due to two distinct service periods?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the Federal Circuit erred in holding that a veteran who switched from using Montgomery GI Bill educational benefits to Post–9/11 GI Bill benefits is limited to only accessing his remaining Montgomery benefits. Petitioner James Rudisill asserts that the Federal Circuit improperly reads § 3327(a) as mandatory and wrongly applies it to certain classes of veterans in a manner not intended by Congress, and in conflict with the pro-veteran canon. The respondent, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs Denis McDonough, counters that § 3327(a) remains elective and is applicable to all veterans, and that Rudisill’s invocation of the pro-veteran canon is improper. This case could impact the educational benefits of millions of veterans, as well as the application of the veterans’ canon, an interpretive tool by which courts assume Congress intends interpretations of ambiguous statutory text that favor veterans.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a veteran who has served two separate and distinct periods of qualifying service under the Montgomery GI Bill and the Post–9/11 GI Bill is entitled to receive a total of 48 months of education benefits as between both programs, without first exhausting the Montgomery benefit in order to obtain the more generous Post–9/11 benefit.

Appellee James Rudisill (“Rudisill”) is a veteran who served in active–duty three separate times, amounting to almost 8 years of active service between 2000 and 2011. Rudisill v.

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Students for Fair Admissions Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College

Issues

Should the Supreme Court overrule Grutter v. Bollinger and hold that institutions of higher education cannot use race as a factor in admissions? Is Harvard College discriminating against Asian American applicants and rejecting workable race-neutral alternatives, thus violating Title VI of the Civil Rights Act?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether Grutter v. Bollinger should be overruled and whether universities should be prohibited from using race in the admission process, as well as whether Harvard violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act by discriminating against Asian American applicants in the admission process and by rejecting workable, race-neutral alternatives. Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. argues that Grutter should be overruled, that universities should not be allowed to use race as a factor in college admission, and that Harvard unlawfully discriminated against Asian American applicants. Harvard counters that Grutter should stand, that there are no workable, race-neutral alternatives, and that Harvard does not discriminate against Asian American applicants. This case has significant implications for future admission practices, diversity on college campuses, and racial minorities.

 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether Grutter v. Bollinger should be overruled and institutions of higher education should be banned from using race as a factor in admissions; and (2) whether Harvard College violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act by discriminating against Asian American applicants and abandoning race-neutral alternatives.

Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. (“SFFA”) constitutes a coalition of applicants and prospective applicants to institutions of higher education and their families, and includes at least one Asian-American member who applied for and was denied admission to Harvard.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Brian M. Richardson for his guidance and insights into this case.

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Winkelman v. Parma City School District

Issues

When are parents able to bring Individuals with Disabilities Education Act claims, for themselves or their children, without legal counsel?

 

Jeff and Sandee Winkelman contested the adequacy of their eight-year-old autistic son’s “Individual Education Plan,” designed by Parma City School District, under the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA). Both the administrative hearing board and the federal district court that heard the Winkelmans’ claim approved the plan. The Winkelmans appealed the decision without a lawyer. The court of appeals dismissed the Winkelmans’ claim, holding that parents are barred from litigating IDEA claims pro se on behalf of their children. The Winkelmans argue that IDEA permits pro se litigation, while Parma City claims educational policy and precedent suggest otherwise. Courts of appeals are split on whether parents can litigate pro se their own procedural IDEA claims, their children’s substantive IDEA claims, or neither. The case will settle the split and define the scope of parental rights under IDEA and pro se litigation under federal law in general.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, and if so, under what circumstances, non-lawyer parents of a disabled child may prosecute an Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act, 20 U.S.C § 1400 et seq., case pro se in federal court?

Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (2003), states and local school boards receive federal grants for assistance in educating children with disabilities. Any state receiving federal funds must provide each enrolling disabled child with a “free appropriate public education” (FAPE), which includes special education and related services tailored to the child’s needs. 20 U.S.C.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professors Michael Heise and Andrea Mooney for their insight into this case.

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Zuni Public School District No. 89 v. Department of Education

Issues

Should the Supreme Court follow Chevron and defer to the Secretary of Education's formula to determine whether a school district should continue to receive federal funding, although the formula apparently conflicts with the statutory method?

 

The Federal Impact Aid Act provides federal funding to school districts located on Indian Reservations, military bases, or land with federal presence. Under the Act, the Secretary of Education can divert federal aid from the district back to the state if it determines that the state's school district operational funding is “equalized.” After determining that New Mexico's funding for the year 1999-2000 was equalized, the Secretary allowed the state to withhold federal subsidies from certain districts. The Zuni Public School District claims that the Secretary's formula for determining whether a school district receives federal subsidies conflicts with the plain meaning of the Act. In resolving this issue, the Supreme Court will clarify the scope of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the seminal case governing agency interpretations of enabling legislation.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Secretary has the authority to create and impose his formula over the one prescribed by Congress and through this process certify New Mexico's operational funding for fiscal year 1999–2000 as “equalized,” thereby diverting the Impact Aid subsidies to the State and whether this is one of the rare cases where this Court should exercise its supervisory jurisdiction to correct a plain error that affects all State school districts that educate federally connected children.

The Zuni Public School District (“Zuni”) is located almost entirely within Zuni and Navajo Reservation lands in New Mexico. Brief for Petitioner at 2. The Federal Impact Aid Act provides subsidies to Zuni as well as other school districts located on Indian Reservations, military bases, or land with other types of federal presence. 20 U.S.C. § 7709 et seq. (2000).

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank for Professor Jonathan Siegel for his insight into this case.

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