Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railroad Co. v. White

Issues

Does an employer engage in an adverse employment action, and thereby violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, when he retaliates against an employee who files a discrimination claim by temporarily suspending her without pay and reassigning her to a position with different responsibilities?

 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids employers from retaliating against an employee who opposes discriminatory practices. However, the requisite provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), does not define what kinds of adverse employment decisions are actionable. Courts of appeal have adopted three different standards to guide this determination: the Sixth Circuit prohibits any “materially adverse change in the terms of employment;” the Ninth Circuit prohibits any adverse treatment “reasonably likely to deter” the plaintiff from engaging in protected activity; and finally, the Fifth and Eighth Circuits only prohibit an “ultimate employment decision.” In this case, the Sixth Circuit held that a temporary suspension rescinded by the employer with full back pay, or an inconvenient reassignment, constituted actionable adverse employment decisions. The Supreme Court must now determine which of the foregoing standards is correct.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether an employer may be held liable for retaliatory discrimination under Title VII for any "materially adverse change in the terms of employment" (including a temporary suspension rescinded by the employer with full backpay or an inconvenient reassignment, as the court below held); for any adverse treatment that was "reasonably likely to deter" the plaintiff from engaging in protected activity (as the Ninth Circuit holds); or only for an "ultimate employment decision" (as two other courts of appeals hold).

On June 23, 1997, Burlington Northern hired Sheila White to work in its Maintenance of Way department at the Tennessee Yard. White v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railroad Co.,364 F.3d 789, 792 (6th Cir. 2004). Marvin Brown, roadmaster of the Yard, assigned White to operate the forklift, a position formerly held by Ralph Ellis until his June 1997 resignation. Id.

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CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Issues

Can the basis for awarding attorney’s fees to a defendant arise from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s failure to comply with pre-suit obligations pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?

 

The Supreme Court will decide whether the basis for awarding attorney’s fees to a defendant can arise from EEOC’s failure to comply with pre-suit obligations pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. CRST asserts that Title VII and Court precedent do not require defendants to “prevail on the merits” to be awarded attorney’s fees, and that, even if they do, CRST prevailed on the merits in this case. On the other hand, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) contends that both Title VII and Court precedent require the party to have prevailed on the merits to receive attorney’s fees, meaning that the judgment must bar further litigation on the matter. The outcome of this case implicates the incentives for EEOC to comply with its obligations in pre-suit investigations in Title VII actions.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Can a dismissal of a Title VII case, based on the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s total failure to satisfy its pre-suit investigation, reasonable cause, and conciliation obligations, form the basis of an attorney’s fee award to the defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)?

On December 1, 2005, Monika Starke filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) against her former employer CRST Van Expedited, Inc. (“CRST”), a transit and logistics company. See EE

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Kentucky Retirement Systems v. EEOC

Issues

The Commonwealth of Kentucky ("Kentucky") provides normal retirement benefits to public employees who are 55 years of age and have satisfied a minimum service requirement, or who have worked for Kentucky for 20 years. Kentucky also provides disability-retirement benefits to employees who are ineligible for normal retirement benefits (e.g. employees who are under 55 or who have not satisfied the service requirement) and who become disabled. Because age is a factor in determining whether an employee may receive normal retirement benefits, by definition, age is also a factor in determining whether an employee may receive disability-retirement benefits.

Moreover, the calculation that determines the amount of benefit paid to an employee under both plans includes the employee's age as well as the years served. Under the disability-retirement plan, however, Kentucky inflates the number of years worked to the level needed to receive normal retirement benefits. In other words, when an employee has not yet reached age 55, or has not yet worked 20 years, Kentucky will pay them as though they have, or, at the very least, increase their payment to a statutory cap. Because it takes fewer years to bring an older employer to that threshold, the disability-retirement plan often provides a greater benefit to younger employees.

The question presented to the U.S. Supreme Court asks, as the benefits provided under the disability-retirement plan often exceed those under normal retirement, and in certain instances, are provided exclusively under the disability-retirement plan, whether the plan's use of age as a factor violates the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. ? 621, et seq, as amended by the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act ("OWBPA") 29 U.S.C. ? 621 note.

 

After finding that older individuals faced discrimination in the workplace, Congress passed the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. ?621 et seq. The ADEA prohibits employers from arbitrarily discriminating against older employees. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") brought suit against the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department, the Commonwealth of Kentucky, and Kentucky Retirement Services ("KRS"), who administers the state retirement program, because the retirement program distinguishes among recipients, at least in part, on the basis of age. The U.S Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the retirement scheme in question violated the ADEA. In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court will determine whether an employer may deny an employee disability benefits because of his or her eligibility to receive normal retirement benefits under the ADEA.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

This Petition involves a public employee retirement plan that includes normal and disability retirement benefits. A member who is eligible for normal retirement benefits based on attained age plus a minimum service requirement, or based on service alone, is not eligible for disability retirement benefits. Because age may be a factor in determining eligibility for normal retirement, it is an indirect factor in determining eligibility for disability retirement. Moreover, the calculation of disability retirement benefits is based upon actual years of service plus the number of years remaining before the member reaches retirement age or eligibility based on years of service alone; age may thereby be an indirect factor in determining the amount of disability retirement benefits.

The question presented in this Petition is accordingly: Whether any use of age as a factor in a retirement plan is "arbitrary" and thus renders the plan facially discriminatory in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act?

Kentucky law prescribes two methods in which a public employee may reach what is termed "normal retirement." Brief for Petitioner at *4. Under normal circumstances, a public employee may retire upon crossing either of two thresholds, whichever comes first. Id. Employees who work in hazardous positions become eligible to receive normal retirement benefits when t

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Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.

Issues

Whether a claimant alleging illegal pay discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 may use evidence of an allegedly discriminatory act from outside the statutory time limit to prove that pay she received within the statutory period was illegally discriminatory.

Lilly Ledbetter sued her employer, Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging illegal pay discrimination. Prior to filing suit, Ledbetter filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, as required under Title VII, and thereby set the statutory period of her suit to 180 days before she filed the complaint with the Commission. At trial, Ledbetter relied on evidence of allegedly discriminatory salary reviews that occurred before the statutory period to prove that the amount of the paychecks that she received within the statutory period were discriminatorily low. The jury found that Goodyear had paid Ledbetter a lower salary because of unlawful sex discrimination, in violation of Title VII. Goodyear appealed, arguing that Title VII’s statutory time period should limit Ledbetter’s evidence to the two incidents of allegedly discriminatory conduct that occurred within the statutory period. Further, Goodyear argued that it did not illegally discriminate against Ledbetter during either incident. The Eleventh Circuit agreed, and dismissed the case. The Court’s decision in this case will affect employees’ ability to file equal pay claims under Title VII, as well as employers’ ability to defend themselves against such claims.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether and under what circumstances a plaintiff may bring an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 alleging illegal pay discrimination when the disparate pay is received during the statutory limitations period, but is the result of intentionally discriminatory pay decisions that occurred outside the limitations period.

Lilly Ledbetter began working at Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company’s Gadsden, Alabama tire plant in a supervisory role in 1979. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 421 F.3d 1196, 1173 (11th Cir. 2005).

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Mach Mining v. EEOC

The Supreme Court will determine the extent to which courts can review efforts by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) to informally mediate discrimination claims before filing a lawsuit. Mach Mining, LLC argues that judicial review of the EEOC’s pre-suit conciliation efforts is permissible pursuant to the statutory language of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). Contrarily, the EEOC asserts that Congress did not intend for judicial review of the EEOC’s pre-suit conciliation efforts. The Supreme Court will have the opportunity to resolve a circuit split regarding judicial review of the EEOC’s pre-conciliation efforts. Further, the Supreme Court will clarify the boundaries of the EEOC’s responsibilities in the conciliation process. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the court can impose the mandatory requirement of conciliation on the EEOC before the organization to file a civil discrimination suit?

In 2008, a woman filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). See EEOC v. Mach Mining Inc., 738 F.3d 171, 173 (7th Cir. 2013). The woman alleged that Mach Mining, LLC (“MM”) denied her a job because of her sex.

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Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory

Issues

After an employee shows that an employment practice had a disparate impact on older workers, and after an employer presents evidence that the challenged practice was neutral, does the employer have to convince the jury that its policy was "reasonable," or does an employee have to convince the jury the policy was "unreasonable?"

 

In this case, a hair's breadth of analytical difference is worth almost $6 million dollars, as the plaintiffs, former employees at Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory ("KAPL") ask the U.S. Supreme Court to overturn the Second Circuit's finding for the defendants. The plaintiffs had prevailed at trial and on appeal on a disparate impact theory of illegal age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (the "ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq., when the Supreme Court remanded for reconsideration in light of Smith v. City of Jackson. While upholding the disparate impact theory, City of Jackson also requires the touchstone of the analysis to be whether employers considered "reasonable factors other than age," which the Second Circuit determined was a burden of persuasion to be borne by the plaintiffs. The employee-plaintiffs disagree, maintaining that the "reasonable factors other than age" harbor in the ADEA statute is a traditional affirmative defense on which the employer-defendants bear the burden of proof. In determining where the burden rests, the Supreme Court's decision will impact the nature of future employee litigation under the ADEA, shape the strategies for a successful reduction in force, and determine what deference is due the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's regulations interpreting the ADEA.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether an employee alleging disparate impact under the ADEA bears the burden of persuasion on the "reasonable factors other than age" defense, as held by the Second Circuit in this case in conflict with the decisions of other circuits and a regulation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory (the "Lab") draws its workforce of 2,600 from the small upstate New York towns of Niskayuna and New Milton.

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