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This case asks whether a claim that a fiduciary breached their duty of prudence under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) requires identification of a meaningful benchmark against which the court can evaluate the claim to advance past the pleading stage. Anderson, on behalf of a class of Intel plan participants, argues that the meaningful benchmark standard creates an unnecessary hurdle to plead ERISA claims and is incompatible with the federal rules of plausibility pleading. Intel Corporation’s Investment Policy Committee (“Intel”) counters that a claim for the breach of the duty of prudence is dependent on the decision-making process of the fiduciary, so a meaningful benchmark is necessary to allow the court to appropriately evaluate the claim. The outcome will have a significant impact on the volume of ERISA litigation, potentially barring more plaintiffs from seeking relief or heightening protection for fiduciaries from meritless suits.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a Delaware law that imposes an extra pleading requirement for medical malpractice complaints applies in federal cases. Berk maintains that the Delaware law is incompatible with numerous Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and is procedural, and therefore cannot be applied in federal courts under the Erie doctrine. Respondents contend that the affidavit of merit simply screens the merits of a suit without altering pleadings, which avoids any conflicts with the Federal Rules, is specifically contemplated by Rule 11(a), and should be interpreted as a substantive rule under Erie. The Third Circuit held that there was no conflict with the Federal Rules and that the Delaware law is substantive. This created a circuit split contradicting other appellate courts that refused to apply similar laws from other states. This case will potentially affect forum‑shopping incentives, plaintiffs’ access to courts, and healthcare litigation exposure.

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Wanda Krupski (“Krupski”) suffered an injury as a passenger on a cruise ship owned and operated by Costa Crociere S.p.A. (“Costa Crociere”). In the United States District Court of the Southern District of Florida, her lawyer filed suit against Costa Cruise, N.V., LLC, Costa Crociere’s booking agent. The parties dismissed that suit by stipulation, because the owner and operator of a cruise ship is subject to liability, not the booking agent. Krupski filed an amended complaint against Costa Crociere—the correct party. Costa Crociere filed a motion to dismiss. The district court granted the motion, finding that Krupski had not made a “mistake” within the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) (“Rule 15(c)”) that would allow the amendment to relate back to the original filing of the complaint. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court’s decision will clarify what constitutes a “mistake” within the meaning of Rule 15(c).

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide how plaintiffs can demonstrate intent (also called “scienter”) under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”) for the purpose of alleging securities fraud. More specifically, this case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether plaintiffs can allege intent based on allegations about internal company documents without referring to specific content in those documents. It also asks the Supreme Court to determine if plaintiffs can satisfy the Act's falsity requirement by relying on an expert opinion in lieu of particularized allegations of fact. NVIDIA argues that Öhman’s failure to allege with particularity the contents of the internal documents to show that NVIDIA misrepresented its finances to investors does not show a strong inference of scienter that the PSLRA requires in order to reduce frivolous lawsuits, and that Öhman’s reliance on expert testimony to satisfy the PSLRA’s rigorous particularity standard would allow plaintiffs to circumvent it. Öhman counters that the PSLRA evinces a holistic approach in meeting the burden of showing a strong inference of scienter rather than requiring one specific allegation. Öhman also claims that an expert’s conclusion is an allegation of fact since the experts’ assertion is backed by embedded statements of fact to arrive at such a conclusion. The outcome of this case has strong implications for the national economy and access to justice.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a plaintiff suing under Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 must plead and prove that they bought shares registered under the allegedly misleading registration statement. Slack Technologies argues that the text of the statute reflects congressional intent to limit liability to only those who bought shares registered under the relevant registration statement. Slack additionally argues that past judicial and regulatory precedent supports this theory. Fiyyaz Pirani counters that the text of the statute reflects congressional intent to create broad liability by including a range of securities so as to protect investors. Pirani contends that this particular issue is novel and was undecided prior to the district court decision below. The outcome of this case will determine the extent to which investors are protected by the Securities Act of 1933 and the availability of remedial measures to investors under the Act.

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