Rutherford v. United States

    Issues

    Can a district court consider sentencing disparities created by the First Step Act when deciding whether compassionate release is warranted by “extraordinary and compelling reasons?”

    Oral argument:
    November 12, 2025
    Court below:
    United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

     

    This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the compassionate release provision of the Sentencing Reform Act allows courts to consider disparities created by the First Step Act’s prospective reduction in mandatory minimum sentences. Petitioner Daniel Rutherford argues that the phrase “extraordinary and compelling” invites a totality of the circumstances analysis utilizing any relevant facts, including sentencing length and changes in law. Respondent United States counters that change in law disparities are not “extraordinary and compelling reasons” under the plain meaning of the statute. The outcome of this case will impact the separation of powers between branches of government as well as the mechanisms for remedying sentence disparities.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether a district court may consider disparities created by the First Step Act’s prospective changes in sentencing law when deciding if “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warrant a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).

    Facts

    As part of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“SRA”), Congress enacted a “compassionate release” provision that allows district courts to reduce prison sentences.  The provision specifically gives district courts the power to modify sentences if “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction,” and the reduction is consistent with “applicable” policy statements and the federal sentencing guidelines. In 2018, Congress enacted the First Step Act (“FSA”) to reform federal prisons and sentencing law. Specifically, the FSA reduces mandatory minimum sentences for certain drug and firearm offenses and allows prisoners to file compassionate release motions after exhausting administrative remedies with the Bureau of Prisons.

    In 2003, Daniel Rutherford, then 22 years old, committed two armed robberies of a chiropractic office within five days. He was arrested, tried, and convicted of two counts of robbery, one count of conspiracy to commit robbery, and two counts of using a firearm during a violent crime. Rutherford’s crimes carried a sentence of 100 to 125 months for the robbery charges, plus consecutive mandatory minimum seven-year and twenty-five-year sentences for the firearms charges. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania sentenced Rutherford at the high end of the sentencing guidelines to a total of about forty-two and a half years imprisonment, broken down into the minimum thirty-two years for the weapons charges plus 125 months, to run consecutively. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed Rutherford’s conviction. After Rutherford’s conviction, the FSA reduced the mandatory minimum for the weapons charges to seven years in prison for each conviction, meaning that had Rutherford would have been subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of fourteen instead of thirty-two years if he had been sentenced after the FSA’s passage.  

    Rutherford attempted to secure compassionate release from the district court multiple times. In his third attempt, filed in April 2021, he argued that the FSA’s passage constitutes the “extraordinary and compelling reason” necessary to grant him early release under the compassionate release provision. However, prior to the district court ruling on Rutherford’s motion, the Third Circuit decided United States v. Andrews, which held that the FSA is not an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for compassionate release. In April 2023, the district court denied Rutherford’s motion, citing Andrews. After Rutherford’s motion was denied, the U.S. Sentencing Commission amended its policy statement to say that when deciding compassionate release, courts could consider nonretroactive changes to sentencing law, like the FSA.

    Rutherford appealed to the Third Circuit, which instructed the parties to address in their briefs: 1) whether the court should consider amendments to sentencing guidelines in assessing a compassionate release motion, and if so, 2) the extent to which the federal sentencing guidelines abrogates the Third Circuit’s holding in Andrews. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that the FSA does not abrogate Andrews. The court reasoned that despite the guideline change, allowing compassionate release based on the FSA contravenes Congress’s intent that the FSA be non-retroactive.  

    Johnnie Markel Carter (“Carter”) also filed a motion seeking compassionate release after the passage of the FSA.  Similar to Rutherford, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of compassionate release based on Andrews.

    On January 30, 2025, Rutherford filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States.  On June 6, 2025, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated the case with Carter v. United States. 

    Analysis

    INTERPRETING THE COMPASSIONATE RELEASE PROVISION

    Rutherford argues that the text of the compassionate release provision permits the consideration of changes in sentencing law that result in large disparities.  Rutherford contends that the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” limitation for compassionate release cannot be distilled to a categorical rule. Thus, Carter argues that evaluating whether a set of circumstances qualifies as “extraordinary and compelling” requires a context-dependent, case-by-case factual analysis. Rutherford argues that stacked mandatory minimum sentences and significant sentencing disparities can constitute “extraordinary and compelling” circumstances. Because holistic evaluation requires consideration of all relevant factors, Rutherford argues that courts should be permitted to consider sentence length and disparity. Further, Rutherford points out that there is only one textual limit on the holistic standard: namely that rehabilitation is not sufficiently “extraordinary and compelling” on its own. Drawing on statutory construction precedents, Rutherford argues that the presence of an explicit limit on sentencing practices makes additional judicially constructed implicit limits inappropriate. Thus, Rutherford contends that categorically barring the consideration of length and disparity improperly constrains what qualifies as “extraordinary and compelling” more than what Congress intended.

    Additionally, Rutherford argues that purpose of the SRA was to provide compassionate release where unforeseeable and significant changes in a defendant’s circumstances rendered continued imprisonment unjust. Rutherford maintains that Congressional reports and hearings related to the SRA specifically contemplated its ability to safeguard against unfairly long sentences. Rutherford notes that, prior to the compassionate release provision, it was the norm for courts to consider the “fullest information possible” when deciding whether to modify a sentence. Thus, Rutherford argues that the SRA did not limit what information courts could consider, it merely specified that relief can be granted only where those considerations indicate “extraordinary and compelling” circumstances.

    The United States counters that the sentencing disparities caused by the FSA are not “extraordinary and compelling.” The United States notes that non-retroactivity in sentencing laws is the norm. Thus, the United States argues that there is nothing unusual about recent offenders serving less time due to a change in sentencing law. Similarly, the United States asserts that the exclusion of prior offenders from the benefits of the FSA was a deliberate policy choice made by Congress. The United States argues that this policy decision is also reflected in the adoption of the SRA. To support this, the United States relies on the fact that the SRA’s “extraordinary and compelling reasons” requirement supplanted district courts’ traditional discretion to reduce sentences for any reason, thus making finality more difficult to disrupt. Further, the United States rejects the argument that the explicit exception for rehabilitation precludes any further limits. Rather, the United States argues that rehabilitation was specifically included because there was a prior understanding that it was “extraordinary and compelling.”

    Additionally, the United States argues that the compassionate release provision historically applied to personal circumstances rather than legal ones. The United States explains that the provision was understood and intended to replace the parole authority that allowed for a reduction in the period before a prisoner would be eligible for parole. Those parole reductions were typically used in cases of severe illness, and the Bureau of Prisons interpreted the compassionate release provision in the same manner. The United States argues that the legislative history supports the contention that the SRA was targeted at addressing personal circumstances. Further, the United States argues that the traditional sentencing approach of broadly considering all relevant information is not analogous to the compassionate release provision because the provision has a threshold eligibility requirement.

    AUTHORITY OF THE SENTENCING COMMISSION

    Rutherford argues that the proper interpretation of the First Step Act requires courts to follow the Sentencing Commission’s policy guidelines allowing consideration of disparities caused by changes in law.   Carter argues that Congress empowered the Sentencing Commission to promulgate policy statements defining what circumstances are “extraordinary and compelling” and makes those policy statements binding on the courts. Carter adds that the Sentencing Commission’s discretion in exercising this authority is large due to its unique position as a judicial agency whose policies are directed at federal judges. Rutherford asserts that courts are tasked with determining the typicality of individual cases utilizing the permissible spectrum of information outlined by Congress and the Sentencing Commission. Thus, Rutherford argues that courts are improperly encroaching on the Sentencing Commission’s statutory role by prohibiting particular factors across the board.  

    Rutherford asserts that courts should instead follow the Sentencing Commission’s policy guidance. Rutherford explains that the Sentencing Commission only permits considerations of changes in law when a defendant (1) received an unusually long sentence, (2) has already served at least ten years, (3) would likely receive a highly reduced sentence at the time the motion is filed, and (4) the court also considers the defendant’s full “individualized circumstances.” Rutherford argues that this policy statement mirrors the text of the SRA by specifying that sentences must be unusually long and establishing that changes in law are not sufficient on their own to demonstrate “extraordinary and compelling” circumstances. Carter adds that the Sentencing Commission’s interpretation is reasonable because it does not disturb finality by making changes in law dispositive and because cases meeting the first three requirements are unusual by definition.

    The United States counters that, despite the Sentencing Commission’s authority, it cannot define “extraordinary and compelling” in a manner that is inconsistent with the SRA. The United States contends that when Congress delegates discretion to an agency, that discretion is necessarily limited by the language in the authorizing statute. Insofar as the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement contradicts the court’s statutory analysis, the United States argues it is invalid. The United States rejects the notion that the statute empowering the Sentencing Commission to “describe what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons” equates to granting it the authority to issue a conclusive definition for the courts. The United States claims thateven ambiguous statutory mandates place limits on agency discretion. Indeed, the United States argues that the textual limits of the FSA mean that the Sentencing Commission can only narrow the scope of what is “extraordinary and compelling.”

    Additionally, the United States asserts that courts are tasked with assessing whether the Sentencing Commission has adopted a reasonable interpretation of the law and that courts must independently determine “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for a sentence reduction. The United States argues that courts have an explicit and independent statutory role in interpreting what “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for sentence reductions are. The United States reads the SRA to require that reductions are acceptable under both court and Sentencing Commission standards. Therefore, the United States argues that if a court does not think particular reasons warrant a reduction, it does not need to move to the portion of the inquiry considering the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements.  

    Discussion

    SEPARATION OF POWERS IN SENTENCING

    Senators Corey Booker and Dick Durbin (collectively “Senators”) argue that Congress expressly delegated broad power to the Sentencing Commission to define “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for a sentence reduction, allowing these guidelines to evolve over time as new reasons for sentence reductions arise. A group of clinical law professors emphasize that delegating power to the Sentencing Commission allowed experts and stakeholders to participate in sentencing guideline creation.  Professor Douglas Berman agrees that the “division of labor” between Congress and district courts is consistent with criminal justice norms and leads to responsible sentencing policy.  Professor Berman adds that granting authority to the Sentencing Commission enables regular evaluation and improvement of sentencing guidelines. Further, the National Association of Federal Defenders asserts that the discretion district judges have to reduce sentences more efficiently resolves cases, given the frequent consolidation of sentence reduction motions by judges. 

    The United States posits that the Sentencing Commission cannot have unfettered policymaking power to define what “extraordinary and compelling” means. The United States argues that if the Sentencing Commission has no actual limits on its power to set sentencing guidelines, then it could turn anything into a pretense for a sentence reduction, allowing courts to improperly override Congress. The United States further argues that without limits, the Sentencing Commission could bypass previous Supreme Court decisions rejecting reasons to limit sentences by adding them as bases for sentence reduction. In the opinion below, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals (“Third Circuit”) points out that the Sentencing Commission’s binding policy statements must reflect Congressional intent, and that courts are required to constrain these policy statements to Congress’s directives to maintain separation of powers.   The Third Circuit reasons that the Sentencing Commission would be overstepping its administrative authority by interpreting the FSA as retroactive, given that Congress explicitly made nonretroactive sentencing changes.

    REMEDYING PAST SENTENCING DISPARITIES

    A group of former federal judges argue that the rampancy and severity of sentencing disparities justify the FSA’s retroactive changes to existing sentences. The Cato Institute and two other research institutes (“Cato Institute et al.”) argue that the previous guidelines caused mass incarceration and penalized defendants who exercised their right to trial with longer sentences.  Cato Institute et al. therefore argue that Congress specifically gave judges more discretion under the FSA to address these sentencing disparities. Additionally, the New York Council of Defense Lawyers (“NYCDL”) argues that the FSA addressed disparities caused by stacking lengthy sentences for additional weapons or narcotics, causing defendants to receive longer sentences.  Further, Families Against Mandatory Minimums and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (collectively “FAMM”) argue that affirming the Third Circuit would unjustly foreclose relief for rehabilitated inmates, leaving them stuck in prison with unnecessarily long sentences that the FSA subsequently reduced. 

    The United States contends that if the FSA were retroactive, district courts would be burdened with more litigation, creating significant administrative challenges. The United States explains that the sentencing guideline changes are supposed to better account for overcrowding and individual circumstances like age and health, not disrupt prior court decisions. The United States adds that the Bureau of Prisons is responsible for evaluating whether individual circumstances warrant compassionate release, and it would be administratively untenable to additionally burden them with evaluating sentencing disparities and filling additional sentence-reduction motions. The United States contends that reversing the Third Circuit will deepen sentencing disparities because individual judges’ views about sentencing guideline changes will dictate retroactive sentencing decisions, leading to disparate outcomes for inmates depending on which judge presides over their case.

    Conclusion

    Authors

    Written by:    V. Carter and Olivia Hussey

    Edited by:      Andrew Hallowell

     

    Additional Resources