First Choice Women’s Resource Centers, Inc. v. Platkin

    Issues

    May a party challenge a state subpoena in federal court on First Amendment grounds without first being compelled to comply with the subpoena in state court?

    Oral argument:
    December 02, 2025
    Court below:
    United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

    This case asks the Supreme Court to decide if a party subject to a state investigatory subpoena may seek relief in federal court without first being held in contempt in state court for refusing to comply with the subpoena. In his capacity as the Attorney General of New Jersey, Respondent Matthew Platkin issued a subpoena to Petitioner First Choice Women’s Resource Centers, Inc. (“First Choice”), requesting that it turn over donor information. The subpoena was issued in relation to Platkin’s investigation of alleged deceptive and fraudulent practices by First Choice in its solicitation of donations and administration of reproductive healthcare. First Choice argues that a federal forum should be available to hear its claims because the organization and donors are both suffering injuries-in-fact from the chilling of their First Amendment rights. Platkin argues that First Choice’s alleged injury is too speculative to constitute an injury-in-fact that would allow for Article III jurisdiction. This case has significant policy implications for the First Amendment rights and safety of organizations and their donors who are targets of state subpoenas and who seek federal relief from state investigations. 

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether, when the subject of a state investigatory demand has established a reasonably objective chill of its First Amendment rights, a federal court in a first-filed action is deprived of jurisdiction because those rights must be adjudicated in state court.

    Facts

    Federal and state governments have the power to issue subpoenas to procure information related to an alleged wrongdoing. In New Jersey, if someone fails to comply with a subpoena sent by the Attorney General, the Attorney General may ask a court to order the party to comply with the subpoena. A party who fails to comply with that order could be held in contempt of court and face penalties. The state of New Jersey grants the Attorney General the power to issue administrative subpoenas for investigating actions potentially unlawful according to the Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”), the Charitable Registration and Investigation Act (“CRIA”), and Professions and Occupations Act (“P&O Law”).

    In November 2023, the Attorney General of New Jersey Matthew Platkin issued a subpoena to First Choice Women’s Resource Centers (“First Choice”) in relation to an investigation into First Choice’s potential violations of the CFA, CRIA, and the P&O Law. First Choice, a pro-life women’s health clinic, allegedly deceived donors and potential clients with misleading language on its website, allegedly provided faulty medical advice, and allegedly neglected licensing requirements for professionals administering health care at its facilities. Among the materials requested in the subpoena was donor information that New Jersey wished to use to identify donors who may have been misled by First Choice.

    Before its deadline to respond to New Jersey’s subpoena, First Choice challenged the subpoena in federal court, arguing that the subpoena infringed upon its First Amendment rights and was too general. The district court dismissed First Choice’s challenge, finding its injury “unripe” since the state lacked power to enforce its subpoena without first obtaining a judicial order. Platkin then filed an enforcement action in state court, while First Choice appealed the district court’s decision. After Platkin successfully obtained the judicial order from state court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit remanded First Choice’s challenge of the subpoena to district court, acknowledging that its claims were “ripe.” However, for a second time, the district court dismissed because the claims were unripe, determining that First Choice’s claims could not reach the ripeness threshold until they were required to “respond to the subpoena under threat of contempt.”

    Meanwhile, in state court, the parties were ordered to meet and negotiate the scope of the subpoena and determine remaining constitutional disputes. On appeal in federal court, the Third Circuit dismissed, determining that First Choice’s complaint could not demonstrate the needed injury-in-fact because its constitutional claims had not yet been fully adjudicated in state court.

    First Choice petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted on June 16, 2025. 

    Analysis

    FEDERAL FORUM GUARANTEE

    First Choice argues that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 guarantees it a federal forum to bring its First Amendment claim. First Choice argues that plaintiffs may typically assert constitutional claims under § 1983 in federal court without first asserting them in state court. First Choice contends that the lower court’s decision effectively created a state litigation requirement before reaching federal court, contradicting precedent set in Knick v. Township of Scott.First Choice asserts that a state court litigation requirement for unripe constitutional injuries presents a unwinnable dilemma: if a plaintiff litigates in state court to prove the ripeness of their constitutional injuries and loses, res judicata may bar the issue from being relitigated in federal court. First Choice argues that res judicata does not only bar claims actually litigated in state court, but those that could have been argued there as well. First Choice believes the possibility of federal review in the Supreme Court, well after lengthy state litigation, is not a sufficient substitute for the guarantee of a federal forum specified in Section 1983. Therefore, First Choice argues that the preclusive effects of state litigation suggest that a state litigation requirement does not exist.

    Platkin acknowledges that First Choice has the right to a federal forum if it can establish a ripeinjury under Article III. , Platkin asserts that First Choice is wrong to be concerned about a state-litigation requirement because Platkin agrees that such a requirement does not exist. Platkin notes that the lower court’s ruling did not rest on this logic. However, according to Platkin, First Choice incorrectly assumes that claims under § 1983 require a federal forum. Platkin asserts that First Choice must first prove that Article III jurisdiction exists with a reasonable injury under § 1983. Platkin further argues that First Choice’s preclusion concerns do not justify a federal forum guarantee in opposition to established Article III jurisdictional requirements. Platkin believes that First Choice misinterprets Knick, and that there is no state-litigation requirement creating a preclusion trap. Platkin points out that a ripe Article III claim would not fall victim to any preclusion trap because the federal forum would be available. Platkin also argues that parallel litigation in state and federal courts and appeal to the Supreme Court are all options that circumvent any preclusion dilemma that may inhibit future plaintiffs.

    RIPENESS OF ARTICLE III INJURIES

    First Choice argues that it suffered two main Article III injuries. First Choice alleges that its first Article III injury is that the subpoena chilled its First Amendment rights. First Choice points out that under Laird v. Tatum, Article III injuries include the chilling of one’s expressive rights instead of an outright prohibition. First Choice maintains that the forced disclosure of its donor list chills its donors’ freedom of association and speech rights, even though the Constitution protects against the forced revealing of one’s political associations and beliefs. First Choice argues that the hostile political climate towards pregnancy centers like First Choice indicates that a reasonable person would be chilled from exercising their First Amendment rights to publicly associate with its organization. First Choice asserts that the logical result of the subpoena is that donors will be deterred from interacting with First Choice, and that this dynamic constitutes a chilling of either the donors’ or First Choice’s First Amendment rights. First Choice alleges that its second alleged Article III injury is the threat of enforcement of the subpoena. First Choice asserts that the threat of enforcement is a sufficient injury-in-fact when the plaintiff (1) intends to engage in conduct with constitutional interest, (2) the conduct is arguably burdened, and (3) there is a credible threat of enforcement. First Choice contends that the first two criteria are met because the subpoena chills its expression. Additionally, First Choice argues that, because the Attorney General expressly threatened and followed through on opening an enforcement action for the subpoena, a credible threat of enforcement existed. New Jersey’s view that the administration of a “non-self-executing” subpoena is not ripe enough to open a § 1983 claim in federal court would, according to First Choice, mean that federal courts lack jurisdiction over any pre-enforcement challenge, because subpoenas do not carry penalties until non-compliance is adjudicated by a court. Rather, First Choice contends that it continuously suffers an injury-in-fact until the subpoena is quashed, and therefore its claims are ripe enough for review in a federal forum. Lastly, First Choice asserts that prudential concerns do not deny jurisdiction to its § 1983 claims. First Choice asserts that federal courts have a responsibility to hear disputes where jurisdiction is present. However, First Choice asserts that it meets the fitness and hardship factors of the prudential ripeness doctrine because there are no questions of fact remaining, and First Choice will face irreparable harm if it is not granted prompt judicial review.

    Platkin responds by asserting that First Choice has not established a ripe injury-in-fact to trigger Article III federal jurisdiction. Platkin argues that a chilling effect must be “objectively reasonable” to constitute a ripe injury. Platkin continues by arguing that a chill-based injury is unripe if it is speculative or subjective in nature. Platkin argues that the alleged harm must be actual or imminent, rather than based on speculative future injuries. Platkin asserts that First Choice’s injury is contingent upon the state court’s enforcement of the subpoena and is therefore speculative. Platkin points out that First Choice has not yet been required to produce donor information, and First Choice has not provided evidence that donors have been harmed by mere issuance of the subpoena. Platkin further argues that should the donor information be revealed, future donors would not be reasonably deterred from associating with First Choice because there are ways to donate to First Choice without the risk of disclosure. Platkin asserts that because they are omitting several of First Choice’s donation webpages from the disclosure order within the subpoena, First Choice cannot establish that its expressive rights were chilled. Platkin also claims that there is no basis for finding that disclosure influences any harassment First Choice faces in the hostile political climate. Platkin asserts that First Choice’s theory that reasonable donors would change their behavior is too speculative, noting that there is no evidence that donors would be the subject of harassment. Platkin points out that the laws at issue target First Choice instead of donors, and First Choice has not established that donors have been harmed by the instant proceedings. According to Platkin, First Choice cannot show a ripe injury in a pre-enforcement challenge unless the government’s action comes with the threat of severe penalties and causes a significant and immediate change in conduct. Platkin argues that since non-self-executing subpoenas do not come with penalties for noncompliance, even a serious threat that the State will enforce penalties cannot provide Article III standing. Platkin leans on the legal tradition of administrative subpoenas, asserting that the receipt of a non-self-executing subpoena has never been the basis for a ripe Article III injury. Whether or not non-self-executing subpoenas can ever establish a ripe chill-based injury is irrelevant, according to Platkin, because the facts of this case ultimately do not support a conclusion that First Choice suffered a ripe injury-in-fact.

    Discussion

    RELIEF FROM FIRST AMENDMENT CHILLING EFFECT OF STATE INVESTIGATIONS

    The Chamber of Commerce of the United States (“The Chamber of Commerce”), in support of Petitioner, argues that states increasingly use investigations to silence and intimidate political opponents by chilling their political speech in violation of the First Amendment. The Chamber of Commerce asserts that prompt access to federal courts is necessary to prevent the chilling effect of state civil investigations because state courts can be influenced by state politics. The Buckeye Institute, in support of Petitioner, argues that forcing the targets of state investigations to litigate in state court before they can access federal court imposes an immense cost burden on those targets, which are often non-profits or public interest organizations. The Buckeye Institute points out that this financial burden is particularly intense for organizations which rely on anonymous donations for funding because donors may be deterred from contributing to organizations that are targets of investigations seeking donor identities.

    The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the District of Columbia, and nineteen other states (“Massachusetts et al.”), in support of Respondent, assert that targeted organizations can seek relief from state investigations in state court, pointing out that state courts routinely apply the U.S. Constitution and are more than capable of adjudicating First Amendment claims.  Massachusetts et al. argue that state courts will provide adequate relief from the chilling effects of state investigations, so a federal venue is not necessary to prevent these effects. The Local Government Legal Center and its three founding member organizations (“LGLC”) argue that federal litigation over state subpoenas is inefficient because states often issue subpoenas without intending to enforce them in state court.  LGLC also points out that federal courts cannot enforce state subpoenas, so if the state wins in federal court it will still bring an enforcement action in state court, which will result in a greater financial burden on both the state and the targeted organization.

    PRIVACY AND SAFETY CONCERNS 

    The Equal Protection Project, in support of Petitioner, argues that the government cannot be trusted to keep sensitive personal information data private, and that leaking such data may result in political violence against unpopular groups. The Equal Protection Project summarizes several recent government data leaks and argues that ruling for Respondent would make it easier for governments to collect the data of political organizations by denying them a federal forum. The Equal Protection Project further asserts that recent increases in political violence endangers donors whose information is subpoenaed by state governments, so making it easier for the government to gather donor information endangers the targets of government subpoenas.  The Buckeye Institute also points to several recent government data leaks, arguing that the information requested by Respondent, if it became public, could subject anonymous donors to doxxing, harassment, or more severe forms of political violence.

    Massachusetts et al., in support of Respondent, argue that state civil investigations are designed to protect the privacy of the investigation targets. Massachusetts et al. explain that targets of state investigations normally negotiate confidentiality agreements with the state during state court litigation, arguing that providing a federal forum for targets of state investigations disincentivizes these negotiations. States often, according to Massachusetts et al., use civil investigations rather than litigation to protect confidentiality, which in turn protects the privacy of the investigation’s targets. Thus,Massachusetts et al. explain that allowing targets to seek relief in federal court inhibits this use of civil investigations, forcing states to litigate and expose organizations to public scrutiny. Platkin additionally argues that the state is unlikely to leak sensitive donor information, and that state investigations do not threaten the safety of their targets even with increases in political violence. 

    Conclusion

    Authors 

    Written by:    Sam Schoenberg and Matthew Charles

    Edited by:      Andrew Hallowell

    Additional Resources