Fernandez v. United States

    Issues

    Can federal judges consider reasons that support vacating a conviction when deciding whether to reduce a sentence for “extraordinary and compelling reasons?”

    Oral argument:
    November 12, 2025
    Court below:
    United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

     

    This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether federal judges may reduce a prisoner’s sentence under the compassionate release statute for reasons that may also fall under a post-conviction motion challenging the legality of a sentence. Joe Fernandez, convicted and sentenced to life on October 7, 2014, for participating in a double murder-for-hire conspiracy, sought a sentence reduction after the trial judge expressed doubts regarding the credibility of the government’s witness and the fairness of the verdict based on extraordinary and compelling reasons. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that prisoners must bring arguments regarding innocence or sentencing errors through the habeas process, not via compassionate release. Fernandez argues that Congress designed the compassionate release statute to afford courts broad discretion to reduce sentences in exceptional circumstances. The United States government, meanwhile, argues that the compassionate release statute is limited to four specific categories of circumstances: age, illness, family hardship, or other circumstances the Bureau of Prisons finds compelling. The outcome of this case will have a major impact on how much discretion federal judges have in revisiting sentences they believe are unjust, thereby clarifying the balance between mercy and finality for criminal defendants. 

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether a combination of “extraordinary and compelling reasons” that may warrant a discretionary sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) can include reasons that may also be alleged as grounds for vacatur of a sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

    Facts

    Prisoners seeking release on the grounds that their sentence was in violation of the law can move to make such a collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). 18 U.S.C § 3582(c)(1)(A) permits a court to reduce an otherwise valid sentence for “extraordinary and compelling reasons” after considering factors laid out in 18 U.S.C § 3553(a).

    In February 2000, Mexican cartel members Arturo Cuellar and Idelfonso Flores traveled to New York to collect a cocaine shipment payment from Jeffery Minaya. Minaya had hired Patrick Darge to kill Cuellar and Flores to avoid the payment. Darge had recruited Luis Rivera as a getaway driver and Petitioner Joe Fernandez as a backup shooter. On February 22, 2000, Fernandez shot and killed Cuellar and Flores, then fled with Darge and Rivera.

    Fernandez surrendered himself to the police on October 18, 2011. While Fernandez’s co-defendants pleaded guilty, Fernandez went to trial. On February 6, 2013, a federal grand jury indicted Fernandez with one count of conspiracy in a murder-for-hire resulting in death under 18 U.S.C. § 1958 and one count of aiding and abetting the use of a firearm in a violent crime resulting in death under 18 U.S.C. § 924. The jury convicted Fernandez of both counts on March 7, 2013.  

    Fernandez argued on three separate occasions that the evidence to convict him was insufficient because Darge’s testimony against him was not reliable. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York rejected Fernandez’s argument and issued him two consecutive life sentences. Meanwhile, Fernandez’s co-defendants received lighter sentences, ranging from two to thirty years. Fernandez continued to collaterally attack his conviction and was successful on some counts.  On November 3, 2021, the district court vacated Fernandez’s firearm charge for unconstitutional vagueness. The district court refused to overturn Fernandez’s murder-for-hire conviction, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (“Second Circuit”) affirmed the decision.  

    On November 30, 2021, Fernandez filed a motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), arguing that the following warranted sentence reduction: (1) Darge’s non-credible testimony; (2) the co-defendants’ lower sentences; (3) imprisonment conditions during the COVID-19 pandemic; and (4) Fernandez’s rehabilitation in prison. The district court considered in particular the first and second factors.  As to the first factor, the district court agreed with Fernandez that there were issues with Fernandez’s conviction due mostly to Darge’s reliability as a witness against Fernandez.  On the second factor, the district court again agreed with Fernandez that courts may consider disparate treatment between co-defendants.  Based on these two issues, the district court granted Fernandez compassionate relief and ordered him released on November 17, 2022.

    On December 12, 2022, the government appealed to the Second Circuit. On June 11, 2024, the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s decision to release Fernandez. In addressing the first factor, the Second Circuit reasoned that § 3582 is limited by 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and therefore the extraordinary and compelling reasons language from § 3582 is not relevant. As for the second factor, the Second Circuit concluded that even under § 3582, a sentencing disparity between co-defendants is not an extraordinary or compelling reason.  

    Fernandez subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari on November 13, 2024. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on May 27, 2025. 

    Analysis

    DEFINITION OF “EXTRAORDINARY AND COMPELLING” REASONS

    Fernandez first contends that courts should interpret 18 U.S.C. § 3582 according to its plain meaning. Fernandez argues that when the words are clear, judges should not narrow the meaning of the statute with interpretations that Congress did not explicitly include. Fernandez explains that a court may consider any relevant facts when modifying a sentence under the First Step Act unless Congress or the Constitution says otherwise. Fernandez highlights the rule that sentencing judges may weigh a broad range of information and argues that nothing in the First Step Act’s text or structure expressly or implicitly narrows that traditional discretion.

    Fernandez further argues that § 3582(c)(1)(A) authorizes a reduction once the court has considered the § 3553(a) factors and determined that extraordinary and compelling reasons exist. Fernandez identifies two express limits: that any reduction must be consistent with the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements, and that rehabilitation alone is insufficient. Fernandez explains that traditional definitions define “extraordinary” as unusual or rare and “compelling” as forceful or persuasive, which together speak to the degree of the reasons rather than the kinds of reasons a court may consider. Accordingly, Fernandez argues that the terms do not imply categorical exceptions and that nothing in § 3582(c)(1)(A) prevents courts from considering relevant facts or arguments, including reasons that might also support relief under § 2255.

    Furthermore, Fernandez clarifies that rehabilitation can count as part of a broader mix of reasons for sentence reduction. Fernandez argues that, by the same logic, courts may consider § 2255-type issues within a § 3582 motion because when Congress barred rehabilitation alone, it still permitted it as one component of a broader set of circumstances supporting an extraordinary and compelling finding. Fernandez emphasizes that a judge’s lingering doubt about possible innocence, especially that of the trial judge, together with significant disparities among co-defendants, can contribute to a finding that the reasons are extraordinary and compelling. Fernandez highlights that in 1984, after eliminating federal parole, Congress created § 3582 to give courts the ability to reduce sentences. Fernandez also contends that in 2018, Congress authorized prisoner-initiated motions to expand the use and transparency of compassionate release. Fernandez argues that these developments together indicate an intent to provide courts broader discretion to weigh equitable considerations in unusual cases.

    In response, the United States Federal Government argues that even under a plain meaning interpretation, Fernandez’s reasons were not extraordinary and compelling.   The United States points out that “extraordinary and compelling” should be defined as “most unusual” or “far from common.” The United States explains that ordinary claims of trial or sentencing error are common and fall within the scope of § 2255. The United States notes that Fernandez challenged the jury’s finding of guilt and the reliability of the government’s witness at trial, after trial, on appeal, and under § 2255, and largely lost. The United States contends that relabeling those arguments under a § 3582 motion does not suddenly make them extraordinary and compelling.

    In addition, the United States asserts that § 3582 allows only a reduction of an already valid sentence. The United States argues that the § 3582 use of “reduce” implies that the original judgment must remain in place and therefore the statute does not authorize vacatur. Id. The United States argues that, as a result, using § 3582 to attack the conviction’s validity would be inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statute. The United States further explains that Congress narrowed post-sentencing changes when it replaced the broad Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 reconsideration standard with a stricter extraordinary and compelling standard. The United States notes that Rule 35 allowed judges to correct illegal sentences at any time and to reduce sentences within a short window for any reason. The United States argues that reading § 3582 to include § 2255-type claims would recreate the broad consideration that Congress eliminated.  

    The United States further explains that § 3582 is administered by the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) and aligns with the Sentencing Commission’s policy, which focuses on personal circumstances such as age, illness, and caregiving. The United States highlights that the BOP lacks expertise on trial-error issues and that historic policy examples never treated those issues as grounds for compassionate release. The United States concludes that the Sentencing Commission’s latest policy statement from 2023 does not include errors in the original conviction or sentence.

    § 3582 & § 2255: PARALLEL TRACKS OR CONFLICT?

    Fernandez argues that § 3582 and § 2255 offer different types of relief and therefore are not in conflict with each other. Fernandez posits that § 2255 targets unlawful judgments and offers vacatur, while § 3582 presumes a valid judgment and authorizes a discretionary reduction only in exceptional circumstances. Fernandez characterizes a § 3582 motion as a holistic showing based on the totality of circumstances. Fernandez argues that a § 3582 motion only looks at equitable considerations and therefore does not ask the court to alter the judgment. Fernandez asserts there is no irreconcilable conflict to trigger an implied repeal, so courts need not choose one over the other or read either as narrowing or restricting the other. Fernandez explains that even when a concern about innocence overlaps with a theory available under § 2255, a § 3582 motion relying partly on that concern is not a disguised § 2255 motion, because it asks the judge to use discretion to reduce a still-valid sentence based on equitable factors rather than to vacate it. Fernandez adds that each statute has its own standards and procedures, and that neither is categorically more specific than the other. Fernandez concludes that the procedural and threshold differences between the two statutes reduce any risk that courts will deploy § 3582 to bypass § 2255 across ordinary claims.

    The United States, in response, argues that using § 3582 to air claims that defendants can raise under § 2255 would put the statutes in conflict. In the United States view, § 2255 is the specific and comprehensive vehicle for post-conviction error claims, while § 3582 is a narrow exception to sentence finality for compassionate release. The United States maintains that including error-based arguments in § 3582 would undercut the balance by allowing prisoners to sidestep procedural limitations. The United States argues that defendants repeatedly use § 3582 to revive defaulted issues, invoke non-retroactive changes in law, relitigate guideline-calculation disputes barred under § 2255, and evade timeliness and gatekeeping requirements. The United States warns that Congress did not intend “extraordinary and compelling” to become a judge-by-judge pathway around § 2255’s limits or a marker of anything unusual.The United States posits that labeling such contentions “extraordinary and compelling” would, in effect, replace § 2255’s structured scheme with case-by-case discretion. The United States emphasizes that, had Congress intended § 3582 to carve out an exception to § 2255, it would have said so expressly. Instead, the United States explains that Congress used limiting words that exclude commonplace error claims and designed a process that assumes a valid judgment, requires BOP exhaustion, and looks to Sentencing Commission policy that focuses on personal circumstances. The United States concludes that the trial or sentencing error is not a proper basis for § 3582 relief.

    Discussion

    THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION

    In support of Fernandez, the Constitutional Accountability Center (“CAC”) explains that Congress specifically passed the First Step Act to shift sentencing decision-making powers from parole authorities to judges, who are better equipped to assess the fairness and proportionality of an offender’s sentence.  The New York Council of Defense Lawyers (“NYCDL”), also in support of Fernandez, adds that the burden of demonstrating “extraordinary and compelling” circumstances is already extremely high for petitioners, so broad judicial discretion here does not threaten any abuse of the compassionate relief provision.  Further, the NYCDL asserts that disqualifying any compassionate relief motion because the reasons could fall under § 2255 will give prosecution an unfair advantage because under this scheme, a defendant could not argue a sentence reduction based on weak evidence, while the government would face no limitations in opposing the motion based on the evidence’s strength.

    The United States counters that expanding judicial discretion regarding extraordinary and compelling reasons in a compassionate release motion would bypass key procedural limitations, such as direct and collateral review, which the United States argues is inappropriate because extraordinary and compelling circumstances are not subjective terms to be open to interpretation.  Rather, the United States asserts that these terms have specific, restrictive meanings and that Congress did not intend to permanently leave the door open for sentence reductions for lesser reasons. The United States ultimately argues that Congress never intended the compassionate release statute to give the courts essentially unlimited power to, on their own whim, subjectively decide what may constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason. 

    BALANCING FINALITY AND FAIRNESS 

    Professor Douglas Berman, in support of Fernandez, argues that Congress instructed the Sentencing Commission to develop guidelines that provide fair sentences, including those that encourage lighter sentences for first-time, non-violent offenders. Additionally, the CAC argues that § 3582(c)(1)(A) appropriately authorizes sentencing reductions or releases on mercy grounds where it would be unfair for the defendant to continue his sentence due to compelling circumstances. The CAC contends that Congress intended the compassionate release statute to operate on “compassion,” as evidenced by the Sentencing Reform Act’s separation of compassionate release from the modification or correction of a sentence. Senators Richard J. Durbin and Cory A. Booker, similarly in support of Fernandez, add that, since the First Step Act’s enactment, prisoners have received compassionate release for grounds such as unusually long sentences or sentences imposed alongside improper career offender classifications, but would not have received such relief under the United States’ interpretation of § 3582(c)(1)(A). 

    In response, the United States argues that the fairness-finality line should remain firm to prevent prisoners’ attempts to avoid collateral review restrictions. The government also emphasizes that § 3582(c)(1)(A) is a narrow, not broad, mechanism to reduce sentences because prisoners frequently object to their sentences that do not rise to the high level of extraordinary and compelling reasons, and if the courts interpret the statute broadly, it may cause a flood of release applications. Additionally, the United States urges that disturbing the finality of a prison sentence should be avoided, absent these reasons, to ensure the goals of predictability and legitimacy of the legal system. Specifically, the United States claims that Fernandez’s potential innocence cannot constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason because this type of objection is vague, and that accepting it would allow other prisoners to reduce their sentences for unclear and unimportant reasons, thereby conflicting with the essential goals of the legal system.

    Conclusion

    Authors

    Written by:    Raj Walia and Jeff Feng

    Edited by:      Kehan Rattani

    Additional Resources