Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe I

    Issues

    Do the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act support a judge-made private cause of action for aiding and abetting liability?

    Oral argument:
    April 28, 2026
    Court below:
    United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

    This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) and the Torture Victim Protection Act (“TVPA”) allow individuals to sue someone for aiding and abetting the commission of an international human rights violation. The ATS allows foreign nationals to sue in U.S. federal courts for violations of international law or U.S. treaties, while the TVPA allows individuals to sue for damages caused by torture. Cisco Systems, Inc. argues that neither the ATS nor the TVPA provides a valid cause of action for aiding and abetting, and that the current judicial landscape does not allow for creating a new cause of action under these statutes. Fourteen unnamed members of the Falun Gong (referred to as “Doe”) argue that aiding and abetting is a universal norm in international law, which the ATS was intended to enforce, and that the language of the TVPA allows for an aiding and abetting claim. This ruling could have impacts on U.S. foreign relations and foreign direct investment by U.S. corporations, and on the accountability for U.S. corporations’ involvement with countries committing human rights violations.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    (1) Whether the Alien Tort Statute allows a judicially implied private right of action for aiding and abetting; and (2) whether the Torture Victim Protection Act allows a judicially implied private right of action for aiding and abetting.

    Facts

    Falun Gong is a religious practice that emerged in China in the early 1990s. As the Falun Gong grew, the Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”) launched a douzheng campaign, a systematic persecution campaign against dissident groups, against the Falun Gong. As part of this campaign, the People’s Republic of China created the “Golden Shield.” The Golden Shield is a mass surveillance network used to monitor internet activity, identify practitioners of Falun Gong, and give the information to Chinese intelligence agencies. Since China lacked the technological capacity to build such a system at the time, CCP officials sought help from foreign companies, including petitioner Cisco Systems, Inc. (“Cisco”), to build their security apparatus.

    Cisco is an international technology company headquartered in San Jose, California. In 2001, the CCP’s enforcement arm selected Cisco to help create the Golden Shield. Cisco Systems developed key components of the Golden Shield, manufactured hardware for the system, and provided ongoing support to CCP security officers. Cisco used the term douzheng in its marketing materials and described suppression of the Falun Gong as the main purpose of that particular technology. The surveillance apparatus collected information on Falun Gong practitioners, enabling Chinese authorities to identify, track, apprehend, and detain members of the Falun Gong.

    The respondents include thirteen Chinese citizens and one U.S. citizen, all of whom are members of the Falun Gong (collectively “Doe”). Doe alleges that they were subjected to arbitrary detention, forced labor, torture, and sent to re-education camps based on information gathered by the Golden Shield. Several of the Doe members say that information gathered by the Golden Shield, including private communications, family contacts, and personal data, were used against them during torture by the CCP. Doe alleges that the abuse they faced amounts to violations of international law.

    Doe sued Cisco in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, claiming Cisco was liable for the international crime of aiding and abetting under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) and the Torture Victim Protection Act (“TVPA”). The ATS allows foreign nationals to sue in U.S. federal courts for violations of international law or U.S. treaties. The TVPA allows individuals to sue for damages caused by torture. The district court stayed the case until the Supreme Court of the United States could rule on a relevant case, Kiobel v. Dutch Petroleum Co. When Kiobel determined that “the ATS does not apply extraterritorially,” the district court dismissed Doe’s claims for a lack of connection between the U.S. and the alleged violations. The district court also reasoned that Doe’s complaint did not prove that Cisco knew their products would be used for anything other than a security purpose, or that their actions had a substantial effect on the torture against Doe.

    Doe appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which considered whether aiding and abetting causes of action were allowed under the ATS and the TVPA. The Ninth Circuit held that aiding and abetting liability is available under the ATS because the definition of aiding and abetting is recognized as a customary principle of international law and is sufficiently defined and universal. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that establishing aiding and abetting liability under the ATS does not implicate separation of powers or foreign policy concerns, making it a proper exercise of judicial discretion. The Ninth Circuit also ruled that aiding and abetting claims are valid under the TVPA. The Ninth Circuit reasons that because the TVPA imposes liability on people who “subject an individual to torture,” the TVPA covers people who cause another to be tortured, encompassing those who aid and abet in torture as defined under the TVPA.

    On January 31, 2025, Cisco petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari, which was granted on January 9, 2026. 

    Analysis

    AIDING AND ABETTING LIABILITY UNDER THE ATS

    Cisco argues that aiding and abetting is an unavailable cause of action under the ATS because the only causes of action available under the ATS are the three recognized within the statute. Cisco highlights that in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress only had three primary offenses in mind when enacting the ATS. Cisco acknowledges that the Sosa decision suggested that new causes of action could theoretically exist. However, Cisco points out, even under the Sosa framework, which allows courts to recognize a new cause of action under the ATS if (1) the alleged international law violation reflects a “specific, universal, and obligatory” norm, and (2) the case would be “a proper exercise of judicial discretion,” creating a new cause of action would still be inappropriate. Cisco argues that the Supreme Court has warned that the judicial branch should not be involved in creating private rights of action, as the creation of these actions is mainly a legislative endeavor. Cisco argues that the traditional rule adopted by courts is that courts should refrain from creating private causes of action if there is any rational reason to think that Congress is better suited to create them. Cisco argues that there is never a sound reason for a court to create a new cause of action under the ATS because political branches have the power and means to weigh the foreign policy concerns of these causes of action, not the judicial branch. Cisco further believes that the framework in Sosa for creating new causes of action is inconsistent with its broader reasoning which cautions that creating new private causes of action under the ATS would improperly transform international law issues into judicial issues regarding private rights.

    Cisco additionally argues that even if the Sosa framework does allow for additional causes of action under the ATS, a private cause of action for aiding and abetting is specifically impermissible under Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. In Central Bank, the Court held that because civil causes of action for aiding and abetting are not available in common law precedent, and because Congress did not expressly include an aiding and abetting provision in the statute in question (the Securities Exchange Act), the judiciary lacked authority to recognize a civil aiding and abetting cause of action. Cisco argues that the reasoning in Central Bank applies to federal statutes beyond the Securities Exchange Act, meaning that if an aiding and abetting cause of action does not explicitly exist within a statute, then it is not available. Cisco further claims that Central Bank’s approach to aiding and abetting liability applies to the ATS because the ATS does not give district courts jurisdiction to create new liability under the ATS, similar to Central Bank’s approach of not creating new causes of action that do not exist within a statute. Additionally, Cisco argues that statutes made around the same time as the ATS include aiding and abetting liability, demonstrating that Congress purposely excluded aiding and abetting as a cause of action in the ATS.

    Doe claims that the ATS was meant to give the United States the ability to enforce the “law of nations”—rules meant to regulate interactions between sovereign states. Doe argues that there are multiple founding era sources that find aiding and abetting punishable under the law of nations, and Doe presents evidence of prominent prosecutions, including penalties enacted by Congress, for aiding and abetting under the law of nations. Additionally, Doe claims that the First Congress created the ATS to allow foreign victims of a law-of-nations violation to gain civil remedies from responsible parties instead of using government funds to redress their damages. As a result, according to Doe, the ATS should be read to allow aiding and abetting liability to foster the goal of requiring responsible foreign parties to provide compensation. Finally, Doe claims that federal officials, shortly after the ATS’ enactment, interpreted the ATS to allow aiding and abetting claims. Doe provides examples of early federal officials’ interpretations of the ATS to show the statute’s history of including claims of aiding and abetting, including a 1794 interpretation of the statute by Attorney General William Bradford who believed that British subjects could make an ATS claim against American nationals who aided and abetted in the plundering of property in Sierra Leone.

    Doe highlights that aiding and abetting is a universal norm in international law, asserting that all modern international criminal tribunals impose aiding and abetting liability. Additionally, Doe argues that major international human rights treaties tasked with resolving issues similar to those addressed by the ATS require parties who aid and abet in violation of the treaty be held accountable. Doe disagrees with Cisco’s argument that aiding and abetting liability is an improper exercise of judicial power, highlighting that the Framers of the Constitution extended the judicial branch’s jurisdiction to cases arising under treaties, and cases with foreign states as parties. When enacting the ATS, Doe argues, the First Congress directed federal courts to adjudicate international law violations and gave them broad power to do so. So, according to Doe, if Congress does not restrict the judiciary’s power to recognize aiding and abetting liability, then the judiciary should have power to hear these cases. Doe finally argues that Central Bank does not foreclose aiding and abetting claims, reasoning that aiding and abetting claims are subject to the Sosa framework, a framework that supports enforcing aiding and abetting liability. Doe highlights that Central Bank covered a securities statute, and there is no indication in its legislative history that Congress intended to extend the limitations of this statute to the existence of aiding and abetting liability in other statutes. According to Doe, the Central Bank decision was made based on an interpretation of the statute in question, not based on an “blanket presumption against aiding-and-abetting.”

    AIDING AND ABETTING LIABILITY UNDER THE TVPA

    Cisco argues that aiding and abetting is not a valid cause of action under the TVPA because the TVPA does not specifically include aiding and abetting as a cause of action. Cisco additionally argues that the TVPA imposes a liability on people who subject others to torture, but not to those who aid and abet in the torture caused by another. Cisco argues that the verb “subjects” in the statute holds accountable only individuals who direct the actions of someone personally carrying out the torture, not everyone who aids and abets in the torture of a private individual. Cisco reinforces this claim by demonstrating that current dictionary definitions and definitions from when the TVPA was enacted define “subjecting” a victim to something to mean inflicting some action on them, not just providing assistance to another. Cisco also highlights that the TVPA is a very narrow statute, targeting only a specific group of defendants, employing a ten-year limitations period, and using a well-balanced remedial scheme. So, allowing for aiding and abetting claims, Cisco argues, would make the statute more open-ended, at odds with the narrow approach of the statute.

    Doe argues that the text and context of the TVPA emphasize that Congress authorized aiding and abetting liability under the TVPA. Doe maintains that “subject” is a broad verb that in the context of the TVPA, “extends to those who substantially contribute to the acts of torture” of a specific person. Doe further argues that this usage of “subject” coincides with aiding and abetting liability, because aiding and abetting occurs when someone’s assistance has a substantial effect on the perpetration of an international crime. Additionally, Doe highlights that Congress enacted the TVPA to implement the U.S.’s obligations under the Torture Convention. According to Doe, the Torture Convention requires the U.S. to allow torture victims to hold those who aided and abetted in their torture accountable for their actions. Doe additionally argues that the Senate Judiciary Committee found that liability under the TVPA extends to people who “ordered, abetted, or assisted in the torture” of another. Doe asserts that an author of the TVPA explained that the bill conferred a tort remedy for torture. This means, according to Doe, that the TVPA was created with general tort principles in mind, which include providing civil causes of action for aiding and abetting.

    Discussion

    IMPACT ON FOREIGN POLICY AND ECONOMICS 

    The Washington Legal Foundation, in support of Cisco, argues that creating a cause of action for aiding and abetting under the ATS and TVPA could negatively impact both United States’ and American companies’ relations with foreign actors. Specifically, the Washington Legal Foundation warns that allowing the judiciary to rule on aiding and abetting liability in these cases would create an avenue for the judiciary to participate in foreign policy, such as by allowing a federal court to determine that the CCP violated the rights of the Falun Gong. The U.S. Chamber Of Commerce and other business advocacy groups (collectively “U.S. Chamber of Commerce”), in support of Cisco, add that these cases would allow U.S. courts to conduct investigations into foreign countries through the discovery necessary for such cases. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce additionally argues that expanding the ATS and TVPA in this way would deter foreign direct investment by U.S. companies, which in turn harms countries in need of the benefits of U.S. business’ investment. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce stresses that foreign investment is not only economically beneficial for foreign governments but is also a method of laying a foundation for improving human rights in these countries.

    Representative Christopher Smith and other members of Congress, in support of Doe, assert that Congress considered concerns about U.S. courts becoming overly entangled in foreign relations at the time of the TVPA’s enactment, but Congress still passed the bill with support from President Reagan. A group of former U.S. Ambassadors-at-Large for Global Criminal Justice and Prosecutors of international crimes (collectively “U.S. Ambassadors and Prosecutors”), in support of Doe, further counter foreign policy concerns by recognizing that aiding and abetting liability advances the U.S. foreign policy interest of penalizing crimes against humanity and war crimes. U.S. Ambassadors and Prosecutors reference notable tribunals supported by the U.S. to create accountability for human rights crises, such as those in Nuremberg, Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Cambodia, all of which included liability for aiding and abetting, indicating that imposing aiding and abetting liability has been a long-standing foreign policy perspective of the U.S.Oxfam America along with multiple economics and political science professors, in support of Doe, also counter claims of harming foreign economies by arguing that tort liability actually promotes economic efficiency by creating accountability in countries where sanctions or taxes have less of an impact.

    ACCOUNTABILITY FOR U.S. CORPORATIONS

    The U.S. Chamber of Commerce warns that U.S. corporations are often targeted in ATS claims, despite often not actually being the party committing the wrongdoing, and that these corporations suffer when their deep pockets make them a good target for this type of claim rather than a  foreign government.CACI Premier Technology, in support of Cisco, furthers that ATS claims can seriously harm U.S. corporations just by participating in the lengthy legal process required, referencing their own case which has included “eighteen years of litigation, six trips to the Fourth Circuit, two trials, and millions of dollars in defense costs.” The U.S. Chamber of Commerce also notes that many U.S. corporations find themselves taking on the expensive and burdensome task of restructuring their companies to create subsidiaries or units in foreign countries that are not subject to U.S. courts’ jurisdiction, supporting the idea that U.S. corporations are highly disadvantaged by these cases. Not only are U.S. companies harmed through these cases, warns the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, but foreign companies are also advantaged by filling the gaps formerly lead by U.S. corporations.

    The Center for a Free Cuba and other advocacy groups, in support of Doe, counter that the U.S. both should and historically has proven a desire to hold their own corporations accountable, in order to ensure the U.S. itself neither bears responsibility nor allows immunity for human rights violations.The Electronic Frontier Foundation, in support of Doe, supports the need for judicial accountability for U.S. corporations given that, particularly in the technology industry, the only real methods of accountability for human rights violations are informal and voluntary, evidenced by many technology companies not even having human rights policies or due diligence processes. Reverend Bob Fu and other religious freedom advocates, in support of Doe, further argue that accountability in the U.S. is necessary as without access to U.S. courts, victims of religiously motivated persecution would have few alternative avenues for relief. A group of persecuted Christian minorities and religious freedom advocates, in support of Doe, address the need for a broad reading of the ATS and TVPA not only because it is one of the only methods of redress for religious minorities, but also because ATS and TVPA liability prevents U.S. corporations from knowingly enabling persecution and expecting immunity in the U.S.

    Conclusion

    Authors

    Written by:    John Lauro and Evan Pittman

    Edited by:      Sierra Berry

    Additional Resources