CLAIMS

Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee

Issues

May the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) in an inter partes review (“IPR”) use a  broadest-reasonable  interpretation when construing the claims of a patent, or is the PTAB required to construe claims to their plain and ordinary meaning? May courts review the PTAB’s decision to institute an IPR proceeding?

The Supreme Court will decide the standard that the United States Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) should use when construing claims in an issued patent and whether the PTAB’s decision to institute an inter partes review (“IPR”) proceeding is judicially reviewable. Cuozzo Speed Technologies argues that claims should be given their ordinary meaning and that the PTAB’s decision to institute an IPR should be judicially reviewable. Meanwhile, the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) argues that when the PTAB institutes an IPR, the PTAB should construe claims with their broadest-reasonable construction standard. Furthermore, the PTO argues that the PTAB’s decision to institute an IPR is final and non-reviewable by the courts. The Supreme Court’s decision may help resolve inconsistent standards used between district courts and IPR proceedings while affecting innovator’s rights. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Did the court of appeals err in holding that, in IPR proceedings, the Board may construe claims in an issued patent according to their broadest reasonable interpretation rather than their plain and ordinary meaning?
  2. Did the court of appeals err in holding that, even if the Board exceeds its statutory authority in instituting an IPR proceeding, the Board’s decision whether to institute an IPR proceeding is judicially unreviewable?

On August 17, 2004, Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC (“Cuozzo”) was issued U.S. Patent No.

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Slack Technologies v. Pirani

Issues

Are plaintiffs required to plead and prove that they bought securities when claiming that a registration statement is misleading under Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a plaintiff suing under Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 must plead and prove that they bought shares registered under the allegedly misleading registration statement. Slack Technologies argues that the text of the statute reflects congressional intent to limit liability to only those who bought shares registered under the relevant registration statement. Slack additionally argues that past judicial and regulatory precedent supports this theory. Fiyyaz Pirani counters that the text of the statute reflects congressional intent to create broad liability by including a range of securities so as to protect investors. Pirani contends that this particular issue is novel and was undecided prior to the district court decision below. The outcome of this case will determine the extent to which investors are protected by the Securities Act of 1933 and the availability of remedial measures to investors under the Act.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 require plaintiffs to plead and prove that they bought shares registered under the registration statement they claim is misleading

In 2018, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) issued a new rule allowing companies to publicly sell stock through a direct listing. Pirani v. Slack Technologies, Inc., at 6. Normally, a company issues stock to the public for the first time through an initial public offering (IPO).

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