claim preclusion

Brownback v. King

Issues

Does a judgment in favor of the United States on state law tort claims brought under Section 1346(b)(1) of the Federal Tort Claims Act necessarily preclude a plaintiff from seeking recourse under Bivens for a civil rights violation stemming from the same underlying factual allegations?

Court below

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether a judgment against the plaintiff on a Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) claim, alleging violations under state tort law, bars the plaintiff from pursuing a constitutional remedy under Bivens. Petitioner Douglas Brownback contends that the district court’s dismissal of Respondent James King’s FTCA claims on the basis of his failure to establish the elements of Section 1346(b) constitutes a final judgment on the merits of all claims pertaining to the same subject matter. Brownback argues that consistent with the purpose of the statute, Section 2676 of the FTCA bars King from pursuing his Bivens action. King counters that the judgment bar should be interpreted to incorporate the doctrine of res judicata, which precludes subsequent claims only if a court with jurisdiction has entered a judgment on the merits. King argues that since no such jurisdiction exists over the claims in this case, his Bivens action should not be barred. The outcome of this case has significant implications for plaintiffs’ access to courts and the avenues for relief plaintiffs may pursue to hold government officials accountable for state tort and constitutional violations.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a final judgment in favor of the United States in an action brought under Section 1346(b)(1) of the Federal Tort Claims Act, on the ground that a private person would not be liable to the claimant under state tort law for the injuries alleged, bars a claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics that is brought by the same claimant, based on the same injuries, and against the same governmental employees whose acts gave rise to the claimant’s FTCA claim.

On July 18, 2014, Officer Ted Allen, a detective with the Grand Rapids Police, and Agent Douglas Brownback, a special agent with the FBI, participated in a joint fugitive task force in search of a criminal suspect pursuant to an arrest warrant issued by the State of Michigan. King v.

Written by

evandyne

mtinker

Edited by

zfranicevic

Additional Resources

Jordan S. Rubin, Law Enforcement Accountability at Stake in Coming SCOTUS Cases, Bloomberg Law (Oct. 6, 2020).
Robert Barnes, Supreme Court to Hear Case of Michigan Man Beaten by Plainclothes Police, Washington Post (Mar. 30, 2020).

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Lucky Brands Dungarees Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Group Inc.

Issues

Under the doctrine of preclusion, can a defendant who fails to raise a defense in a prior action be barred from raising that defense in subsequent actions between the same parties?

Court below

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether courts can prevent a defendant from raising a defense if the defendant failed to assert that defense against the same plaintiff in a prior, similar lawsuit. The Second Circuit recognized “defense preclusion” as a valid civil procedure concept to bar Lucky Brands Dungarees from raising a new defense in a trademark infringement lawsuit against Marcel Fashions Group where Lucky Brands Dungarees could have raised this defense in a previous lawsuit over the same alleged infringement. Lucky Brands Dungarees contends that applying defense preclusion against a defendant conflicts with fundamental principles of res judicata and is a novel invention by the Second Circuit that is harmful to defendants whose interests change over time. Marcel Fashions Group counters that defense preclusion is a logical feature of res judicata and argues that this doctrine clearly applies to defendants who, after losing a lawsuit, do not change their conduct. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will impact when and how defendants strategically raise defenses in civil litigation.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, when a plaintiff asserts new claims, federal preclusion principles can bar a defendant from raising defenses that were not actually litigated and resolved in any prior case between the parties.

Both the Petitioner Marcel Fashions Group (“Marcel”) and the Respondent Lucky Brand Dungarees (“Lucky”) are clothing companies. Marcel Fashions Grp. Inc. v. Lucky Brand Dungarees Inc. at 3. For almost twenty years, the two companies have “hotly” disputed the right to a certain trademark. Id.

Written by

pduggan

rronate

Edited by

cbruni

Additional Resources

Steve Brachmann, The Trademark Cases the Supreme Court Will Hear Next Term, IP Watchdog (Jul. 7, 2019).
Sophie Houenou, In Marcel v. Lucky Brands, Two Retail Companies in Long-Running Trademark Dispute Hope to “Get Lucky” at the Supreme Court, The National Law Review (Jul. 17, 2019).
Sinhdu Sundar, Lucky Brand to Duel Marcel Fashions Before Supreme Court, Women’s Wear Daily (Jul. 2, 2019).

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res judicata

Res judicata translates to "a matter judged."

Overview

Generally, res judicata is the principle that a cause of action may not be relitigated once it has been judged on the merits. "Finality" is the term which refers to when a court renders a final judgment on the merits.

Res judicata is also frequently referred to as "claim preclusion," and the two are used interchangeably throughout this article.

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Taylor v. Sturgell

Issues

May a court bar a party's claim on the theory that the party received "virtual representation" in a prior suit by a different party, despite the fact that the present party shared no legal relationship with the prior party and received no notice of the prior suit?

Court below

United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit

Brent Taylor, executive director of the Antique Aircraft Association ("AAA") filed a Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") request with the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") to obtain plans and specifications for a vintage aircraft. After the FAA denied Taylor's request on trade-secret grounds, he sued to compel disclosure of the information. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that Taylor's claim was barred because he had been "virtually represented" in a prior action by Greg Herrick, a fellow AAA member whose prior FOIA request for the same records the Tenth Circuit found to have been properly denied due to trade-secret protections. Taylor asserts that preclusion of his claim on the "virtual representation" theory violated his due process rights because he had no legal relationship with Herrick and received no notice of the prior suit. The FAA counters that preclusion was appropriate because Herrick had adequately represented Taylor's interests in the earlier action. The decision in this case will clarify the circumstances under which courts may bar claims under the "virtual representation" theory and may influence plaintiffs' litigation strategies, broaden defendants' exposure to duplicative suits, and limit the availability of FOIA requests of certain members of the public.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Can a party be precluded from bringing a claim, under a theory of "virtual representation," and thereby denied the due process right to a day in court, when the party had no legal relationship with any party to the previous litigation and did not receive notice of that litigation?

Under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), any person has the right to obtain records from a federal agency. See Brief for Petitioner at 1; 5 U.S.C.