Soto v. United States

Issues

Does 10 U.S.C. § 1413a, a statute that authorizes combat-related special compensation for veterans, provide a settlement mechanism to be used instead of the default mechanism in the Barring Act?

Oral argument:
April 28, 2025
Court below:
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

This case asks the Supreme Court to clarify the procedures used when granting combat-related special compensation (“CRSC”)—specifically, whether the statute enacting CRSC also provides a settlement mechanism. Generally, military-related claims are governed by the Barring Act, which has a six-year statute of limitations. Soto argues that the Barring Act does not apply here because the CRSC-enacting statute provides its own mechanism for settling claims, thereby displacing the Barring Act. The United States instead asserts that the Barring Act is only displaced when a statute explicitly grants settlement authority, which is not granted in the CRSC statute, and that applying a different rule would be contrary to prior decisions. This case raises important questions regarding combat-wounded veterans’ access to compensation and the administrative and legal burden on the government.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Given the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s holding that a claim for compensation under 10 U.S.C. § 1413a is a claim “involving … retired pay” under 31 U.S.C. § 3702(a)(1)(A), does 10 U.S.C. § 1413a provide a settlement mechanism that displaces the default procedures and limitations set forth in the Barring Act?

Facts

Typically, retired veterans must waive a portion of their retirement pay in order to receive disability pay. However, under 10 U.S.C. § 1413a (the “CRSC statute”), retired veterans who establish that their disability was caused by a combat-related event may receive additional compensation, called combat-related special compensation (“CRSC”), up to the amount of waived retired pay. The CRSC statute requires the Secretary of Defense to set up procedures for veterans to apply for CRSC and allows CRSC to be granted retroactively. The Barring Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3702 , provides a way to settle military-related claims against the government, unless another law provides such a settlement mechanism. Relevantly, the Barring Act has a six-year statute of limitations .

Simon Soto is a retired member of the United States Marine Corps who served two tours of active duty in Operation Iraqi Freedom. In June 2009, Soto was determined to have a disability rating of 100%, meaning “[t]otal occupational and social impairment,” for his PTSD as of December 31, 2008, with various other disability ratings in the prior two years. This qualified him for CRSC as of June 2009. However, Soto did not apply for CRSC, including retroactive CRSC, until June 2016. In reviewing his application for CRSC, the Navy informed Soto that he was limited to six years of retroactive payments under the Barring Act.

Soto filed a class action lawsuit in the Southern District of Texas , arguing that the Barring Act does not apply to claims for CRSC, and therefore he and other similarly situated veterans are entitled to complete retroactive CRSC. The government moved for judgment on the pleadings , which the district court denied. The court held that the Barring Act did not apply to the settlement of CRSC claims because the CRSC statute was a “specific” statute that superseded the Barring Act. The court also applied the pro-veteran canon of statutory interpretation , which states that questions of interpretation should be resolved in a veteran’s favor, to hold that the Barring Act does not apply. Soto later moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted for the same reasons. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit disagreed. The Federal Circuit held that the CRSC statute does not supersede the Barring Act because the CRSC statute only establishes who is eligible for CRSC, rather than how the CRSC claims can be settled. The court held that specific language authorizing settlement of a claim, often using the word “settle,” or a specific provision establishing a statute of limitations was needed to displace the Barring Act.

On September 18, 2024, Soto petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States to hear this case. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on January 17, 2025.

Analysis

SETTLEMENT AUTHORITY

Soto argues that the CRSC statute displaces the Barring Act because it grants settlement authority to the Secretaries of military departments. He notes that “settlement authority” in this context means the ability to determine whether a claimant has a valid claim and what amount is owed on such claim. Soto argues that the CRSC statute grants the agency the authority to make both of these determinations. First, Soto argues that subsection (a) of the CRSC statute explicitly provides the Secretary with the authority to make payments to “eligible” veterans and allows for the Secretary to determine which veterans are “eligible.” He also argues that subsection (d) directs the Secretary to “consider” whether an applicant is eligible for CRSC benefits, and thus the statute’s plain text authorizes the Secretary to administratively determine the validity of each claim. He further argues that this understanding of the CRSC statute is aligned with the guidance that the Department of Defense set out pursuant to subsection (d), which states that the military departments determine which applicants are entitled to CRSC. Second, Soto argues that subsection (a) of the CRSC statute explicitly allows the Secretary to make payments as determined by the statute, and thus implicitly allows for the Secretary to determine the amount owed. Soto further supports his argument that the CRSC statute provides settlement authority by pointing out that it provides payment authority in subsection (h). Soto argues that when a statute governing specific claims provides for payment of those claims, it creates a compensation scheme that includes both settlement and payment of the claims. Because this settlement authority is established in a law other than the Barring Act, Soto argues that the limitations of the Barring Act do not apply.

The United States first rebuts Soto’s argument by noting that the CRSC statute lacks any express grant of settlement authority. It further argues that the CRSC statute is similar to many other statutes involving military pay that are governed under the Barring Act, including payments for basic pay, survivor benefits, and retirement pay. The United States argues that the settlement authority structure argued by Soto—the ability to determine that a claimant has a valid claim and what amount is owed on such claim—is standard in military-compensation statutes and thus is insufficient to differentiate CRSC from other statutes. For example, the United States notes that the statutes providing for travel allowances and survivor benefits both allow for “the Secretary” to “determine” whether a service member is eligible, yet both are governed by the Barring Act. The United States similarly notes that many military-pay statutes provide for specified officials to calculate or determine what should be paid to a service member but nonetheless do not confer settlement authority and thus are governed by the Barring Act. The United States counters Soto’s argument that payment authority implies settlement authority by arguing that settlement and payment are distinct steps.

THE NEED FOR EXPLICIT LANGUAGE

Soto argues that the Federal Circuit’s requirement—that statutes use “specific language” to grant settlement authority and thereby displace the Barring Act—is inappropriate. He notes that there is no statutory or case law requiring the use of the word “settle.” He argues that some statutes that grant settlement authority do so by using different terms, and other statutes only grant such authority by authorizing conduct that must include settlement. He points to decisions of several courts, including the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, as well as adjudications of the Office of Management and Budget, all of which found that settlement authority exists despite the lack of specific statutory language required by the lower court. Soto draws a comparison to a waiver of sovereign immunity, which requires a clearly discernable statement while not requiring “magic words.” Soto argues that specific language should similarly not be required for a statute to displace the Barring Act. Soto further argues that the Federal Circuit’s requirement would amount to unprecedented canon of construction—that statutes do not grant settlement authority in the absence of ‘specific language’—and that a previously unrecognized canon should not be applied to a statute over twenty years old, as Congress would not have been aware of such a canon when drafting the statute.

Additionally, Soto argues that the Federal Circuit’s alternative requirement for an independent statute of limitations in the CRSC statute is atextual. He asserts that, when a statute provides for the settlement of claims, the entire Barring Act does not apply, including the statute of limitations provision. Thus, Soto asserts that the Barring Act’s statute of limitations provision does not apply in this case regardless of whether an independent statute of limitations exists in the CRSC statute. Moreover, Soto argues that the lack of a statute of limitation in the CRSC statute is immaterial, as the statute expressly allows for CRSC to be paid for “any month” that the claimant is eligible, which implies that there is no time limitation on CRSC and thus no statute of limitations.

The United States instead argues that specific language is needed to grant settlement authority. It asserts that Congress uses explicit language when granting settlement authority over claims. The United States points to multiple examples of statutes using such language, including the Federal Torts Claims Act, the Foreign Claims Act, and the Military Claims Act. The United States concedes that not all statutes granting settlement authority use the word “settle” or “settlement,” but it contends that all such statutes use explicit language to grant such power. For example, the United States maintains that the explicit authority to accept a “claim” and then issue a “decision” on that claim would grant settlement authority. Similarly, according to the United States, explicit language authorizing the Secretary to accept the filing of, and then allow, a claim would confer settlement authority. Regardless, the United States contends that some form of clear, explicit language is needed. Citing multiple other laws where Congress has expressly modified the statute of limitations, the United States points out that Congress has historically used explicit language that modifies the statute of limitations when it intended to modify the default statute of limitations (here, six years under the Barring Act). It argues that, when Congress has shown that it knows how to adopt specific language, as it has in these other laws, non-textual interpretations are inappropriate. Therefore, the United States argues that the absence of explicit timing language should not be read to modify the default statute of limitations.

Discussion

ENSURING THE FAIR COMPENSATION FOR VETERANS

The National Law School Veterans Clinic Consortium (the “Consortium”), in support of Soto, emphasizes that ensuring CRSC’s payments to combat-wounded veterans is aligned with the nation’s tradition of honoring extraordinary service and bodily sacrifice in combat through monetary compensation. The Consortium contends that this tradition is best upheld when the Barring Act’s six-year statute of limitations does not apply, as combat-wounded veterans often face significant barriers to timely filing due to the challenges of transitioning to civilian life and coping with service-connected disabilities—such as traumatic brain injuries or post-traumatic stress disorder. Military-Veterans Advocacy, Inc. (“MVA”) and Disabled American Veterans (“DAV”), in support of Soto, furtherargues that applying the Barring Act’s six-year statute of limitations to CRSC awards would unfairly disadvantage veterans because the Department of Veteran’s Affairs is notoriously slow in granting veterans a VA disability rating—an essential step to obtain CRSC – leaving veterans mired in a prolonged VA rating process.

The United States maintains that, while Petitioner and supporting amici raise a valid concern that disabled retirees may struggle to apply for CRSC benefits promptly, this issue is not unique to CRSC. The United States alleges that Congress has addressed similar concerns in other statutes by providing grace periods—such as a one-year window for certain disability benefits—while still limiting retroactive government liability. The United States further asserts that the Department of Defense already offers substantial flexibility for veterans in CRSC cases. According to the United States, retirees who apply within six years of becoming eligible can receive full back payments, and even those applying more than six years after they become eligible still can receive six years of retroactive payments plus future benefits if they seek and receive a waiver of the statutory time bar.

BURDEN ON THE GOVERNMENT

The Connecticut Veterans Legal Center (“CVLC”) and National Organization of Veterans’ Advocates (“NOVA”), in support of Soto, argue that the government’s argument that many untimely CRSC claims will be filed if the Barring Act does not apply is unfounded because Congress designed CRSC to be narrowly available; indeed, in 2022, only 7.3 percent of retired military personnel receiving retired pay received CRSC. CVLC and NOVA also contend that ruling for the Petitioner would not incentivize veterans to bring untimely claims as doing so would postpone their receipt of monthly payments.

Noting how the Barring Act operates to bar stale and untimely claims, the United States suggests that the Barring Act plays the role of limiting excessive spending on these long-past due claims. The United States alleges that accepting Petitioner’s view that the Barring Act’s applicability should be limited would open the door to unlimited retroactive claims across many military compensation programs lacking explicit time limits. The United States asserts that if a law doesn’t include a time limit or a cap on back pay, it could be interpreted to allow unlimited retroactive payments whenever someone steps forward with a claim. According to the United States,this could make the Department of Defense responsible for a large number of old military pay claims going back decades.

Conclusion

Gregory Jameson and Kayla Espinoza

Sean Lee

Additional Resources