statute of limitations

Arellano v. McDonough

Issues

Does the rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling, which would allow a veteran to apply for disability benefits past the normal deadline, apply to 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(1), and if so, has the Government rebutted that presumption?

38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(1) allows veterans who apply for disability compensation benefits within one year of discharge from the military to have retroactive disability compensation benefits counted from the date of discharge instead of the date of application for benefits. In this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether equitable tolling, an exemption to statutes of limitations under which plaintiffs who could not discover the basis to bring their lawsuits until after the expiration of the limitations period may bring a claim, applies to this one-year deadline. Although 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(1) does not have an explicit statute of limitation, Arellano argues that the statute functionally serves as a statute of limitations and that the Court has held that equitable tolling applies by default to functional statutes of limitations, including those applicable to suits against the government. McDonough counters that § 5110(b)(1) is not a statute of limitations, and that if Congress intended to allow equitable tolling to apply to the statute, it would have explicitly stated so in the law. The Court’s decision in this case will impact veterans’ welfare and the speed and procedure of disability claims administration.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether the rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling from Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs applies to the one-year statutory deadline in 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(1) for seeking retroactive disability benefits, and, if so, whether the government has rebutted that presumption; and (2) whether, if 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(1) is amenable to equitable tolling, this case should be remanded so the agency can consider the particular facts and circumstances in the first instance.

Congress has authorized disability benefits under 38 U.S.C. § 1110 for veterans who suffered disabilities during their service. Arellano v. McDonough at 1061. The size of the benefits is partly determined by the effective date of the award.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Kevin M. Clermont for his guidance and insights into this case.

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Artis v. District of Columbia

Issues

In a case involving both federal- and state-law claims, if a federal court dismisses a plaintiff’s federal claim and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, does the tolling provision in § 1367(d) suspend the limitations period for the plaintiff’s state-law claim while the claim is pending and for an additional thirty days after the claim is dismissed, or does the tolling provision simply provide an additional thirty days beyond the dismissal for the plaintiff to re-file without suspending the limitations period?

The court will decide whether the tolling provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d)—which addresses cases involving both federal- and state-law claims suspends the limitations period for a state-law claim while the federal claim is pending and provides an additional thirty days after the federal claim is dismissed, or whether it simply provides thirty days beyond the dismissal of the claim to re-file in state court. Stephanie Artis argues that § 1367(d) suspends the limitations period for state-law claims while the federal claims are pending and provides an additional thirty days in which to re-file after claims are dismissed. On the other hand, the District of Columbia argues that the approach taken by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which only provides an additional thirty days after a state-claim is dismissed, is the appropriate standard. This issue arises in every case in which a district court ultimately declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Accordingly, the case will impact the way in which plaintiffs bring state-law claims in federal courts. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Section 1367 of Title 28 authorizes federal district courts in certain circumstances to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims arising under State law. Section 1367 further provides that “[t]he period of limitations for any [such] claim … shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of thirty days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d). The question presented is whether the tolling provision in § 1367(d) suspends the limitations period for the state-law claim while the federal suit is pending and for thirty days after the claim is dismissed, or whether the tolling provision does not suspend the limitations period but merely provides thirty days beyond the dismissal for the plaintiff to refile.

Beginning in August 2007, Petitioner Stephanie C. Artis was employed, under temporary status, as a Department of Health inspector. Artis v. District of Columbia, 135 A.3d 334, 335 (D.C. 2016). During her employment, Artis had a combative relationship with her supervisor, Gerard Brown. Id. Artis contends that Brown constantly treated her unfairly in the workplace.

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BP America Production Co. v. Burton

Issues

In its attempt to recover gas and oil royalties through administrative orders, is MMS, a government agency, bound by the six-year statute of limitations that governs actions for money damages brought by the United States?

 

The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. 181 et seq., and other statutes charge the Secretary of the Interior with leasing federal and Indian lands for development of oil and gas resources. The Minerals Management Service ("MMS") administers the leases. In the wake of a dispute over royalties, the Minerals Management Service (“MMS”), sought to recover, through administrative order, contractual damages which arose more than six years beforehand. Petitioners, producers of natural gas, claim that the collection of these damages is barred by the limitations period set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2415. MMS claims that this limitation period does not apply because the statute only applies to actions in court and not to administrative proceedings. The Supreme Court’s ruling will affect the parity of contractual relations between private citizens and the government with respect to the resolution of contract disputes.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether - contrary to the decision below but consistent with decisions of the Tenth and Federal Circuits - the limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) applies to federal agency orders requiring the payment of money claimed under a lease or other agreement.

Under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. 181 et seq. and other statutes, the Secretary of the Interior leases federal and Indian lands for development of oil and gas resources. Brief for Respondents at 2. Petitioner BP America Production Co. ("BP") is the successor in interest to oil and gas producers Amoco Production Company ("Amoco") and Atlantic Richfield Company and Vastar Resources, Inc.

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California Public Employees’ Retirement System v. ANZ Securities, Inc., et al.

Issues

Does the timely filing of a class action lawsuit stop the running of the three-year time limit for individual class members to bring their claims under Section 13 of the Securities Act? 

This case presents the Supreme Court with an opportunity to clarify the applicability of the time limitations in Section 13 of the Securities Act of 1933 for individual claims brought after a class action lawsuit has been filed in the same matter. Petitioner California Public Employees' Retirement System (“CalPERS”) argues that Section 13 is a statute of limitation, which may be overridden by judge-made rule, as opposed to a statute of repose, which is not subject to judicial extension even in cases of extraordinary circumstances. Accordingly, CalPERS asserts that a prior Supreme Court decision, American Pipe, establishes that the filing of a class action tolls the statute of limitation as to all putative members of that class. Respondent ANZ Securities, however, argues that Section 13 is a statute of repose, and under the Second Circuit precedent the American Pipe tolling rule does not extend to statutes of repose. The outcome of this case could encourage litigation strategies that decrease court efficiency or, alternatively, benefit large investors at the expense of smaller ones. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does the timely filing of a valid class action satisfy or toll the three-year filing period set by Section 13 of the Securities Act of 1933 with respect to subsequent opt-out suits by individual class members?

This case arose out of the 2008 collapse of Respondent Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (“Lehman Brothers”). See In Re Lehman Bros. Securities and ERISA Litigation, 799 F. Supp. 2d 258, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). Lehman Brothers was a large investment bank, which traded its securities on the New York Stock Exchange.

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Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation

Issues

Must a federal court hearing state law claims brought under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act apply the forum state’s choice-of-law rules or federal common law to determine what substantive law governs the claims at issue?

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether a federal court should apply the forum state's choice-of-law rules or federal common law in cases brought against a foreign state under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”). Petitioner David Cassirer contends that the forum state's choice-of-law rules should apply, arguing that Congress intends state law to apply so that results in cases against a foreign national and against a foreign state are the same. Thus, Cassirer argues that, in this case, California substantive law should apply. In response, Respondent Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation (“TBCF”) contends that federal common law should apply because jurisdiction under FSIA is more analogous to federal question jurisdiction rather than diversity jurisdiction. In this case, TBCF argues that Spanish law should govern. This case has important policy implications for foreign relations, international justice, and the separation of powers.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a federal court hearing state law claims brought under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act must apply the forum state’s choice of law rules to determine what substantive law governs the claims at issue, or whether it may apply federal common law.

In Nazi Germany, in 1939, Lilly Neubauer—David Cassirer’s great-grandmother—was forced to “sell” a Pissarro painting to a Berlin art dealer. Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation  at 6. The Nazi government demanded that Lilly sell the painting under threat of imprisoning her in Germany. Id. Both parties and the district court have concluded that the painting was forcibly taken from Lilly.

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CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries

Issues

Can an employee alleging employer retaliation for racial discrimination complaints  bring  a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("Section 1981"), as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991?

 

42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("Section 1981") provides that any “person within the jurisdiction of the United States” has the same right to "make and enforce" contracts, regardless of their skin color. Section 1981 protects parties from discriminatory treatment both at the time when contracts are formed, and in post-formation conduct. Section 1981 applies to many aspects of the employment relationship because that relationship is considered contractual; however, the extent of this protection is unclear. This case addresses the question of whether an employee can bring a claim for retaliation under Section 1981. Retaliation does not clearly come under the scope of Section 1981 because often it is based not on an employee's characteristic, such as race, but instead on an action taken by the employee, such as complaining about work conditions or discriminatory treatment. However, retaliation claims often overlap with, and are difficult to separate from, claims of discrimination. Should the Supreme Court decide that Section 1981 protects an employee from race-based retaliation, it will give employees greater flexibility in filing claims of retaliation, because they will not be subject to the filing deadlines and limits on damages found in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, an alternate provision which does encompass retaliation claims.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Is a race retaliation claim cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981?

Herndrick Humphries, an African American, worked as an associate manager in a Cracker Barrel restaurant owned by CBOCS West, Inc. ("Cracker Barrel") for three years, until Cracker Barrel terminated his employment on December 5, 2001 for violation of company policy. See Humphries v. CBOCS West Inc., 474 F.3d 387 389-90 (7th Cir.

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Charles R. Kokesh v. Securities and Exchange Commission

Issues

Does the five-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2462 apply when the Securities and Exchange Commission compels offenders to disgorge the proceeds of their illegal activity?

In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether the five-year statute of limitations on forfeitures and penalties in 28 U.S.C. § 2462 applies when the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) directs a wrongdoer to surrender proceeds stemming from his illegal activity (“disgorgement claims”). Petitioner Charles R. Kokesh argues that § 2462 applies to SEC disgorgement claims because these claims fell within the ordinary meaning of “forfeiture” at the time Congress enacted the statute. In addition, Kokesh contends that § 2462 applies because disgorgement claims are in part to punish the wrongdoer and are therefore penalties. Respondent SEC counters that disgorgement claims are not forfeitures under § 2462 because the term “forfeiture” was only intended to include procedures to take tangible property when Congress enacted the statute. The SEC also argues that disgorgement claims are not penalties because they do not make wrongdoers worse off financially than they would have been if they did not violate the law. This case will resolve a circuit split regarding whether § 2462’s statute of limitations applies to SEC disgorgement claims. In doing so, this case will also determine whether the SEC can enforce U.S. securities laws through disgorgement orders without regard to when the alleged violation occurred.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2462, any “action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, shall not be entertained unless commenced within five years from the date when the claim first accrued.”

The question presented is:

Does the five-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2462 apply to claims for “disgorgement”?

In 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) brought an enforcement action against Charles R. Kokesh, alleging that two investment advisory firms (“Advisers”) that he owned had mishandled the money of four clients (“Funds”). See Brief for Petitioner, Charles R.

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Cochise Consultancy Inc. v. United States, ex rel. Hunt

Issues

In a False Claims Act qui tam action in which the United States government does not intervene, under what circumstances may the relator rely on the statute of limitations set forth in 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(2)?

This case asks whether relators can benefit from the longer of the False Claims Act’s two statutes of limitations. The False Claims Act (“FCA”) contains two statutes of limitations, and circuits are split as to whether both statutes of limitations apply to private individuals. Cochise Consultancy, Inc. and the Parsons Corporation contend that, based on a contextual interpretation of the FCA, only the Act’s six-year statute of limitations, from when the cause of action occurs, should apply to relators. Billy Joe Hunt, the relator in this suit, counters that the plain language of the statute permits relators to benefit from the FCA’s three-year statute of limitations, which begins when an official of the United States learns the materials facts of the action, even when the United States is not a party. This case will likely impact the number and costs of suits brought under the FCA.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a relator in a False Claims Act qui tam action may rely on the statute of limitations in 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(2) in a suit in which the United States has declined to intervene and, if so, whether the relator constitutes an “official of the United States” for purposes of Section 3731(b)(2).

In 2006, Respondent Billy Joe Hunt worked for the Parsons Corporation (“Parsons”) in Iraq to fulfill Parson’s $60 million munitions clean-up contract with the Department of Defense. United States ex rel. Hunt v. Cochise Consultancy, Inc. at 1083–84. Parsons sought bids from subcontractors and initially awarded a contract to ArmorGroup.

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Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Issues

Whether a plaintiff’s Administrative Procedure Act claim “first accrues” under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) when an agency issues a rule—regardless of whether that rule injures the plaintiff on that date—or when the rule first causes a plaintiff to “suffer[] legal wrong” or be “adversely affected or aggrieved.”

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether Corner Post, Inc.’s (“Corner Post”) claim under the Administrative Procedure Act was barred under a particular statute of limitation, and whether that six-year statute began running 2011 when the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (“Federal Reserve”) published their regulation, or in 2018 when Corner Post was first founded and affected by it. Corner Post asserts that interpreting statutes of limitations to start when harm is inflicted on plaintiffs is consistent with historic models of statutory interpretation and fairness. The Federal Reserve counters that the statute in question was clear in its terms and intentions to give administrative agencies a distinct time period during which to expect legal challenges, and as such the six-year statute would begin with the promulgation of the regulation. The outcome of this case has serious implications for administrative law and statutory interpretation, particularly with respect to the practicability of suing agencies for long-standing policies.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a plaintiff’s Administrative Procedure Act claim “first accrues” under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) when an agency issues a rule—regardless of whether that rule injures the plaintiff on that date—or when the rule first causes a plaintiff to “suffer[] legal wrong” or be “adversely affected or aggrieved.”

In 2010, Congress amended the Electronic Fund Transfer Act to address fees for consumer debit transactions charged to merchants, “interchange fees,” by debit-card-issuing banks (e.g., Visa and Mastercard).  

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CTS Corp. v. Waldburger

Issues

Does § 9658 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act apply to state statutes of repose in addition to state statutes of limitations?

In 2009, Respondent Peter Waldburger and other landowners discovered that their well water was contaminated with chemicals similar to the ones stored by CTS Corporation when it owned the land 20 years earlier. About two years after this discovery, Waldburger and the other landowners brought a nuisance action, subject to North Carolina law, against CTS. North Carolina requires that suits involving real property be brought within three years of the injury becoming discoverable (a statute of limitation) and within ten years of the defendant’s last act (a statute of repose). In attempting to prevent dismissal of this case, Waldburger argues that this latter ten year requirement is preempted by § 9658 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA"). CTS argues that § 9658 does not apply to statutes of repose, only to statutes of limitations. The Supreme Court now has to consider whether § 9658 applies to statutes of repose. Resolution of this case will have far-reaching consequences, affecting both potential defendants, including industrial companies and the United States government, and potential victims of contamination and hazardous waste—which could include anyone who does not know that they are suffering injury from undiscovered hazardous waste.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

For certain state-law tort actions involving environmental harms, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) preempts the state statute of limitations’ commencement date and replaces it with a delayed commencement date provided by federal law. Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 9658 provides that if “the applicable limitations period for such an action (as specified in the State statute of limitations or under common law) provides a commencement date which is earlier than the federally required commencement date, such period shall commence at the federally required commencement date in lieu of the date specified in such State statute.” Id. § 9658(a)(1). Section 9658, in turn, defines “applicable limitations period”-i.e., the state laws to which § 9658 applies-to “mean[] the period specified in a statute of limitations during which a civil action referred to in subsection (a)(1) of this section may be brought.” Id § 9658(b)(2).

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit deepened a split in the state and federal appellate courts by interpreting § 9658 to preempt not just state statutes of limitations but also state statutes of repose. A statute of limitations extinguishes a claimant’s right to pursue a cause of action after a certain period of time following accrual, whereas a statute of repose abolishes a cause of action as to a particular defendant after a period of time, regardless of whether the claim has accrued.

The question presented is: Did the Fourth Circuit correctly interpret 42 U.S.C. § 9658 to apply to state statutes of repose in addition to state statutes of limitations?

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Facts

From 1959 to 1985, Petitioner CTS Corporation (“CTS”) operated a fifty-four acre facility in Asheville, North Carolina, where notable quantities of chemicals were stored. Waldburger v. CTS Corp. 723 F.3d 434, 440 (4th Cir. 2013). In 1987, CTS sold this property to Mills Gap Road Associates after promising realtors that the land was clean.

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