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Harris v. Quinn

Issues

  1. Can a State compel in-home caregivers to financially support a union to be their exclusive representative for collective-bargaining purposes?  
  2. Since the State has failed thus far to designate a union to be a particular group’s representative, do individuals falling within that group have standing to bring their claim?

Under Illinois law, caregivers who provide in-home assistance to disabled individuals through certain Medicaid-waiver programs may be compelled to support a private organization to be their exclusive representative for collective-bargaining purposes. According to Illinois, the purpose of the mandate is to prevent inter-union rivalries that might hinder collective-bargaining negotiations and to prevent non-union members from “free-riding” off union members.  In this case, the Supreme Court will consider whether compelled support for exclusive representation in this specific context violates the Constitution. Petitioners argue that forcing in-home service providers to unionize infringes upon their First Amendments rights, including freedom of speech and freedom of association.  Respondents counter that the Supreme Court’s precedent allows the government to force public workers to unionize when there is a compelling government interest for doing so. However, the fact that the Supreme Court has granted certiorari on such a narrow issue has many commentators speculating that the Court may be intending to decide much more than is immediately apparent, including decisions that may have drastic consequences for the very future of labor unions. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. May a State, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, compel personal care providers to accept and financially support a private organization as their exclusive representative to petition the State for greater reimbursements from its Medicaid programs?   
  2. Did the lower court err in holding that the claims of providers in the Home Based Support Services Program are not ripe for judicial review?  

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Facts

Petitioners in this case are individuals who provide in-home assistance to disabled persons in Illinois. Harris v. Quinn, 656 F.3d 692, 694 (7th Cir. 2011). Some of the petitioners operate under Illinois’s Home Services Program (“Rehabilitation Program”) while the rest operate under Illinois’s Home-Based Services Program (“Disabilities Program”).

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Horne v. Department of Agriculture

In 2002, California raisin farmers Marvin and Lena Horne (“Horne”) substantially reorganized their raisin business in order to handle the raisins that they produced to try to avoid the requirement under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 (“AMAA”) to turn over a percentage of handled raisins to the government. After Horne’s failure to comply, the USDA brought an action against Horne according to the required AMAA procedure. Although the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals initially ruled against Horne on his takings claim, the Ninth Circuit amended its opinion and determined that Horne’s takings claim was “unripe” because Horne had to raise his takings claim in the Court of Federal Claims pursuant to the Tucker Act. Horne and the USDA disagree over whether Horne’s takings claim is ripe for adjudication; the USDA believes that the claim is unripe until Horne pursues it in the Court of Federal Claims. Specifically, the USDA believes that the AMAA does not displace the Tucker Act’s otherwise-mandatory procedures, while Horne asserts that the AMAA’s comprehensive statutory scheme displaces the Tucker Act for all related claims. Horne states that such a requirement mandates costly, duplicative litigation, while the USDA counters that such a result is the desired outcome of the statutory scheme.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in holding, contrary to the decisions of five other Circuit Courts of Appeals, that a party may not raise the Takings Clause as a defense to a "direct transfer of funds mandated by the Government," Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 521 (1998) (plurality), but instead must pay the money and then bring a separate, later claim requesting reimbursement of the money under the Tucker Act in the Court of Federal Claims. 

2. Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in holding, contrary to a decision of the Federal Circuit, that it lacked jurisdiction over petitioners' takings defense, even though petitioners, as "handlers" of raisins under the Raisin Marketing Order, are statutorily required under 7 U.S.C. § 608c(15) to exhaust all claims and defenses in administrative proceedings before the United States Department of Agriculture, with exclusive jurisdiction for review in federal district court.

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Issue

May raisin farmers raise the Takings Clause as a defense to a USDA order requiring them to pay a monetary equivalent to a portion of their crop, or must they litigate non-takings defenses in the government enforcement action, pay the disputed amount to the government if liable, and then file suit in the Court of Federal Claims to recover their money?

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Summers v. Earth Island Institute

Issues

Whether the APA and Supreme Court precedent allow parties to directly challenge the Forest Service’s regulations limiting public notice, comment, and administrative appeals for certain projects even if the parties are not simultaneously challenging a site-specific application of the regulations.

 

Earth Island Institute and other conservation groups sued the United States Forest Service after it authorized application of regulations 36 C.F.R. 215.4(a) and 36 C.F.R. 215.12(f) to a planned salvage logging project in the Sequoia National Forest. The conservation groups claimed that the regulations, which limit public notice, comment and administrative appeals, were invalid under the Administrative Procedure Act, which protects the ability of the public to appeal administrative actions. The parties settled the dispute over the regulations as they were applied to the salvage logging project, but the conservation groups continued the suit as a direct facial challenge to the regulations themselves. At issue before the Supreme Court in this case is whether judicial review of the regulations was proper, whether the conservation groups established standing and ripeness to challenge the regulations after settling the controversy over the regulations’ application to the specific project, and whether issuing a nationwide injunction was a proper remedy. The outcome of the case will influence federal agencies’ requirements to provide administrative appeals, the ability of the public to challenge administrative actions, and the scope of equitable remedies against improper applications of agency regulations.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether the Forest Service’s promulgation of 36 C.F.R. 215.4(a) and 215.12(f), as distinct from the particular site-specific project to which those regulations were applied in this case, was a proper subject of judicial review.

2. Whether respondents established standing to bring this suit.

3. Whether respondents’ challenge to 36 C.F.R. 215.4(a) and 215.12(f) remained ripe and was otherwise judicially cognizable after the timber sale to which the regulations had been applied was withdrawn, and respondents’ challenges to that sale had been voluntarily dismissed with prejudice, pursuant to a settlement between the parties.

4. Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the nationwide injunction issued by the district court.

In 1992, Congress enacted the Forest Service Decisionmaking and Appeals Reform Act (“ARA”). See Brief for Petitioners, Priscilla Summers et al.

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