FULD v. PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

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Nos. 24–20 and 24–151

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MIRIAM FULD, et al., PETITIONERS

24–20 v.

PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, et al.

EVA WALDMAN, et al., PETITIONERS

v.

PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, et al.

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER

24–151 v.

PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, et al.

on writs of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the second circuit

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 Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court.

 Congress passed the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act in 2019. The Act deems the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority—if they engage in specified conduct—to have consented to personal jurisdiction in civil suits brought in the United States under the Antiterrorism Act. The question presented is whether this personal jurisdiction provision violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

 I

A

 Before us are two separate lawsuits against respondents, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestinian Authority (PA)—entities responsible for carrying out, respectively, foreign and domestic governmental functions for parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. See 82 F. 4th 74, 80 (CA2 2023). Although the United States does not recognize respondents as sovereign, other nations do, and respondents maintain consular facilities and diplomatic missions around the world. The PLO also maintains an office in New York City as part of its mission to the United Nations, in which the PLO participates as a “Permanent Observer.” Ibid.

 Motivated by concerns over respondents’ support for overseas terrorism, Congress has for decades restricted their activities on U. S. soil. For example, in the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987, 101 Stat. 1406, 22 U. S. C. §5201 et seq., Congress found that the PLO and its constituent groups “ha[d] taken credit for, and been implicated in, the murders of dozens of American citizens abroad.” §5201(a)(4). Congress accordingly limited the PLO’s operations in the United States. §§5201(b), 5202. Congress has similarly restricted the PA’s ability to conduct activities on U. S. soil. See Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act of 2006, §7, 120 Stat. 3324, 22 U. S. C. §2378b. It has also placed limits on the distribution of foreign aid and other assistance to respondents. See Taylor Force Act, §1004(a), 132 Stat. 1144, 22 U. S. C. §2378c–1(a).

 As part of its comprehensive legal response to international terrorism, Congress also enacted the Antiterrorism Act of 1990 (ATA), §132, 104 Stat. 2250–2252, 18 U. S. C. §2331 et seq.; see H. R. Rep. No. 102–1040, p. 5 (1992). The ATA creates a civil treble damages cause of action for any U. S. national injured or killed “by reason of an act of inter national terrorism.” §2333(a); see also §2333(d)(2) (permitting aiding and abetting liability). The ATA provides for nationwide service of process and venue and exclusive jurisdiction in federal courts. §§2334(a), 2338.

B

 The ATA supplied the underlying cause of action in both lawsuits now before us. The first was brought by a group of American citizens (and their estates and survivors) injured in terror attacks in Israel. It was filed in 2004 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. See Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Org., No. 1:04–cv–397, 1 App. 1–51.¹ The case went to trial, and in 2015 a jury found respondents liable under the ATA. The jury awarded the plaintiffs $218.5 million in damages, which was trebled to $655.5 million.

 That victory was short lived. The next year, the Second Circuit vacated the District Court’s judgment and directed dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. Respondents were not subject to jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals held, because the complained of “killings and related acts of terrorism . . . were unconnected to the forum and were not expressly aimed at the United States.” 835 F. 3d 317, 337 (2016); accord, Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 851 F. 3d 45, 57–58 (CADC 2017).

 Congress responded by enacting the Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act of 2018 (ATCA), 132 Stat. 3183. The ATCA added a new provision to the ATA, which deemed defendants “to have consented to personal jurisdiction” if they engaged in certain activities in the United States or accepted particular forms of U. S. foreign assistance. See §4(a), id.,  at 3184. The Sokolow plaintiffs moved for the Second Circuit to recall its mandate in light of the ATCA. The Court of Appeals declined to do so, 925 F. 3d 570, 574–576 (2019), and the plaintiffs filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court, see Pet. for Cert. in Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Org., O. T. 2019, No. 19–764.

C

 While the Sokolow certiorari petition was pending, the landscape changed again—this time, through Congress’s enactment in December 2019 of the law at issue here: the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act (PSJVTA), §903, 133 Stat. 3082–3085, 18 U. S. C. §§2333, 2334. Section 903(c) of the PSJVTA, subtitled “Jurisdictional Amendments to Facilitate Resolution of Terrorism-Related Claims of Nationals of the United States,” superseded the ATCA’s jurisdictional provisions. 133 Stat. 3083. Under the PSJVTA’s now operative provision, which refers to the PA and PLO by name, respondents “shall be deemed to have consented to personal jurisdiction” in ATA cases in two specified circumstances. §§2334(e)(1), (5).

 The first jurisdictional predicate relates to respondents’ practice “of paying salaries to terrorists serving in Israeli prisons, as well as to the families of deceased terrorists”—conduct which Congress has condemned as “an incentive to commit acts of terror.” Taylor Force Act, §1002(1), 132 Stat. 1143. Jurisdiction is triggered under this prong if, after a specified time, respondents “mak[e] any payment, directly or indirectly”:

 “(i) to any payee designated by any individual who, after being fairly tried or pleading guilty, has been imprisoned for committing any act of terrorism that injured or killed a national of the United States, if such payment is made by reason of such imprisonment; or

 “(ii) to any family member of any individual, following such individual’s death while committing an act of  terrorism that injured or killed a national of the United States, if such payment is made by reason of the death of such individual.” §2334(e)(1)(A).

 The PSJVTA’s second predicate ties jurisdiction to respondents’ activities on U. S. soil. The PLO and PA are deemed to have consented to personal jurisdiction if, after a specified period, either “continues to maintain,” “establishes[,] or procures any office, headquarters, premises, or other facilities or establishments in the United States,” or otherwise “conducts any activity while physically present in the United States.” §2334(e)(1)(B). The statute expressly excludes respondents’ United Nations mission and its ancillary activities. §2334(e)(3).

D

 Given this legislative development, we granted the Sokolow plaintiffs’ pending certiorari petition, vacated the judgment of the Second Circuit, and remanded for “further consideration in light of the [PSJVTA].” 590 U. S. ___ (2020). A few days after our remand, a different set of plaintiffs—the family of an American citizen stabbed in a 2018 attack in the West Bank—sued respondents under the ATA in the Southern District of New York, and invoked the PSJVTA as the basis for personal jurisdiction. See Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Org., No. 1:20–cv–3374, 2 App. 383–439.

 Both sets of plaintiffs—the Sokolow plaintiffs back in District Court and the Fuld plaintiffs there for the first time—alleged that respondents had engaged in conduct sufficient to trigger both PSJVTA predicates. In response, respondents contended that the PSJVTA violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The United States intervened in both cases to defend the law’s constitutionality. See 28 U. S. C. §2403(a); Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 5.1(c).

 Both District Courts found evidence that respondents  had engaged in conduct sufficient to satisfy at least the payments prong. Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Org., 607 F. Supp. 3d 323, 325 (SDNY 2022); 578 F. Supp. 3d 577, 583, and n. 3 (SDNY 2022). But both courts agreed with respondents that “an exercise of jurisdiction under either of the PSJVTA’s factual predicates is unconstitutional.” 607 F. Supp. 3d, at 326; see also 578 F. Supp. 3d, at 595–596.

 The Second Circuit consolidated the cases and affirmed. Following Circuit precedent “holding that the due process analyses under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments parallel one another in civil cases,” the panel explained that the statute’s factual predicates involve conduct insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. 82 F. 4th, at 91, 102. And so, it reasoned, “those same activities” could not “reasonably be interpreted” under the deemed consent language as signaling respondents’ intent to submit to “the authority of ” U. S. courts. Id., at 91; see also id., at 102–104. The court therefore held that the PSJVTA could not, consistent with “the requirements of constitutional due process,” “establish personal jurisdiction over the PLO or the PA.” Id., at 80; 82 F. 4th 64, 73 (2023) (per curiam).

 The Second Circuit denied rehearing en banc. Judge Menashi, joined by two other judges in full and one judge in part, dissented. In his view, the panel had construed too narrowly the circumstances under which a foreign entity may be deemed to have consented to personal jurisdiction. See 101 F. 4th 190, 204–205 (2024). The dissent also disagreed that “the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment imposes the same limits on the jurisdiction of the federal courts that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes on the jurisdiction of the state courts.” Id., at 205. In the dissent’s view, “the federal government is not similarly situated to the state governments in the extraterritorial reach of its courts,” and so “the due process standards limiting the exercise of personal jurisdiction are not the same.” Ibid.

  We granted certiorari to decide whether the PSJVTA violates the Fifth Amendment. 604 U. S. ___ (2024).

II

 We have long held that a “court must have . . . power over the parties before it (personal jurisdiction) before it can resolve a case.” Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortgage Corp., 580 U. S. 82, 95 (2017). This requirement, we have stated, “flows . . . from the Due Process Clause.” Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U. S. 694, 702 (1982). Our modern personal jurisdiction cases, however, have grappled only with the limitations imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment on state courts. See 4 C. Wright, A. Miller, & A. Steinman, Federal Practice and Procedure §1068.1, pp. 696–699 (4th ed. 2015). We have expressly reserved “the question whether the Fifth Amendment imposes the same restrictions on the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a federal court.” Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., San Francisco Cty., 582 U. S. 255, 269 (2017) (emphasis added); see also Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U. S. 97, 102, n. 5 (1987).

 To be sure, this is not our first personal jurisdiction case to have originated in federal court. But under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[f]ederal courts ordinarily follow state law in determining the bounds of their jurisdiction over persons.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U. S. 117, 125 (2014) (citing Rule 4(k)(1)(A)) (applying Fourteenth Amendment analysis to evaluate personal jurisdiction in Federal District Court). Any difference between the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is therefore implicated in only a subset of federal cases, such as those in which personal jurisdiction is—as in the PSJVTA—“authorized by a federal statute.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 4(k)(1)(C). Because we must determine in these cases the constitutionality of such a statute, the question we have long reserved is now squarely before us.

 A

 Our current framework for assessing personal jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amendment derives from International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 (1945). Under that framework, “a tribunal’s authority” over a defendant “depends on the defendant’s having such ‘contacts’ with the forum State that ‘the maintenance of the suit’ is ‘reasonable, in the context of our federal system of government,’ and ‘does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 592 U. S. 351, 358 (2021) (quoting International Shoe, 326 U. S., at 316–317).

 Since International Shoe, “our decisions have recognized two types of personal jurisdiction: ‘general’ . . . and ‘specific.’ ” Bristol-Myers Squibb, 582 U. S., at 262. General jurisdiction lies in the forum where the defendant is domiciled or “fairly regarded as at home.” Ibid. (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown, 564 U. S. 915, 924 (2011)). A court in such a forum “may hear any claim against that defendant, even if all the incidents underlying the claim occurred in a different State.” Bristol-Myers Squibb, 582 U. S., at 262. No one contends, however, that the PLO and PA are subject to general jurisdiction in the United States.

 “Specific jurisdiction is different: It covers defendants less intimately connected with a State, but only as to a narrower class of claims.” Ford Motor Co., 592 U. S., at 359. A state court may exercise specific jurisdiction “over a nonresident defendant only so long as there exist ‘minimum contacts’ between the defendant and the forum State.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U. S. 286, 291 (1980) (quoting International Shoe, 326 U. S., at 316). The requisite contacts “for this kind of jurisdiction often go by the name ‘purposeful availment.’ ” Ford Motor Co., 592 U. S., at 359. “The defendant, we have said, must take  ‘some act by which it purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State.’ ” Ibid. (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U. S. 235, 253 (1958); alteration omitted). And the plaintiff ’s claims, we have held, must “deriv[e] from, or [be] connected with,” those activities. Goodyear, 564 U. S., at 919.

 Respondents urge us to apply this familiar Fourteenth Amendment framework here. See Brief for Respondents 49–50. They point out that the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are, textually speaking, nearly identical. Compare Amdt. 5 (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”) with Amdt. 14, §1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”).²

 We have long recognized, however, that “[w]hile the language of [the two] amendments is the same,” “they were engrafted upon the Constitution at different times and in widely different circumstances of our national life.” French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U. S. 324, 328 (1901). We have therefore anticipated that “questions may arise in which different constructions and applications of their provisions may be proper.” Ibid.

B

 We have repeatedly described the due process limitations imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment as driven by two principles: (1) “treating defendants fairly,” and (2) “protecting ‘interstate federalism.’ ” Ford Motor Co., 592 U. S., at 360 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U. S., at 293); see also, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb, 582 U. S., at 263. We have emphasized, therefore, “that the reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction over the defendant must be assessed ‘in  the context of our federal system of government,’ and stressed that the Due Process Clause ensures not only fairness, but also the ‘orderly administration of the laws.’ ” World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U. S., at 293–294 (quoting International Shoe, 326 U. S., at 317, 319; citation omitted). The requirement that a defendant have minimum contacts with the forum, we have said, “can be seen to perform [these] two related, but distinguishable, functions.” World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U. S., at 291–292.

 This framing follows from “the principles of interstate federalism embodied in the Constitution,” id., at 293, and the related protections of due process which ensure that individuals are “subject only to lawful power,” J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U. S. 873, 884 (2011) (plurality opinion). State sovereign authority is bounded by the States’ respective borders. We explained as much nearly one hundred years ago in Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U. S. 378, 404 (1933): “The application to the States of the rule of due process . . . comes from the fact that their spheres of activity are enforced and protected by the Constitution.” “Due process requires that the limits of jurisdiction shall not be transgressed,” and in our constitutional system, “[t]he limits of State power are defined in view of the relation of the States to each other in the Federal Union.” Id., at 401.

 Our Fourteenth Amendment personal jurisdiction standards emerged in that vein, as “a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States.” Hanson, 357 U. S., at 251. Those standards—and in particular, the requirement that a defendant have minimum contacts with the forum State—functionally “ensure that the States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.” World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U. S., at 292.

 These interstate federalism concerns, however, do not apply to limitations under the Fifth Amendment upon the  power of the Federal Government and the corollary authority of the federal courts. The Constitution confers upon the Federal Government—and it alone—both nationwide and extraterritorial authority. While “the limitations of the Constitution are barriers bordering the States and preventing them from transcending the limits of their authority,” there is no equivalent “ground for constructing an imaginary constitutional barrier around the exterior confines of the United States for the purpose of shutting that government off from the exertion of powers which inherently belong to it by virtue of its sovereignty.” United States v. Bennett, 232 U. S. 299, 306 (1914).

 We observed in Burnet, for example, that the geographical limitations on “the taxing power of the States under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” do not equivalently “restrict the taxing power of the Federal Government,” because “[t]he Constitution creates no such relation between the United States and foreign countries as it creates between the States themselves.” 288 U. S., at 400–401, 403, 405; accord, Cook v. Tait, 265 U. S. 47, 55–56 (1924). That same year, we recognized—in light of Congress’s “constitutional authority ‘to regulate commerce with foreign nations’ ”—the Federal Government’s exclusive authority “[i]n international relations and with respect to foreign intercourse and trade.” Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill. v. United States, 289 U. S. 48, 56, 59 (1933) (quoting Art. I, §8, cl. 3) (rejecting contention that state instrumentality was immune from paying import duties).

 Of particular salience here, we have also recognized the National Government’s interest in holding accountable those who perpetrate an “act of violence against” U. S. nationals—who, even when physically outside our borders, remain “under the particular protection” of American law. Gamble v. United States, 587 U. S. 678, 687 (2019). So too the National Government’s corresponding authority to make “the killing of an American abroad” punishable as a  federal offense “that can be prosecuted in [U. S.] courts.” Ibid. (citing 18 U. S. C. §2332(a)(1)); see also Art. I, §8, cl. 10 (giving Congress power to “define and punish” certain extraterritorial offenses). Indeed, that background context informed the enactment of the ATA, which legislators hoped would “ope[n] the courthouse door to victims of international terrorism” by “extend[ing] the same jurisdictional structure that undergirds the reach of American criminal law to the civil remedies that it defines.” S. Rep. No. 102–342, p. 45 (1992).

 Given the distinct territorial reach of the Federal Government’s sovereign power, it makes little sense to mechanically import the limitations that the Fourteenth Amendment imposes on the authority of state courts, which is restricted consonant with the States’ more constrained sovereign spheres. See Burnet, 288 U. S., at 401. Indeed, when evaluating state court jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amendment, we have emphasized that “personal jurisdiction requires” a “sovereign-by-sovereign . . . analysis.” Nicastro, 564 U. S., at 884 (plurality opinion). And we have acknowledged the straightforward premise that “the United States is a distinct sovereign.” Ibid. That distinction makes a difference.

 Accordingly, to the extent that the Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments both implicitly limit the jurisdictional authority of courts, they do so with respect to the distinct sovereignties from which those courts derive their authority. Because the State and Federal Governments occupy categorically different sovereign spheres, we decline to import the Fourteenth Amendment minimum contacts standard into the Fifth Amendment. Rather, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment necessarily permits a more flexible jurisdictional inquiry commensurate with the Federal Government’s broader sovereign authority.

 C

 In the cases before us the Second Circuit, relying on Circuit precedent, declined to apply a different jurisdictional test from the one required under the Fourteenth Amendment. See 82 F. 4th, at 102–105. The PLO and PA likewise urge us not to diverge from Fourteenth Amendment principles. They acknowledge that concerns of interstate federalism cease to be relevant in the Fifth Amendment context, but nonetheless take the view that related considerations of fairness and individual liberty justify the application of equivalent jurisdictional limitations here.

 To be sure, we have occasionally framed the personal jurisdiction limits on state courts as “represent[ing] a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty,” protecting a defendant from the burden of litigating in an inconvenient forum with which he has little connection. Omni, 484 U. S., at 104 (quoting Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 456 U. S., at 702). These statements are best understood, however, to reflect the principle that “due process protects the individual’s right to be subject only to lawful power.” Nicastro, 564 U. S., at 884 (plurality opinion). And “whether a judicial judgment is lawful depends on whether the sovereign has authority to render it.” Ibid.

 Interstate federalism concerns accordingly may be decisive for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., for instance, we stressed that “[e]ven if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State . . . , the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid judgment.” 444 U. S., at 294. We echoed the point in Bristol-Myers Squibb. After acknowledging that “the ‘primary concern’ is ‘the burden on the defendant,’ ” we emphasized that “[a]ssessing this burden” requires not only “consider[ing] the practical problems  resulting from litigating in the forum,” but also “the more abstract matter of submitting to the coercive power of a State that may have little legitimate interest in the claims in question.” 582 U. S., at 263. And so we clarified again: “[A]t times, this federalism interest may be decisive.” Ibid. While certainly germane to the Fourteenth Amendment inquiry, the “general fairness considerations” invoked by respondents do not compel the application of equivalent jurisdictional limits here. Nicastro, 564 U. S., at 883–884 (plurality opinion) (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U. S., at 294).

III

 Although we hold today that the Fifth Amendment does not impose the same jurisdictional limitations as the Fourteenth, we do not purport to delineate the outer bounds of the Federal Government’s power, consistent with due process, to hale foreign defendants into U. S. courts. On this score, the private petitioners argue that the Fifth Amendment imposes no territorial limits on personal jurisdiction. See Brief for Petitioner Miriam Fuld et al. 20. The United States, however, asks us not to embrace—at least for now—this maximalist theory of federal jurisdiction. The Government cautions that the theory is “not easily confirmed as a historical matter,” and points to “strong policy reasons . . . against reaching” it, including the possibility that other nations might respond in kind by haling Americans into their courts under expansive theories of jurisdiction. Brief for United States 47–48.

 We agree with the Government that we need not address the private petitioners’ unbounded jurisdictional theory today. The PSJVTA ties federal jurisdiction to conduct closely related to the United States that implicates important foreign policy concerns. We are wary to reach further and bless more attenuated assertions of jurisdiction when the cases before us do not require doing so. Cf. Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano Cty., 480 U. S. 102, 115 (1987) (“Great care and reserve should be exercised when extending our notions of personal jurisdiction into the international field.” (quoting United States v. First Nat. City Bank, 379 U. S. 378, 404 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting))). It is sufficient unto the day that, whatever the Fifth Amendment’s outer limits on the territorial jurisdiction of federal courts, the PSJVTA does not transgress them.

A

1

 The Federal Government’s “ ‘inherent’ foreign affairs power,” “like every other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution.” American Ins. Assn. v Garamendi, 539 U. S. 396, 416–417, n. 9 (2003) (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 320 (1936)). We accordingly review even legislation implicating foreign policy issues to ensure that it has not crossed a constitutional line. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U. S. 1, 34 (2010). We will not, however, cavalierly interfere with the political branches’ “delicate judgments” on matters of foreign affairs. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 584 U. S. 241, 273 (2018) (plurality opinion); see Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 578 U. S. 212, 215 (2016) (emphasizing that action in this realm “warrants respectful review by courts”). And when the Executive and Congress have spoken with one voice in that sphere, their coordinate action is “supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).

 In respectively passing and signing the PSJVTA into law, Congress and the President made a considered judgment to  subject the PLO and PA to liability in U. S. courts as part of a comprehensive legal response to “halt, deter, and disrupt” acts of international terrorism that threaten the life and limb of American citizens. H. R. Rep. No. 115–858, pp. 7–8 (2018). Combating terrorism is, we have recognized, “an urgent objective of the highest order.” Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U. S., at 28. The Federal Government, relatedly, has a strong interest in permitting American victims of international terror to pursue justice in domestic courts. Cf. Gamble, 587 U. S., at 687 (recognizing interest of United States in prosecuting “the killing of an American abroad . . . in [U. S.] courts”). Indeed, a “key premise” of the PSJVTA was Congress’s desire to facilitate “the adjudication of ATA claims like the plaintiffs’,” which it views as “vital” to “furthering the safety of Americans abroad, facilitating compensation for injuries or death, and deterring international terrorism.” Brief for United States 29, 36 (citing Brief for Sen. Charles Grassley et al. as Amici Curiae on Pet. for Cert. 18–19; H. R. Rep. No. 115–858, at 3–4, 7–8); see also §903(d)(1)(A), 133 Stat. 3085 (providing that the PSVJTA “should be liberally construed to carry out the purposes of Congress to provide relief for victims of terrorism”). The PSJVTA thus reflects the political branches’ balanced judgment of competing concerns over “sensitive and weighty interests of national security and foreign affairs” and fairness to these particular defendants—entities with which the Federal Government has complex, longstanding relationships in which concerns over terrorism have long been at the fore. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U. S., at 33–34; see Brief for United States 38, 43.

 The PSJVTA is also suitably limited to those ends. It does not put respondents at broad risk of being haled into U. S. courts for myriad civil liability actions. Rather, the statute applies only to ATA cases, a narrow category of claims that provide civil remedies only for Americans in jured by acts of international terrorism. See 4 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure §1068.1, at 733 (“[W]hen Congress has undertaken to enact a nationwide service statute applicable to a certain class of disputes, that statute should be afforded substantial weight as a legislative articulation of federal social policy.”). It is permissible for the Federal Government to craft a narrow jurisdictional provision that ensures, as part of a broader foreign policy agenda, that Americans injured or killed by acts of terror have an adequate forum in which to vindicate their right to ATA compensation.

 The statute’s jurisdiction triggering predicates are likewise narrow. The payments prong furthers the Federal Government’s longstanding policy of deterring these sorts of payments, which the United States has determined promote acts of terror that may injure or kill Americans. See Taylor Force Act, 132 Stat. 1143; Reply Brief for United States 2.³ And the activities prong—which predicates jurisdiction on respondents’ conduct within the United States—represents a continuation of the Federal Government’s longstanding, nuanced policy delineating the operations in which respondents may permissibly engage on U. S. soil. See Brief for United States 43. Far from an anything-goes approach, then, the PSJVTA ties jurisdiction to specific and narrow conduct that directly implicates issues of sensitive and ongoing concern in respondents’ relationships with the United States.

  The PSJVTA also limits jurisdiction to only two enumerated nonsovereign foreign entities, both of which have been subject to a series of congressional enactments aimed at deterring terrorism and accomplishing other foreign relations objectives. See, e.g., 8 U. S. C. §1182(a)(3)(B); 22 U. S. C. §§286w, 2227(a), 2378b(a) and (b), 2378c(a), 2378c–1(a), 5201, 5202. Far from haling just any run-of-the-mill private defendant into American courts, the PSJVTA represents but one targeted aspect of a multifaceted foreign policy toward these two sui generis foreign entities, both of which exercise governmental functions in a geopolitically sensitive region and have decades of “meaningful ‘contacts, ties, [and] relations’ ” with the United States. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U. S. 462, 472 (1985) (quoting International Shoe, 326 U. S., at 319).

2

 Respondents, for their part, contend that petitioners “greatly overstate the significance of the PSJVTA” to Congress’s antiterror efforts. Brief for Respondents 45. They point out that the statute only applies to them, but not any “other terrorist group or state-sponsor of terrorism.” Id., at 46; see also id., at 69–70. If anything, though, this supposed underinclusiveness only serves to reinforce that the statute reflects “delicate judgments” on matters of foreign policy that are in “the prerogative of the political branches to make.” Jesner, 584 U. S., at 273 (plurality opinion). “Congress and the Executive are uniquely positioned to make principled distinctions between activities that will further terrorist conduct and undermine United States foreign policy, and those that will not.” Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U. S., at 35. Rather than subject to jurisdiction in its courts a broader range of potential defendants—each of which presumably would implicate distinct foreign affairs concerns—the Federal Government took a narrower tack. We decline to second guess why Congress did not use  a blunter remedial tool to achieve its desired foreign policy ends. And moreover, the statute’s targeted applicability put the PLO and PA on full notice that they could be subject “to personal jurisdiction” in ATA suits in U. S. courts. 18 U. S. C. §§2334(e)(1), (5).

 In respondents’ view, deference to the political branches is also unwarranted here because “Congress’s explicit purpose [was] to reverse federal decisions” holding that the same activities that trigger jurisdiction under the PSJVTA were “insufficient to support the exercise of jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.” Brief for Respondents 14, 45. But we hold today that those lower courts applied the wrong constitutional test.

3

 We need not separately consider whether the statute comports with our cases addressing the circumstances under which a defendant may be deemed, consistent with due process, to have consented to jurisdiction. See, e.g., Mallory v. Norfolk Southern R. Co., 600 U. S. 122 (2023). Respondents’ consent-based arguments rest on the premise that Congress could not in the PSJVTA “transform constitutionally-insufficient conduct overseas into grounds for ‘deemed consent’ to personal jurisdiction in the United States.” Brief for Respondents 31. The Court of Appeals thought similarly. See 82 F. 4th, at 91. Since we hold that the statute ties the assertion of jurisdiction to predicate conduct that in and of itself bears a meaningful relationship to the United States, we need not further consider the matter through the lens of consent.

B

 Although we have already made clear that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not incorporate the Fourteenth Amendment minimum contacts standard,  the prospect remains that the Fifth Amendment might entail a similar “inquiry into the reasonableness of the assertion of jurisdiction in the particular case.” Asahi, 480 U. S., at 115. We need not determine whether such analysis is constitutionally required because, even if it were, the PSVJTA easily comports with the factors we have previously applied to determine “the reasonableness of the exercise of jurisdiction” even under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id., at 113. Reasonableness, we have explained, will depend in each case “on an evaluation of several factors,” including “the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum State, and the plaintiff ’s interest in obtaining relief.” Ibid. The PSJVTA ticks all three boxes.

 For largely the same reasons that we conclude there is a close connection between the PSJVTA’s predicate conduct and the United States, it follows that the forum sovereign has a substantial interest in adjudicating the dispute. We will not belabor that the Federal Government has an exceedingly compelling interest, as part of its comprehensive efforts to deter international terrorism, in providing a forum for American victims to hold the perpetrators of such acts accountable. For similar reasons, American plaintiffs have a strong interest in seeking justice through an ATA damages action in U. S. courts. Cf. Ford Motor Co., 592 U. S., at 368 (recognizing the “significant interests” of a forum State in “providing [its] residents with a convenient forum for redressing injuries inflicted by out-of-state actors” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

 Respondents, moreover, “do not complain of any lack of notice or contend that litigating these cases in the United States would force them to bear an unfair or unmanageable burden.” Reply Brief for United States 9. And as the United States points out, it seems implausible to think otherwise. See Brief for United States 38. Respondents are “sophisticated international organizations” that operate “billion-dollar budgets” and “govern a territory recognized  as a sovereign state by many other countries.” Ibid.; 101 F. 4th, at 208 (Menashi, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). They maintain embassies, missions, and delegations around the world and a longstanding “presence in the United States” which continues to this day. Brief for United States 3, 38. Nor could it have come as much of a surprise that respondents were haled into U. S. courts in these cases. They have litigated ATA suits here for decades, and in the PSJVTA were put on clear notice—far more than most defendants in the mine-run of litigation—that continuing to engage in certain specified conduct would open them up to potential federal court jurisdiction. See ibid.

 Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the PSJVTA’s jurisdictional rule makes “litigation ‘so gravely difficult and inconvenient,’ ” Burger King, 471 U. S., at 478, as to render the “exercise of personal jurisdiction . . . unreasonable and unfair,” Asahi, 480 U. S., at 116.

*  *  *

 The PSJVTA reasonably ties the assertion of federal jurisdiction over the PLO and PA to conduct that involves the United States and implicates sensitive foreign policy matters within the prerogative of the political branches. We hold that the statute’s provision for personal jurisdiction comports with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

 The judgments of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit are reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.