liability

Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe I

Issues

Do the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act support a judge-made private cause of action for aiding and abetting liability?

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) and the Torture Victim Protection Act (“TVPA”) allow individuals to sue someone for aiding and abetting the commission of an international human rights violation. The ATS allows foreign nationals to sue in U.S. federal courts for violations of international law or U.S. treaties, while the TVPA allows individuals to sue for damages caused by torture. Cisco Systems, Inc. argues that neither the ATS nor the TVPA provides a valid cause of action for aiding and abetting, and that the current judicial landscape does not allow for creating a new cause of action under these statutes. Fourteen unnamed members of the Falun Gong (referred to as “Doe”) argue that aiding and abetting is a universal norm in international law, which the ATS was intended to enforce, and that the language of the TVPA allows for an aiding and abetting claim. This ruling could have impacts on U.S. foreign relations and foreign direct investment by U.S. corporations, and on the accountability for U.S. corporations’ involvement with countries committing human rights violations.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether the Alien Tort Statute allows a judicially implied private right of action for aiding and abetting; and (2) whether the Torture Victim Protection Act allows a judicially implied private right of action for aiding and abetting.

Falun Gong is a religious practice that emerged in China in the early 1990s. Doe I v.

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City and County of San Francisco v. Environmental Protection Agency

Issues

Does the Clean Water Act allow the Environmental Protection Agency to discipline permit-holders for violations of water quality standards without enumerating specific limits to which permit holders’ water discharges must conform?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine if the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) must impose specific limits in the permits it distributes under the Clean Water Act (“CWA”). The CWA empowers the EPA to issue National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permits to cities and businesses that discharge waste. The City of San Francisco contends that the EPA can only establish limitations on effluent discharges under the permit, and that it lacks the authority to establish other generic requirements. The EPA counters that its authority reaches beyond effluent limitations and that it is permitted to enforce limitations on water receiving standards. The outcome of this case has profound implications on businesses’ ability to avoid legal liability, as well as the interests of local communities.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Clean Water Act allows EPA (or an authorized state) to impose generic prohibitions in NPDES permits that subject permitholders to enforcement for exceedances of water quality standards without identifying specific limits to which their discharges must conform.

Like most cities in the United States, San Francisco operates a combined sewer system that collects both sewage and stormwater runoff. City of San Francisco v. U.S. EPA (“Ninth Circuit”) at 7. During extreme weather, the system occasionally exceeds capacity causing a combined sewer overflow (“CSO”) that discharges pollutants into surrounding waterways.

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indemnify

To indemnify, also known as indemnity or indemnification, means compensating a person for damages or losses they have incurred or will incur related to a specified accident, incident, or event. Typically, parties make a written agreement in which one party (indemnitor) promises to indemnify the other party (indemnitee) for future specified losses. 

Jesner v. Arab Bank

Issues

Can foreign plaintiffs sue corporations in the United States under the Alien Tort Statute?

Under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”), foreign victims of torts that violate international law may sue foreign perpetrators in United States courts if the case touches and concerns the United States. The Court must now determine whether the ATS contemplates suits against foreign corporations. Jesner et al.––survivors of terrorist attacks in the Middle East and the families of such victims––allege that Arab Bank (“the Bank”), headquartered in Jordan, financed terrorist organizations through its New York branch, and should therefore be within the purview of the ATS. The Bank denies these allegations, and maintains that, because corporate liability is not a universal international norm, United States courts do not have jurisdiction over foreign corporations under the ATS. Jesner argues that denying corporate liability will eliminate a significant deterrent against terrorism financing and create international discord, while the Bank counters that corporate liability would actually hinder counterterrorism efforts and damage the United States’ alliance with Jordan. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, categorically forecloses corporate liability.

Petitioners, Joseph Jesner, et al. (“Jesner”), are non-residents of the United States who were injured by terrorists in the Middle East. In re Arab Bank, PLC Alien Tort Statute Litigation, 808 F.3d 144, 147 (2d Cir. 2015 ). Respondent, Arab Bank, PLC (the “Bank”), is a global bank headquartered in Jordan, with a branch in New York.

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joint and several liability

piercing the corporate veil

Overview

"Piercing the corporate veil" refers to a situation in which courts put aside [wex:limited liability] and hold a [wex:corporation|corporation's] [wex:shareholder|shareholders] or [wex:director|directors] personally liable for the corporation’s actions or debts. Veil piercing is most common in [wex:close corporation|close corporations]. 

respondeat superior

Respondeat superior is a legal doctrine, most commonly used in tort law, that holds an employer or principal legally responsible for the wrongful acts of an employee or agent, if such acts occur within the scope of the employment or agency.  Typically when respondeat superior is invoked, a plaintiff will look to hold both the employer and the employee liable.

Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh

Issues

(1) Does a social media website that allegedly could have taken more meaningful action to prevent terrorists from using its services provide substantial assistance to those terrorists in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2333; and (2) can a social media website incur liability for aiding and abetting under § 2333 despite a lack of connection between their generic, widely available services and the specific terrorist act that injured the plaintiff?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, and Google provide substantial assistance to terrorists by allegedly not taking meaningful action to prevent such terrorists from using their services. This case also asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the same social media platforms can be held liable under the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (“JASTA”), even if their services were not used in connection with the specific act of terrorism that caused injury to the plaintiff. Twitter contends that a defendant does not knowingly provide substantial assistance through general awareness that terrorists were among its many users, and that liability cannot stem from such generalized assistance to a terrorist organization. Mehier Taamneh counters that whether Twitter and other defendants know of terrorist use of their services is a question of fact, and, at this stage, the Court need only decide that plaintiff’s factual allegation is plausible. Taamneh also argues that liability exists when a defendant substantially assists international terrorism and that JASTA’s text doesn’t limit liability to action that has a direct connection to the specific attack that injures the plaintiff.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether a defendant that provides generic, widely available services to all its numerous users and “regularly” works to detect and prevent terrorists from using those services “knowingly” provided substantial assistance under 18 U.S.C. § 2333 merely because it allegedly could have taken more “meaningful” or “aggressive” action to prevent such use; and (2) whether a defendant whose generic, widely available services were not used in connection with the specific “act of international terrorism” that injured the plaintiff may be liable for aiding and abetting under Section 2333.

On January 1, 2017, Abdulkadir Masharipov, an individual affiliated with and trained by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”), committed a terrorist attack on the Reina nightclub in Istanbul, Turkey. Gonzalez v. Google, at 16. Masharipov fired more than 120 rounds into a crowd of 700 people for seven minutes, injuring 69 and killing 39.

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Wyeth v. Levine

Issues

Whether a drug manufacturer that has complied with the Food and Drug Administration’s labeling requirements can still be liable under state product liability laws on grounds that the label was inadequate.

Court below

 

In 2000, Diana Levine was treated with Phenergan to relieve nausea caused by a migraine headache.  The drug was incorrectly administered into Levine’s vein, causing gangrene that ultimately led to the amputation of part of her arm. Levine sued Wyeth, Phenergan’s manufacturer, in Vermont Superior Court and the Supreme Court of Vermont on claims of negligence and products liability, arguing that Phenergan’s label was inadequate in warning consumers about its possible risks. Wyeth, on the other hand, argued that federal law preempted Levine’s state law claims, as state law directly conflicted with the requirements of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. With both lower courts ruling in favor of Levine, this case gives the Supreme Court an opportunity to further define the federal preemption doctrine by clarifying whether a drug manufacturer can be liable under state law after complying with the labeling requirements of the Food and Drug Administration. Stakeholders on both sides argue that the outcome of this case will have a direct impact on the kind of information included on drug labels and as such, has serious implications for patient safety and public health.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the prescription drug labeling judgments imposed on manufacturers by the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") pursuant to FDA's comprehensive safety and efficacy authority under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq., preempt state law product liability claims premised on the theory that different labeling judgments were necessary to make drugs reasonably safe for use.

In April of 2000, Diana Levine sought medical treatment for symptoms, such as pain and nausea, caused by a migraine headache. See Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179, 182 (Vt.

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·   Drug and Device Law Blog:  Views on issues related to pharmaceutical and medical device product liability litigation.

·   Pharmaceutical and Medical Devices:  Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P. Briefing on Wyeth v. Levine.

·   Drug Injury Watch Blog:. Information about prescription drug side effects.

·   Mass Tort Litigation Blog

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