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Blueford v. Arkansas

Issues

Where a jury states, in open court, that a defendant is not guilty on a greater offense, but then deadlocks on a lesser offense, does the Double Jeopardy Clause bar a retrial of the greater offense?

Court below

Arkansas Supreme Court

The State of Arkansas brought charges against Alex Blueford for the murder of 20-month-old Matthew McFadden, Jr. Initially, the forewoman told the court that the jury unanimously agreed that Blueford had not committed capital murder or first-degree murder, but that it was unable to arrive at a verdict on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter, and had not reached the lesser-included offense of negligent homicide. Ultimately, the jury announced that it was deadlocked, and the court declared a mistrial. Blueford moved to prevent retrial of the murder charges, arguing that the jury had acquitted him on those counts. Arkansas contended that there was no acquittal because the hung jury was unable to reach a verdict. The Supreme Court of Arkansas denied Blueford’s motion, and he appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. Blueford argues that allowing a retrial on all the charges would violate the Constitution’s Double Jeopardy Clause and allow the state to overreach its authority. Arkansas asserts that barring a retrial on the capital and first-degree murder charges would result in a partial verdict, which leads to jury decisions based on compromise and coercion. The Supreme Court's decision will affect the protections defendants receive from the threat of multiple trials, the pressure on juries to reach a conclusive decision, and whether a court must record a verdict before it becomes final.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, if a jury deadlocks on a lesser-included offense, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars re-prosecution of a greater offense after a jury announces that it has voted against guilt on the greater offense.

On November 28, 2007, Petitioner Alex Blueford was watching Matthew McFadden, Jr., his girlfriend's 20-month-old son, in their home. See Brief for Petitioner, Alex Blueford at 2. Shortly after Blueford began babysitting, McFadden stopped breathing. See

Written by

ahsu

askaife

Edited by

fwagner

jbendert

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank former Supreme Court Reporter of Decisions Frank Wagner for his assistance in editing this preview.

Additional Resources

Verdict, Sherry F. Colb, What Purpose Does the Double Jeopardy Clause Serve?: The U.S. Supreme Court Grants Review in Blueford v. Arkansas (Nov. 2, 2011)
Harvard Law & Policy Review, David Yin, Blueford v. Arkansas: Jeopardy on Trial (Oct. 28, 2011).

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first degree murder

First degree murder is the intentional killing of another person by someone who has acted willfully, deliberately, or with planning. Generally, there are two types of first-degree murder: premeditated intent to kill and felony murder. This definition will focus on first-degree murder involving premeditated intent to kill.

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Skinner v. Switzer

Issues

Must a convicted capital murderer bring a federal habeas corpus claim in order to assert his due process right to access to DNA evidence, or may he bring his claim as a civil rights violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983?

Court below

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Florida convicted petitioner Henry Skinner of capital murder and sentenced him to death. Although Skinner admits that he was present at the scene of the murders, he maintains his innocence. Skinner now seeks access to biological evidence for DNA testing, which he claims will prove that he is innocent of the murders. After unsuccessfully filing two habeas corpus claims, Skinner filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim to attempt to gain access to the evidence. The Fifth Circuit denied Skinner’s motion to stay his execution, but Skinner appealed that decision and the Supreme Court agreed to hear Skinner’s case. The Court must now decide whether a demand for access to biological evidence may be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or whether the claim falls within the realm of habeas corpus law and was thus improperly filed. The Supreme Court’s decision will not only decide Skinner’s fate, but also clarify the scope and procedure of habeas corpus claims.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

May a convicted prisoner seeking access to biological evidence for DNA testing assert that claim in a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or is such a claim cognizable only in a petition for writ of habeas corpus?

In 1995, Henry Skinner was convicted of murdering his girlfriend and her two sons in their Pampa, Texas home, and sentenced to death. See Brief for Petitioner, Henry W.