Barber v. Thomas
Issues
Whether the proper calculation of “good time credits” to shorten the sentence of federal prisoners, based on their good behavior, is based on actual time served or the sentence imposed, when considering both the rule of lenity and the deference due to the decisions of the Bureau of Prisons.
Petitioners Michael Barber and Tahir Jihad-Black are serving sentences in federal prison for various gun and drug charges. The Ninth Circuit allowed Petitioners to consolidate their cases with several earlier cases in order to petition the Supreme Court for certiorari. Petitioners are challenging the Bureau of Prisons’ (“BOP”) interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b), which allows well-behaved and compliant federal-prisoners to receive up to 54 days off their sentences for “each year of the prisoner’s term of imprisonment.” Petitioners argue that “term of imprisonment” means the total sentence imposed by the court. Respondent contends that it refers to the prisoners’ actual time served. The standard of computation ends up differing because under Petitioners’ method, a prisoner receives good behavior credit for years they do not end up serving. Petitioners argue that the courts do not owe the BOP’s interpretation deference, because the statute is unambiguous and the record does not contain any reason for the BOP’s interpretation. Even if the statute is ambiguous, Petitioners argue that the rule of lenity should apply. The rule of lenity holds that when considering penal statutes, the courts should resolve any ambiguity in the defendant’s favor. Respondent agrees that the statute is unambiguous, but counters that it instead requires computation of good time credit on the basis of time served. Respondent also argues that even if the statute is ambiguous, the rule of lenity does not apply because the statute is civil rather than penal.
Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties
The federal good time credit (GTC) statute provides for credits ‘‘up to 54 days at the end of each year of the prisoner’s term of imprisonment.” Throughout federal sentencing statutes, and elsewhere in the same sentence, ‘‘term of imprisonment” means the sentence imposed. However, the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") interprets ‘‘term of imprisonment” as unambiguously meaning time served. For each year of a sentence imposed, the BOP interpretation results in seven fewer days of available credits. The first question presented is:
Does ‘‘term of imprisonment” in Section 212(a)(2) of the Sentencing Reform Act, enacting 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b), unambiguously require the computation of good time credits on the basis of the sentence imposed?
The circuits, using a variety of rationales, have rejected the BOP’s claim that the statute was unambiguous, but deferred to the BOP interpretation under Chevron based on “term of imprisonment” being ambiguous. In this litigation, the BOP has conceded that the regulation implementing the GTC statute, and previously accorded deference, was promulgated in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the BOP rule under Skidmore. The second question presented is:
If “term of imprisonment” in the federal good time credit statute is ambiguous, does the rule of lenity and the deference appropriate to the United States Sentencing Commission require that good time credits be awarded based on the sentence imposed?
Under federal law, a federal prisoner serving a sentence of more than one year but less than life, “may receive credit toward the service of [his] sentence, beyond the time served, of up to 54 days at the end of each year of the prisoner’s term of imprisonment, beginning at the end of the first year of the term.” 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1). These good time credits (“GTCs”) are subject to a determination by the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") that “the prisoner has displa