ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether and under what circumstances a timely Rule 59(e) motion should be recharacterized as a second or successive habeas petition under Gonzalez v. Crosby. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), a petitioner may not obtain habeas relief for a state court’s decision on a claim unless the decision clearly runs counter to the Constitution or is based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Section 2244(b) of AEDPA requires a court to dismiss a claim, if it presents a second or successive habeas corpus application that was presented in a prior application. Banister argues that a Rule 59(e) motion, which mandates that a motion to alter or amend a judgment be filed within 28 days of the judgment, does not constitute a “second or successive habeas application” under Section 2244(b) because it is part of a habeas applicant’s first habeas proceeding. Although Gonzalez held that a Rule 60(b) motion, which asks a court to relieve the movant from a final judgment, can constitute a second or successive habeas application, Banister contends that a Rule 59(e) motion does not similarly apply to Section 2244(b)’s restrictions because it is distinct from a Rule 60(b) motion. In response, Davis argues that so long as a Rule 59(e) motion is made after a final adjudicated judgment, it constitutes a second or successive habeas application subject to Section 2244(b)’s restrictions. Davis further asserts that Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b) motions are similar enough to warrant the same treatment under Section 2244(b)’s restrictions. The outcome of this case will affect the timing for filing Rule 59(e) motions. This case will also have important implications for the limitations placed on federal habeas corpus review and on courts’ ability to correct or clarify previous rulings.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

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Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide two questions about the interpretation of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). First, does 28 U.S.C. § 2255 incorporate 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1)’s restrictions on second or successive motions to federal prisoners? Second, are the courts of appeals the final forum for federal prisoners seeking authorization to file such motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(e), or can the Supreme Court review these gatekeeping decisions? The Petitioner, Michael Bowe, argues that extending both the restrictions on second or successive motions and the bar on Supreme Court review to federal prisoners goes against congressional intent and creates an unnecessary roadblock to federal prisoner’s claims to be fairly adjudicated by the courts. Kasdin Mitchell, whom the Supreme Court appointed to defend the judgment below because the United States declined to do so, argues that allowing for second or successive motions will burden the courts with unnecessarily and largely erroneous filings. For its part, the United States argues that the bar on Supreme Court review in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(e) should extend to federal prisoners because they have other avenues, beyond AEDPA, to appeal their convictions. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will impact the fairness of habeas procedures and judicial economy.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

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