ATTORNEY’S FEES

CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Issues

Can the basis for awarding attorney’s fees to a defendant arise from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s failure to comply with pre-suit obligations pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?

 

The Supreme Court will decide whether the basis for awarding attorney’s fees to a defendant can arise from EEOC’s failure to comply with pre-suit obligations pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. CRST asserts that Title VII and Court precedent do not require defendants to “prevail on the merits” to be awarded attorney’s fees, and that, even if they do, CRST prevailed on the merits in this case. On the other hand, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) contends that both Title VII and Court precedent require the party to have prevailed on the merits to receive attorney’s fees, meaning that the judgment must bar further litigation on the matter. The outcome of this case implicates the incentives for EEOC to comply with its obligations in pre-suit investigations in Title VII actions.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Can a dismissal of a Title VII case, based on the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s total failure to satisfy its pre-suit investigation, reasonable cause, and conciliation obligations, form the basis of an attorney’s fee award to the defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)?

On December 1, 2005, Monika Starke filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) against her former employer CRST Van Expedited, Inc. (“CRST”), a transit and logistics company. See EE

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Perdue v. Kenny A.

Issues

Are courts ever allowed to increase the amount awarded in attorney’s fees to prevailing civil rights litigation plaintiffs in recognition of extraordinary performance by their counsel?

 

In 2005, Kenny A. and eight other plaintiffs (collectively “Kenny A.”) settled a federal civil rights class action lawsuit against the Georgia Department of Human Resources and others. The settlement provided, in relevant part, that “the Plaintiff Class is entitled to recover its expenses of litigation, including reasonable attorneys fees . . . pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.” The District Court for the Northern District of Georgia approved a lodestar amount and a fee enhancement, which the court attributed to the extraordinary performance by Kenny A.’s counsel. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine if, under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, courts may increase the amount they award in attorney’s fees to prevailing civil rights litigation plaintiffs in recognition of extraordinary performance by their counsel. The Court's decision will affect the economic incentives around federal civil rights litigation.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Can a reasonable attorney’s fee award under a federal fee-shifting statute ever be enhanced based solely on quality of performance and results obtained, or are these factors already included in the lodestar calculation?

Kenny A. and eight other named plaintiffs (collectively "Kenny A.") are minors in the custody of the Georgia Department of Human Resources. See Kenny A. v. Perdue, 532 F.3d 1209, 1214 (11th Cir. 2006). Kenny A.

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Additional Resources

·      Law.com: Civil Rights Defendants Going After Attorneys’ Fees (Aug. 24, 2009)

·      The ’Lectric Law Library: Attorney’s Fees

·      Litigation Management Blog, Barger & Wolen LLP: Lodestar Adjustment (Feb. 6, 2009)

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Rimini Street Inc. v. Oracle USA Inc.

Issues

Does the phrase “full cost” as used in the Copyright Act and codified at 17 U.S.C. § 505 encompass non-taxable litigation expenses, including expert witness expenses and e-discovery fees beyond the statutorily enumerated taxable costs and rate setting prescribed in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920 and 1821?

This case asks the Supreme Court to interpret Section 505 of the Copyright Act and to decide whether it authorizes courts to award litigation costs that are non-taxable as specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Specifically, Section 505 of the Copyright Act states that “the court in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs,” and the dispute hinges on the meaning of “full costs.” The lower court determined that Rimini Street Inc. (“Rimini”) and its CEO, Seth Ravin (“Ravin”), infringed copyrights held by Oracle USA, Inc. (“Oracle”), and the court ordered Rimini and Ravin to recompense Oracle for certain litigation costs that are not taxable. The parties’ arguments draw on the structure of the statutes and historical practice. The Supreme Court’s decision could have a meaningful impact on future copyright infringement litigation because the available awards could alter parties’ incentives to sue.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Copyright Act’s allowance of “full costs,” 17 U.S.C. § 505, to a prevailing party is limited to taxable costs under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920 and 1821, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have held, or whether the act also authorizes non-taxable costs, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit holds.

In 2010, Oracle USA, Inc. et al. (“Oracle”) commenced suit against Rimini Street, Inc. (“Rimini”) and Rimini’s CEO, Seth Ravin (“Ravin”), in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, alleging infringement of the Copyright Act and violation of certain state laws against computer-based fraud.

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