comity

Animal Science Products, Inc., et al., v. Hebei Welcome Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., et al.

Issues

Is a court bound to defer to a foreign government’s interpretation of its domestic law when appearing before the court?

 

This case will decide whether American courts are bound to accept a foreign government’s interpretation of its own laws. Animal Science Products Inc. (“Animal Science Products”) argues that a “binding deference standard”, which requires courts to accept an appearing foreign government’s description of its laws, inhibits a court’s ability to independently reach an accurate determination of foreign law. Furthermore, Animal Science contends, the lower court’s decision to uphold binding deference misapplied the Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Pink. Hebei Welcome Pharmaceuticals (“Hebei”) counters that requiring courts to accept an appearing foreign government’s reasonable statement of its laws appropriately balances judicial independence and international comity concerns. Moreover, Hebei asserts that the court below was correct in finding United States v. Pink to support binding deference. This issue affects how federal courts interpret foreign law in international litigation. Accordingly, this case will impact international litigation strategy and entities with operations that are regulated outside of the U.S.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a court may exercise independent review of an appearing foreign sovereign’s interpretation of its domestic law (as held by the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits), or whether a court is “bound to defer” to a foreign government’s legal statement, as a matter of international comity, whenever the foreign government appears before the court (as held by the opinion below in accord with the Ninth Circuit).

In 2005, Animal Science Products, Inc. and various Vitamin C producers in the United States (“Animal Science Products”) filed suit in the Eastern District of New York against Hebei Welcome Pharmaceuticals Co. (“Hebei”), a Chinese pharmaceutical company and its holding company, alleging that Hebei was a co-conspirator who established an illegal cartel for price-fixing purposes. Animal Science Products, Inc., et al. v. Hebei Welcome Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., et al., 837 F.3d 175, 179 (2d Cir. 2016) at 5–6.

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Bowe v. United States

Issues

Does 28 U.S.C. § 2255 incorporate the bar on second or successive applications in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1), thereby preventing federal prisoners from filing repeat motions to vacate? When a court of appeals denies authorization for a successive § 2255 motion, does 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E) bar Supreme Court review, making the courts of appeals the court of last resort for such prisoners?

 

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide two questions about the interpretation of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). First, does 28 U.S.C. § 2255 incorporate 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1)’s restrictions on second or successive motions to federal prisoners? Second, are the courts of appeals the final forum for federal prisoners seeking authorization to file such motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(e), or can the Supreme Court review these gatekeeping decisions? The Petitioner, Michael Bowe, argues that extending both the restrictions on second or successive motions and the bar on Supreme Court review to federal prisoners goes against congressional intent and creates an unnecessary roadblock to federal prisoner’s claims to be fairly adjudicated by the courts. Kasdin Mitchell, whom the Supreme Court appointed to defend the judgment below because the United States declined to do so, argues that allowing for second or successive motions will burden the courts with unnecessarily and largely erroneous filings. For its part, the United States argues that the bar on Supreme Court review in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(e) should extend to federal prisoners because they have other avenues, beyond AEDPA, to appeal their convictions. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will impact the fairness of habeas procedures and judicial economy.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) applies to a claim presented in a second or successive motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255; and (2) whether § 2244 (b)(3)(E) deprives this court of certiorari jurisdiction over the grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive motion to vacate under § 2255.

Habeas corpus proceedings allow prisoners to challenge the legality of their detention, but habeas procedures differ for state and federal prisoners. Specifically, 28 U.S.C.

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Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl

Issues

Does the Tax Injunction Act prohibit federal courts from hearing cases where a tax-exempt, out-of-state entity brings suit to challenge an in-state law that does not impose a tax on the exempt entity but does impose notice and reporting requirements?

The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will determine whether the Tax Injunction Act (“TIA”) prevents federal court review of the notice and reporting requirements imposed on tax-exempt entities through the Colorado Collection Act. The Direct Marketing Association argues that neither the TIA’s language nor Congress’s intent when writing the TIA support the proposition that the TIA bars federal court jurisdiction when a tax-exempt entity challenges a statute that imposes notice and reporting obligations on the entity but does not create an actual tax liability. Brohl counters that the TIA protects the notice and reporting obligations from federal review because those functions are essential to facilitate the collection of the use tax. The resolution of this case will implicate the role that federal courts have over state taxation matters.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the TIA bars federal court jurisdiction over a suit brought by non-taxpayers to enjoin the informational notice and reporting requirements of a state law that neither imposes a tax, nor requires the collection of a tax, but serves only as a secondary aspect of state tax administration?

Colorado requires that all retailers pay a 2.9 percent tax on the sale of all tangible goods within the state. Direct Marketing Ass’n v. Brohl, 735 F.3d 904, 906 (10th Cir. 2013). The Commerce Clause and the Supreme Court’s decision in Quill Corp. v.

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Jimenez v. Quarterman

Issues

When a court finds that a defendant lost his right of direct appeal because of a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, and accordingly reinstates his appeal, does the time to seek federal habeas review run from the conclusion of the reinstated proceedings?

 

Carlos Jimenez was convicted of burglary and, due to a prior felony, received an enhanced sentence of forty-three years in prison. Jimenez appealed to the Texas Third Court of Appeals, but through no fault of his own, was unaware that his appeal was denied until after the statute of limitations expired for him to appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. In order to remedy this, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted Jimenez a reinstated appeal, which essentially tolled the statute of limitations for purposes of direct review in state court. After exhausting all state remedies, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied Jimenez’s federal petition for habeas corpus, stating that for purposes of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A), “direct review” ended when he initially failed to timely appeal the decision of the Third Court of Appeals, not when his reinstated appeal was exhausted. The United States Supreme Court will decide whether the reinstated appeal tolled the statute of limitations until the completion of the reinstated direct review for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A).

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a Certificate of Appealability should have issued pursuant to Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 482, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 1604 (2000) on the question of whether pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(1)(A) when through no fault of the petitioner, he was unable to obtain a direct review and the highest State Court granted relief to place him back to original position on direct review, should the 1-year limitation begin to run after he has completed that direct review resetting the 1- year limitations period?

Because the underlying cases are unpublished, the following facts are taken from the parties’ briefs.

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Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc.

Issues

Does a federal court have jurisdiction to entertain a lawsuit that seeks to enjoin a state tax credit based on the Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause?

 

Respondent, Commerce Energy, Inc., sued the Ohio Tax Commissioner, Petitioner, Richard Levin, alleging Ohio's tax scheme violates the Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Commerce contends that four Ohio companies benefit from certain tax exemptions that Commerce is not eligible for as an out-of-state company. Levin argues that the Tax Injunction Act and principles of comity bar Commerce's suit from proceeding in a federal court. Commerce counters that a federal court has jurisdiction to hear their suit. In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court will clarify the scope of the federal judiciary's authority to hear lawsuits regarding state tax law.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Did the Court’s decision in Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88 (2004), which addressed the scope of the Tax Injunction Act’s bar against federal cases seeking to enjoin the assessment and collection of state taxes, eliminate or narrow the doctrine of comity, which more broadly precludes federal jurisdiction over cases that intrude on the administration of state taxation?

2. Do either comity principles or the Tax Injunction Act bar federal jurisdiction over a case in which taxpayers allege, on equal protection and dormant Commerce Clause grounds, that their tax assessments are discriminatory relative to other taxpayers’ assessments?

Respondents, Commerce Energy, Inc., a California corporation, and Interstate Gas Supply Inc., an Ohio corporation (collectively “Commerce”), sell and market natural gas to consumers in Ohio. See Commerce Energy, Inc. v. Levin, 554 F.3d 1094, 1096 (2009).

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Republic of Hungary v. Simon

Issues

Do district courts have the discretion to abstain from exercising jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act for reasons pertaining to international comity?

 This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the common-law doctrine of international comity provides federal courts with the discretion to dismiss claims under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”). Respondent the Republic of Hungary argues that the FSIA must be construed in light of international comity doctrine, and that the federal court should defer to Hungary as Hungary’s interests in hearing this case outweigh those of the United States. Petitioners Rosalie Simon and other Hungarian Holocaust survivors argue that the FSIA has displaced common law and that federal courts should exercise jurisdiction in cases such as this one, where a sovereign state has failed to provide an adequate alternate forum. The outcome of this case will have implications on foreign policy, the extraterritorial reach of U.S. law, and the remedies available to the victims of Holocaust.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a district court may abstain from exercising jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act for reasons of international comity, in a matter in which former Hungarian nationals have sued the nation of Hungary to recover the value of property lost in Hungary during World War II but the plaintiffs made no attempt to exhaust local Hungarian remedies.

During World War II, Hungary undertook a systematic campaign to eradicate its Jewish population. Simon v. Republic of Hungary, (D.C. Cir. 2018) at 1175. As part of this campaign, the Hungarian government stripped Jews of their belongings. Id. Government officials went “home to home, inventorying and confiscating Jewish property.” Simon v.

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Sprint Communications Co. v. Jacobs

Issues

Should federal courts abstain from remedial actions—state administrative proceedings initiated by a private party—involving a federal question?

Sprint brought an action before the Iowa Utility Board to prevent Windstream, then called Iowa Telecom, from cutting off service to Sprint’s customers. After refusing Sprint’s request to cancel the hearing, the Board required Sprint to pay interstate access charges to Windstream. Sprint, thinking that the Iowa Utility Board did not have jurisdiction to make this determination, initiated suits in federal and state courts against Elizabeth S. Jacobs and other members of the Iowa Utility Board in their official capacity. In the federal suit, the district court granted the Board members’ abstention motion under Younger v. Harris—which requires a federal court to abstain from interfering with certain ongoing state judicial proceedings. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the abstention. The Supreme Court will clarify the difference between remedial and coercive actions, and determine whether Younger abstention applies to a federal suit when there is an ongoing remedial action in state court. The Court’s ruling implicates important issues of federalism including whether a party can seek federal judicial review of a state agency’s decision after the party voluntarily initiated the action.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Eighth Circuit erred by concluding, in conflict with decisions of nine other circuits and this Court, that Younger abstention is warranted not only when there is a related state proceeding that is "coercive" but also when there is a related state proceeding that is, instead, "remedial."

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Facts

Petitioner Sprint Communications Company, L.P. (“Sprint”) connected Voice over Internet Protocol (“VoIP”) calls from Sprint’s to Windstream’s customers.Sprint Commc’n. Co., L.P. v. Jacobs, et al., 690 F.3d 864, 866 (8th Cir.

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