double jeopardy

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether the language of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and § 924(j) allow for cumulative punishments for a singular criminal act that violates both provisions of this statute. Sections 924(c) and (j) punish the use of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime or drug trafficking. Dwayne Barrett contends that § 924(c) and (j) are not separate crimes because they punish the same underlying singular act, and Congress has authorized cumulative sentences for the same act. Charles L. McCloud, as court-appointed amicus curiae, argues that § 924(c) and (j) are two separate crimes, and Congress intended to allow for cumulative punishments for a single act that violates both statutes. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case raises concerns regarding the justice of sentencing to punish multiple violations involving a singular act and the duties of the legislative and judicial branches in determining the scope of criminal punishment. 

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The State of Arkansas brought charges against Alex Blueford for the murder of 20-month-old Matthew McFadden, Jr. Initially, the forewoman told the court that the jury unanimously agreed that Blueford had not committed capital murder or first-degree murder, but that it was unable to arrive at a verdict on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter, and had not reached the lesser-included offense of negligent homicide. Ultimately, the jury announced that it was deadlocked, and the court declared a mistrial. Blueford moved to prevent retrial of the murder charges, arguing that the jury had acquitted him on those counts. Arkansas contended that there was no acquittal because the hung jury was unable to reach a verdict. The Supreme Court of Arkansas denied Blueford’s motion, and he appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. Blueford argues that allowing a retrial on all the charges would violate the Constitution’s Double Jeopardy Clause and allow the state to overreach its authority. Arkansas asserts that barring a retrial on the capital and first-degree murder charges would result in a partial verdict, which leads to jury decisions based on compromise and coercion. The Supreme Court's decision will affect the protections defendants receive from the threat of multiple trials, the pressure on juries to reach a conclusive decision, and whether a court must record a verdict before it becomes final.

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Respondent Michael Bies was convicted of kidnapping, murder and attempted rape of a ten-year-old boy in 1992. Despite expert testimony indicating that he was functionally mentally retarded, a jury recommended and judge delivered a death sentence. On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court recognized that Bies was mentally retarded, but held that the aggravating circumstances of the crime outweighed the mitigating factor of his mental retardation. However, in 2002 the U.S. Supreme Court held that execution of mentally retarded individuals violated the Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. Bies argues that in light of this, his death sentence should be commuted since the Ohio Supreme Court already indicated that he was mentally retarded, and re-litigating the issue would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The State of Ohio argues that since the issue of Bies' mental retardation was not necessary for the State's decision prior to Atkins v. Virginia, contesting the issue of his mental state is not blocked by collateral estoppel, or in violation of the Double Jeopardy clause. This case is important because it will help to determine whether states can have the opportunity to relitigate the issue of whether a convicted capital defendant is mentally retarded before his sentence is commuted in light of Atkins.

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Juan Bravo-Fernandez and Hector Martínez-Maldonado were involved in a federal program bribery scheme in which Bravo allegedly paid for Martinez’s trip to Las Vegas to attend a boxing match in exchange for Martínez pushing through beneficial legislation for Bravo’s private security company. A jury convicted both defendants of committing federal bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666 but acquitted them of other bribery-related charges.  The convictions were later vacated due to a jury instruction error, and Bravo and Martínez were acquitted on remand.  Bravo and Martínez argue that the jury acquittals retain preclusive effect under the Double Jeopardy Clause despite the fact that jury had originally returned inconsistent verdicts. The government counters that because the jury’s inconsistent verdicts do not allow Bravo and Martínez to show that the jury had decided in their favor, collateral estoppel does not apply. The outcome of this case could potentially affect prosecutorial theories and could disadvantage criminal defendants who face various predicate and conspiracy charges. 

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Petitioner Michael Currier was charged with burglary, grand larceny, and possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. Currier and the prosecution agreed to sever the charges. At the first trial, a jury acquitted Currier of burglary and grand larceny. At the second trial, in which the prosecution introduced many of the same facts, the jury convicted Currier of possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. Michael Currier argues that issue preclusion bars the state from re-litigating an issue upon which the jury acquitted him in the first trial. Virginia contends that the defendant waived his right to issue preclusion when he consented to severing the criminal charges into successive trials. The Court’s determination on the scope of the Double Jeopardy Clause will have significant consequences for defendants charged with counts requiring evidence of prior criminal records and, more broadly, for national criminal procedure.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether prosecution of the same conduct, first in a Court of Indian Offenses (“CFR court”), a federally-constituted Article I trial court with jurisdiction over cases arising on Indian reservations, and then in a federal court, is permissible under the dual sovereignty exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Petitioner Merle Denezpi argues that his prosecution in a federal district court following his conviction in the Ute Mountain Ute CFR court violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which prohibits successive prosecutions of the same offense, because the CFR court derives some of its judicial power from the federal sovereignty of the United States government. Respondent the United States counters that Denezpi’s crime falls within the dual sovereignty exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause because the Ute Mountain Ute CFR court is an extension of tribal, not federal, sovereignty and, as Denezpi’s conduct violated both tribal and federal law, he can be prosecuted successively under each law by the two separate sovereigns. The outcome of this case has implications for tribal sovereignty and public safety in tribal communities.

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A Michigan trial court granted defendant-petitioner Lamar Evans a directed verdict of not guilty after the State of Michigan charged him with burning property because the State of Michigan failed to prove that the property Evans allegedly burned was not a dwelling. Upon appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court determined that the trial court erred when it required the State of Michigan to prove that the property was not a dwelling. Furthermore, the Michigan Supreme Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause of both the Fifth Amendment and the Michigan Constitution did not bar Evans’ retrial for the same offense because the error involved an element that was added to the offense. As a result, the directed verdict did not relate to an actual factual element of the case and therefore failed to address Evans’ guilt or innocence of the charged offense. Evans now appeals to the Supreme Court of the United States, arguing that the Michigan Supreme Court erroneously carved out a novel “Extra Element” exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause. This decision will further define the outer limits of protection that the Double Jeopardy Clause offers to defendants and the types of rulings that prosecutors can appeal. 

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The Supreme Court will rule on the separate-sovereigns doctrine, an exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause that permits both state and federal governments to prosecute an individual for offenses arising from the same conduct. Terance Gamble was prosecuted under both state and federal law for possession of a firearm after being convicted of a violent crime. Gamble argues that an exception for successive prosecutions by separate sovereigns is incompatible with the text of the Clause and the Framers’ intent, and that the Court should overrule contrary precedent. The Government counters that the text of the Constitution, historical context, and a long line of affirmative precedent support preservation of the exception. The Court’s decision in this case will have implications for Double Jeopardy protections, state and federal criminal law, and competition in criminal prosecutions between sovereigns.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents a defendant from being retried on a count where he was acquitted by a jury’s verdict. Petitioner McElrath argues that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits defendants from being retried once they are acquitted. Petitioner also contends that the Georgia Supreme Court’s “repugnancy rule,” a rule that voids a jury’s verdicts if its findings on the record are extremely inconsistent, conflicts with the purpose and history of the Double Jeopardy Clause. In response, Respondent Georgia contends that state law, not the Double Jeopardy Clause, defines when a verdict is valid. It further asserts that Georgia’s “repugnancy rule” is consistent with the Constitution because repugnant verdicts and inconsistent verdicts are different, and the Supreme Court has never ruled on contradictory jury findings. The outcome of this case will affect the balance between judicial and jury power, as well as how far a federal court’s power can go in reversing a state court’s decision.

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