Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, is a U.S. Supreme Court case in which the Court struck down a Texas statute that denied funding to local school districts for the education of children who were not "legally admitted" into the United States, and which authorized local school districts to deny enrollment to such children.
Probable cause is a requirement under the Fourth Amendment that must generally be satisfied before police may make an arrest, conduct a search, or obtain a warrant.
Reasonable suspicion is a standard used in criminal procedure to evaluate whether a police officer’s decision to briefly stop an individual, or to conduct a limited search, complies with the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
Does the Fourth Amendment permit police officers to perform a warrantless search of an individual’s cell phone confiscated at the time of an arrest?
In August 2009, David Riley was pulled over in San Diego, California for having expired tags on his car and a suspended driver’s license. As per police department policy, the officer impounded Riley’s car and conducted a warrantless search of the car. The officer found two handguns that were later linked to a shooting that had taken place a few weeks prior. During the arrest, the officers confiscated and rummaged through the data on Riley’s smartphone without a warrant. Some of the data on the phone linked Riley to gang activity and the shooting and was entered into evidence at the trial, where Riley was convicted on three charges. Riley argues that allowing police officers to search through data on his cell phone without a warrant is an unacceptable intrusion on personal privacy. California argues that police officers need to be able to confiscate cell phones without first obtaining a warrant for safety reasons and to prevent destruction of evidence. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will affect the balance between those two concerns and the scope of Fourth Amendment protection available to personal technology.
Whether or under what circumstances the Fourth Amendment permits police officers to conduct a warrantless search of the digital contents of an individual’s cell phone seized from the person at the time of arrest.
On August 2, 2009 around 2:30 p.m., David Riley, an alleged member of the Lincoln Park gang, was parked in a San Diego neighborhood with his girlfriend and three other men. See People v. Riley, No. D059840, 2013 BL 34220, 2013 ILRC 1385 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. Feb. 08, 2013) at 1. When a member of a rival gang, Mr.
Does an officer’s continued detention of a driver, even after completion of the traffic stop, to conduct a canine sniff violate the Fourth Amendment when the officer lacks reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or some other legal justification to support the additional investigation?
The Supreme Court will determine whether an officer may extend a traffic stop, even after the stop has been completed, to conduct a canine sniff without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or some other legal justification. Dennys Rodriguez claims that any extension of a completed stop to conduct further investigation, no matter how brief, violates the Fourth Amendment unless the extension is independently justified by reasonable suspicion. The United States counters that officers may lawfully engage in further investigations during a traffic stop so long as the officer does not unreasonably prolong the stop. The Supreme Court’s decision might curb law enforcement’s investigative powers with respect to routine traffic stops by potentially creating bright-line restrictions on those powers.
This Court has held that, during an otherwise lawful traffic stop, asking a driver to exit a vehicle, conducting a drug sniff with a trained canine, or asking a few off-topic questions are “de minimis” intrusions on personal liberty that do not require reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in order to comport with the Fourth Amendment. This case poses the question of whether the same rule applies after the conclusion of the traffic stop, so that an officer may extend the already-completed stop for a canine sniff without reasonable suspicion or other lawful justification.
On the night of March 27, 2012, police officer Morgan Struble saw a vehicle briefly drive onto the shoulder of a Nebraska highway in violation of Nebraska law. See United States v. Rodriguez, 741 F.3d 905, 906 (8th Cir. 2014); Brief for Respondent, the United States at 2. Struble stopped the vehicle at 12:06 A.M.
Whether the Fourth Amendment requires a stricter standard than reasonableness for student strip-searches, and if so, whether school officials conducting a strip-search have qualified immunity from suit for violation of Fourth Amendment rights.
Safford middle school officials strip-searched thirteen-year-old Savana Redding, seeking prescription-strength ibuprofen pills based on uncorroborated information from another student that Savana possessed ibuprofen in an unspecified time and location. This case concerns whether the school violated Redding's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and, if so, whether qualified immunity shields the school officials from liability. After a District Court and a Ninth Circuit panel found the search to be lawful, the Ninth Circuit reheard the case en banc; it reversed and held that qualified immunity did not protect the school official who ordered the search. Petitioners Safford Unified School District #1, et al. argue that the search was reasonable given the fellow student's tip and the threat of prescription drug abuse, but that even if it was not, school officials must have qualified immunity so they are free to exercise their judgment regarding drug abuse in schools. They argue that a decision in Respondent's favor would hamper school officials' ability to respond in the face of threats to student safety in school. Respondent April Redding argues that a strip search was unreasonable because the school lacked any indication that Savana had pills hidden in her undergarments, and that the school officials should be held responsible. She argues that a decision for Petitioner would enable school officials to conduct highly invasive searches based on only minimal, vague suspicion. This case promises guidance both to school officials seeking to carry out their duties effectively without violating students' rights and to lower courts responsible for assessing school officials' conduct.
(1) Whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits public school officials from conducting a search of a student suspected of possessing and distributing a prescription drug on campus in violation of school policy.
(2) Whether the Ninth Circuit departed from established principles of qualified immunity in holding that a public school administrator may be liable in a damages lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for conducting a search of a student suspected of possessing and distributing a prescription drug on campus.
In the fall of 2003, Safford Middle School officials were concerned about the distribution of prescription and over-the-counter-drugs among students. See Redding v. Safford Unified School District 531 F.3d 1071, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2008). Bringing medicine on campus without permission violated school rules, and a student had recently become ill after ingesting a pill he allegedly received from a classmate.
· "Strip-Search of Girl Tests Limit of School Policy," Adam Liptak, 03/23/2009
· Fourth Amendment, LII Wex
· Prescription and OTC drugs information, National Institute on Drug Abuse
· Prescription and OTC drug abuse resource for teens
· Prescription drug abuse resource
· "Are Strip Searches Special?" Sherry F. Colb, 12/17/2003
Whether a parolee’s Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy is so diminished by his/her societal status that a parolee can be searched at any time and without reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing?
In 1996 the California Legislature adopted Penal Code section 3067, mandating that every prisoner eligible for release on state parole “shall agree in writing to be subject to search or seizure by a parole officer or other peace officer at any time of the day or night, with or without a search warrant and with or without cause.” Petitioner Samson is a parolee who was arrested for drug possession after a search that was instigated solely because of his parolee status. Samson argues that under the Fourth Amendment he enjoys a diminished yet reasonable expectation to privacy that is eliminated by California’s 1996 parole search condition, which Samson claims “confers unfettered discretion on law enforcement officers to conduct searches of parolees.” The Supreme Court will have to decide whether a parolee's diminished expectation of privacy makes parolees subject to searches where there is no suspicion at all of any wrongdoing.
Does the Fourth Amendment prohibit police from conducting a warrantless search of a person who is subject to a parole search condition, where there is no suspicion of criminal wrongdoing and the sole reason for the search is that the person is on parole?
In 1996, the California Legislature enacted Penal Code section 3067, mandating that every prisoner eligible for release on state parole “shall agree in writing to be subject to search or seizure by a parole officer or other peace officer at any time of the day or night, with or without a search warrant and with or without cause.” Brief for Respondent at 2.
What is the scope of reasonable police officer action under Title II of the ADA and the Fourth Amendment when dealing with armed and violent, mentally ill individuals?
The Supreme Court will determine whether the ADA requires police officers, when attempting an arrest, to reasonably accommodate a violent and armed, mentally ill suspect. San Francisco argues that Sheehan, the suspect in this case, posed a direct threat to others and, accordingly, the ADA did not apply. Moreover, San Francisco contends that, at the least, the officers did not violate a clearly established right and, thus, are protected from liability by qualified immunity. Sheehan counters that she posed a threat only to people that entered her room and that the officers’ action violated her clearly established right to be free from unreasonable seizures. The Court’s ruling will have an effect on the safety of the public, the mentally ill, and law enforcement officers.
In 2008, Respondent Teresa Sheehan, who has a mental illness, was a resident at the Conrad House, a group home in San Francisco for the mentally ill. See Sheehan v. San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2014). After a social worker, Heath Hodge, entered Sheehan’s room without her permission to check on her, Sheehan told Hodge to leave and threatened him after stating that she had a knife.
Whether Scott’s use of deadly force during a car chase to stop Harris, who was fleeing from the police’s attempt to enforce a traffic violation, violated the Harris’s Fourth Amendment rights and, in addition, whether Scott should have known that these actions would be considered a Fourth Amendment violation under the law.
In 2001, police witnessed Victor Harris driving 73 miles per hour in a 55 miles per hour zone. When they tried to pull him over, Harris sped away. Officer Timothy Scott joined the chase and after approximately six minutes of pursuit at average speeds between 80 and 90 miles per hour and an unsuccessful attempt at stopping Harris, Scott received authorization from his supervisor to stop Harris by force. Using his push bumper, Scott made direct contact with Harris’s car, causing him to lose control and roll down an embankment. Harris suffered serious injuries. Harris argues that under Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), which set forth circumstances in which deadly force is reasonable to prevent escape, Scott’s use of force was unreasonable and unconstitutional. Scott argues, however, that the force used should not be characterized as “deadly force” and that a simple reasonableness, and not the more specific test of Garner, should apply. Nevertheless, Scott argues that he should be entitled to qualified immunity. The Supreme Court, reviewing the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in favor of Harris, will determine the standard to be applied to uses of force in vehicular pursuits which will in turn affect police officers’ discretion in such situations. The Court will also further define the reasonableness requirement inherent in the Fourth Amendment, contributing to an already expansive and complex body of law.
1. Whether Respondent can show that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when Petitioner used deadly force to terminate a police pursuit by ramming Respondent’s vehicle at a time when he posed no immediate threat to human life, and when Respondent was merely a fleeing traffic offender who was not violently resisting apprehension at any time during the course of the pursuit.
2. Whether clearly established law in 2001 gave fair warning to a reasonable police officer that it is a Fourth Amendment violation to use deadly force to terminate a pursuit by ramming the vehicle of a fleeing traffic offender at a time when the offender poses no immediate threat to human life, and when the offender is merely fleeing and has not violently resisted apprehension at any time during the course of the pursuit.
Note: Because this appeal is from a summary judgment motion before trial, there have been no findings of facts in this case. Rather, for the purposes of deciding Scott’s motion for summary judgment, the lower courts are required to consider as true the facts that are most favorable to the opposing party, Harris. For completeness, the following description contains the facts as presented by both sides, with Harris’s version used where there is a discrepancy.
