ANTI-TERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT (“AEDPA”)

McDaniel v. Brown

Issues

What is the standard of review for analyzing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim under Jackson v. Virginia? May a federal habeas court admit nonrecord evidence to determine the reliability of testimony and evidence given at trial?

 

Following a state conviction for sexual assault, Troy Brown (“Brown”) filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada. The District Court allowed Brown to present new evidence: a report from Dr. Lawrence Mueller. This report detailed a statistical error (“prosecutor’s fallacy”) made by the prosecution during the presentation of DNA evidence. Based on Dr. Mueller’s report, the District Court dismissed the DNA evidence from consideration, found insufficient evidence to convict Brown, and ordered a retrial. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Petitioner, Warden E.K. McDaniel (“McDaniel”), argues that, under Jackson v. Virginia’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard, a district court may not supplement the trial record. Additionally, McDaniel asserts that the District Court’s analysis was not sufficiently deferential to the state court. Brown agrees with McDaniel that the Ninth Circuit improperly applied Jackson. Brown, however, argues that the lower courts analyzed his case as a due process violation, and, as such, a retrial is  the proper remedy  to correct flawed DNA evidence.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. What is the standard of review for a federal habeas court for analyzing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)?

2. Does analysis of a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim pursuant to Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979), under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) permit a federal habeas court to expand the record or consider nonrecord evidence to determine the reliability of testimony and evidence given at trial?

In the early hours of January 29, 1994, a nine-year-old girl was sexually assaulted in the bedroom of her home. See Brown v. State, 934 P.2d 235, 237 (Nev.

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Additional Resources

·      Jonathan J. Koehler: One in Millions, Billions, Trillions: Lessons from People v. Collins (1968) for People v. Simpson (1995) (Apr. 2006)

·      New York Times: The Prosecutor’s Fallacy (May 16, 2007)

·      Science & Law Blog, Law Professors Blog Network: The Transposition Fallacy in Brown v. Farwell (May 30, 2008)

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Smith v. Spisak

Issues

Whether the Sixth Circuit applied the proper standards for determining whether a convicted murderer was unfairly affected by jury instructions and his own counsel’s statements during sentencing, when counsel repeatedly referred to the terrible nature of his own client’s acts in closing arguments at the penalty phase of the trial.

 

Respondent, Frank Spisak (“Spisak”), was convicted on four counts of aggravated murder and four other felony counts for engaging in a shooting spree on and around Cleveland State University in 1982. The jury recommended, and the judge accepted, a death sentence. After the Ohio state courts denied Spisak’s appeals, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ordered a new penalty phase of the trial. The Circuit Court held that defense counsel’s deficient performance during the trial’s sentencing phase functionally denied Spisak his Sixth Amendment right to effective legal representation. The Sixth Circuit held further that the jury instructions regarding sentencing violated the Eighth Amendment, because the jury may have misunderstood them to require a unanimous rejection of the death penalty before considering a life sentence. On its second time before the United States Supreme Court, Ohio argues that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") requires the federal courts to defer to the Ohio Supreme Court's decision to deny Spisak’s Sixth and Eighth Amendment claims.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Did the Sixth Circuit contravene the directives of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") and Carey v. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. 649 (2006), when it applied Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988), to resolve in a habeas petitioner's favor questions that were not decided or addressed in Mills?
  2. Did the Sixth Circuit exceed its authority under AEDPA when it applied United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), to presume that a habeas petitioner suffered prejudice from several allegedly deficient statements made by his trial counsel during closing argument instead of deferring to the Ohio Supreme Court's reasonable rejection of the claim under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)?

In 1983, Frank Spisak (“Spisak”) was convicted of murdering a minister and three students in a racially and homophobically motivated shooting spree at Cleveland State University and was sentenced to death. See Spisak v. Mitchell, 465 F.3d 684, 688 (6th Cir.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor John Blume and Professor Faust Rossi for their insights on this case. John Blume is a Professor of Law at Cornell Law School and the Director of the Cornell Death Penalty Project. Faust Rossi is the Samuel S. Leibowitz Professor of Trial Techniques at Cornell University and a co-author of the Brief of Amici Curiae Steven Lubet, et al., in support of Respondent.

Additional Resources

·      Wex: Law about Criminal Procedure

·      Capital Punishment in Context: Juror’s Understandings and Misunderstandings

·      Charles Doyle, Federation of American Scientists: Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty (Jun. 3, 1996)

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