deference

Barber v. Thomas

Issues

Whether the proper calculation of “good time credits” to shorten the sentence of federal prisoners, based on their good behavior, is based on actual time served or the sentence imposed, when considering both the rule of lenity and the deference due to the decisions of the Bureau of Prisons.

Petitioners Michael Barber and Tahir Jihad-Black are serving sentences in federal prison for various gun and drug charges. The Ninth Circuit allowed Petitioners to consolidate their cases with several earlier cases in order to petition the Supreme Court for certiorari. Petitioners are challenging the Bureau of Prisons’ (“BOP”) interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b), which allows well-behaved and compliant federal-prisoners to receive up to 54 days off their sentences for “each year of the prisoner’s term of imprisonment.” Petitioners argue that “term of imprisonment” means the total sentence imposed by the court. Respondent contends that it refers to the prisoners’ actual time served. The standard of computation ends up differing because under Petitioners’ method, a prisoner receives good behavior credit for years they do not end up serving. Petitioners argue that the courts do not owe the BOP’s interpretation deference, because the statute is unambiguous and the record does not contain any reason for the BOP’s interpretation. Even if the statute is ambiguous, Petitioners argue that the rule of lenity should apply. The rule of lenity holds that when considering penal statutes, the courts should resolve any ambiguity in the defendant’s favor. Respondent agrees that the statute is unambiguous, but counters that it instead requires computation of good time credit on the basis of time served. Respondent also argues that even if the statute is ambiguous, the rule of lenity does not apply because the statute is civil rather than penal.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

The federal good time credit (GTC) statute provides for credits ‘‘up to 54 days at the end of each year of the prisoner’s term of imprisonment.” Throughout federal sentencing statutes, and elsewhere in the same sentence, ‘‘term of imprisonment” means the sentence imposed. However, the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") interprets ‘‘term of imprisonment” as unambiguously meaning time served. For each year of a sentence imposed, the BOP interpretation results in seven fewer days of available credits. The first question presented is:

Does ‘‘term of imprisonment” in Section 212(a)(2) of the Sentencing Reform Act, enacting 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b), unambiguously require the computation of good time credits on the basis of the sentence imposed?

The circuits, using a variety of rationales, have rejected the BOP’s claim that the statute was unambiguous, but deferred to the BOP interpretation under Chevron based on “term of imprisonment” being ambiguous. In this litigation, the BOP has conceded that the regulation implementing the GTC statute, and previously accorded deference, was promulgated in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the BOP rule under Skidmore. The second question presented is:

If “term of imprisonment” in the federal good time credit statute is ambiguous, does the rule of lenity and the deference appropriate to the United States Sentencing Commission require that good time credits be awarded based on the sentence imposed?

Under federal law, a federal prisoner serving a sentence of more than one year but less than life, “may receive credit toward the service of [his] sentence, beyond the time served, of up to 54 days at the end of each year of the prisoner’s term of imprisonment, beginning at the end of the first year of the term.” 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1). These good time credits (“GTCs”) are subject to a determination by the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") that “the prisoner has displa

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Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.

Issues

Should a court provide deference to the Secretary’s interpretation of the FLSA and hold that pharmaceutical sales representatives are outside salesmen, thereby exempt from the required time-and-a-half overtime wages?

 

The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”) requires employers to pay employees one-and-a-half times their normal wages for any time worked over forty hours in a given week, but exempts “outside salesmen” from this overtime pay requirement. Respondent GlaxoSmithKline (“GSK”) refused to pay overtime to petitioners Michael Christopher and Frank Buchanan, whom it employed as pharmaceutical sales representatives, because it considered them to be “outside salesmen.” Christopher and Buchanan sued, arguing that they were not “outside salesmen” under the Secretary of Labor’s interpretation. The Supreme Court will determine whether that interpretation is entitled to deference and whether Christopher and Buchanan are subject to the FLSA’s outside salesman exemption.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

The questions presented are: (1) Whether deference is owed to the Secretary of Labor’s interpretation of the FLSA’s outside sales exemption and related regulations; and (2) Whether that exemption applies to pharmaceutical sales representatives.

Congress enacted the FLSA in response to inequitable depression-era working conditions. See 29 U.S.C.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank former Supreme Court Reporter of Decisions Frank Wagner for his assistance in editing this preview.

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Forest Grove School District v. T. A.

Issues

Whether a school district is liable for the expenses that a disabled student incurred by pursuing private education when that student did not first attempt to seek help in a public school facility, as mandated by statute.

 

In 2000, T.A.'s parents realized that their son was a troubled teenager, and though it was suspected that he might have a learning disability, his school district determined that he was not disabled and therefore not entitled to special education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. T.A.'s problems continued and in 2003 his parents placed him in a private school. In 2004, a hearing officer determined that T.A. was disabled, and that because Forest Grove School District had failed to offer him free appropriate public education, the district had to reimburse T.A.'s parents for the cost of the private school. The school district appealed, and the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that damages were not required because T.A.'s parents removed him unilaterally, without his ever having received special education services from a public agency. In this case, the Court will determine whether parents can unilaterally make this decision and then expect the school district to reimburse them, or if they must wait for action by the school district.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act permits a tuition reimbursement award against a school district and in favor of parents who unilaterally place their child in private school, where the child had not previously received special education and related services under the authority of a public agency.

After years spent in the Forest Grove School District, T.A. left in the middle of his junior year of high school, when his parents decided to put him in a private school. See Forest Grove School District v. T.A., 523 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 2008). T.A.

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Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc. v. Metrophones Telecommunications, Inc.

Issues

Whether a payphone service provider can sue a long distance carrier in federal court when that carrier fails to pay compensation for dial-around calls made in violation of Federal Communications Commission regulations.

 

Payphone users can circumvent the usual payment method and avoid inserting a coin by using an access code or 800 number provided by a long distance carrier. These “dial-around” numbers, while convenient for users, leave payphone service providers uncompensated for the call made. The Federal Communications Commission, as instructed by Congress in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, created regulations to ensure that payphone service providers receive compensation for these “dial-around” calls. Metrophones Telecommunications, Inc., a payphone service provider, argues that Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc., a long distance provider, has violated these regulations by failing to compensate Metrophones for such calls. Metrophones argues that under Section 201(b) of the Communications Act, Global Crossing Telecommunications’ violation of the Federal Communications Commission regulation constitutes an unjust and unreasonable practice, making it unlawful and actionable in federal court. Both the District Court and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a private cause of action does exist under Section 201(b). The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will define the scope of Section 201(b) of the Communications Act as well as give insight into the amount of deference to agency pronouncements that the court deems fit. It will also either provide a long awaited opportunity for payphone service providers to assert their rights in this area or leave them looking for another way to obtain compensation.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) of the Communications Act of 1934 creates a private right of action for a provider of payphone services to sue a long distance carrier of alleged violations of the FCC’s regulations concerning compensation for coinless payphone calls.

Metrophones Telecommunications, Inc. (“Metrophones”) is a payphone service provider (“PSP”). Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc. (“Global Crossing”) is a long distance provider. The basis of the dispute is compensation Global Crossing is required by law to pay Metrophone for “dial around” calls from payphones.

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Holt v. Hobbs

Issues

Does a prison’s grooming policy, which prohibits all beards except for quarter-inch beards for certain medical reasons, violate the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act by prohibiting an inmate from growing a half-inch beard in accordance with his religious beliefs?

In 2000, Congress enacted the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) with the intent to provide protection for the free exercise of religion in various contexts, including prisons and jails. In this case, the Supreme Court will consider whether a prison grooming policy prohibiting a half-inch beard grown in accordance with a prisoner’s religious beliefs, violates RLUIPA. Additionally, the Court will have the opportunity to determine the level of deference courts should give prison officials when considering whether a prison policy that substantially burdens inmates’ exercise of religion furthers a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means available. The resolution of this case may impact the balance between the rights of prisoners to practice their religion freely while incarcerated and the government’s interest in prison safety. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Whether the Arkansas Department of Corrections’ no beard grooming policy violates the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).
  2. Whether a ½ inch beard would satisfy the security goals sought by the policy.
  3. Whether the no beard grooming policy violates Petitioner’s First Amendment right to practice Islam as he believes it is supposed to be practiced by the wearing of the beard.
  4. That the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has decided that the no beard grooming policy does not violate the RLUIPA, but this Court should decide the matter since it has not done so and should rule whether grooming policies of any Department of Correction that do not allow for a religious exception exemption are constitutional.
  5. That the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit’s decision in this case conflicts with other circuit’s rulings on the matter.
  6. That the ADC grooming policy of no beards is not the least restrictive means of achieving the desired objective of staunching the flow of contraband and identifying prisoners in the event of an escape.

In 2000, Congress enacted the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) to provide protection for the free exercise of religion in several contexts, including incarceration. See 42 U.S.C.

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Kappos v. Hyatt

Issues

Whether a plaintiff whose patent has been denied by the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") may present new evidence to the district court reviewing this denial, and whether the court must give deference to the PTO’s prior decision. 

 

Petitioner Gilbert Hyatt initiated a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 145 against Respondent David Kappos, Director of the Patent and Trademark Office, after the PTO's Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences sustained rejections for seventy-nine of Hyatt’s patent claims. The district court disregarded new evidence presented by Hyatt, because he failed to present such evidence before the PTO when it was available, and granted Kappos summary judgment. The Federal Circuit initially affirmed, but later reversed the district court's ruling. Kappos argues that § 145 only affords Hyatt a review that is deferential to PTO determinations, and that new evidence can only be introduced if such evidence becomes available after the PTO proceedings. Hyatt counters that § 145 authorizes the district court to decide patent application de novo, and generally allows introduction of new evidence. The Supreme Court’s decision will clarify the procedure for judicial review of the patent application process.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

When the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") denies an application for a patent, the applicant may seek judicial review of the agency's final action through either of two avenues. The applicant may obtain direct review of the agency's determination in the Federal Circuit under 35 U.S.C. 141. Alternatively, the applicant may commence a civil action against the Director of the PTO in federal district court under 35 U.S.C. § 145. In a § 145 action, the applicant may in certain circumstances introduce evidence of patentability that was not presented to the agency.

The questions presented are as follows:

1. Whether the plaintiff in a § 145 action may introduce new evidence that could have been presented to the agency in the first instance.

2. Whether, when new evidence is introduced under § 145, the district court may decide de novo the factual questions to which the evidence pertains, without giving deference to the prior decision of the PTO.

Petitioner Gilbert P. Hyatt applied to the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) in 1995 to patent his invention of a “computerized display system for processing image information.” See Hyatt v. Kappos, 625 F.3d 1320, 1323 (Fed. Cir.

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Additional Resources

Orin Kerr, The Volokh Conspiracy: Standards of Review in Patent Law: A Comment on Kappos v. Hyatt (December 20, 2011)

Gene Quinn, IP Watchdog: Jump the Shark Patent Style: The Supremes Take Kappos v. Hyatt (June 30, 2011)

Patent and Trademark Office: Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Patent and Trademark Office: How to Get a Patent

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Nielsen v. Preap

Issues

Does 8 U.S.C. 1226(c) require that the Government immediately transfer a criminal alien from criminal custody to immigration custody in order for the Government to subject the criminal alien to mandatory detention without a bond hearing?

This case asks the Supreme Court to interpret the statutory construction of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) and ultimately decide how easy it will be for the Government to begin deportation proceedings against criminal aliens. Section 1226(c)(1) provides for the mandatory detention of criminal aliens who commit certain offenses. Mony Preap, an alien with two drug convictions that triggered mandatory detention under § 1226(c), and two other similarly situated aliens contend that, under this statute, the Department of Homeland Security must immediately arrest criminal aliens upon their release from criminal custody in order for mandatory detention to apply. The Government counters that narrowly construing the statute, as Preap proposes, would contradict Congress’s intent to reduce the growing threat to public safety posed by dangerous criminal aliens and their high risk of flight. The outcome of this case has implications for the Government’s ability to detain aliens without a bond hearing under § 1226(c) following their release from criminal custody and affects the ease with which the Government can initiate deportation proceedings against aliens.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a criminal alien becomes exempt from mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) if, after the alien is released from criminal custody, the Department of Homeland Security does not take the alien into immigration custody immediately.

This case involves three respondents, all who immigrated to the United States as children. Preap v. Johnson (9th Cir.) at 7–8. Respondent Mony Preap was born in a refugee camp after his family escaped the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia and has been living in the United States as a lawful permanent resident since 1981. Id. at 7.

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