A stop-and-frisk refers to a brief non-intrusive police stop of an individual. The Fourth Amendment requires that before stopping the suspect, the police must have a reasonable suspicion that a crime has been, is being, or is about to be committed by the suspect.
Does the favorable termination element of a Section 1983 claim alleging unreasonable seizure require a plaintiff to show that the criminal proceedings at issue terminated in a way that affirmatively indicates the plaintiff’s innocence?
This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the “favorable termination” element of a Section 1983 claim alleging unreasonable seizure requires a petitioner to show that the criminal proceedings at issue terminated in a way that is consistent with his innocence. Petitioner Larry Thompson brought a Section 1983 claim against his arresting officers for violating his Fourth Amendment rights after his criminal charges were dismissed “in the interest of justice,” with no further explanation regarding Thompson’s innocence or guilt. Thompson claims that his criminal proceedings terminated favorably, but Respondent Paigel Clark—an arresting police officer— argues that Thompson failed to meet this requirement, asserting that charges must be dismissed in a way that affirmatively indicates innocence. This case has important implications for the future of Section 1983 claims, prosecutorial discretion, and police officer accountability.
Whether the rule that a plaintiff must await favorable termination before bringing a Section 1983 action alleging unreasonable seizure pursuant to legal process requires the plaintiff to show that the criminal proceeding against him has “formally ended in a manner not inconsistent with his innocence,” as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit decided in Laskar v. Hurd, or that the proceeding “ended in a manner that affirmatively indicates his innocence,” as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit decided in Lanning v. City of Glens Falls.
In January 2014, Petitioner Larry Thompson lived with his fiancé, their newborn child, and his fiancé’s sister, Camille Watson, in Brooklyn, New York. Thompson v. Clark at 182. One night, Watson noticed a rash on the newborn child and called 911 to report that Thompson was abusing his child. Id. When Emergency Medical Technicians (“EMT”) arrived, Thompson confronted them, telling them that no one in the apartment had called 911. Id.
Whether records obtained from a DMV database as the result of an unlawful search should be considered “identity-related” evidence, thus barring suppression of such records as “fruit of the poisonous tree”?
Following an automobile stop in Manhattan, New York police officers ran Petitioner Jose Tolentino’s driver’s license through a Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) database, discovering that his driver’s license had been suspended and that he had at least ten suspensions for failure to answer a summons or to pay a fine. Tolentino was indicted by a grand jury for aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle. On appeal, Tolentino argues his DMV records must be suppressed because they were the fruit of an unlawful stop. Respondent State of New York argues that, even if the stop was unlawful, the exclusionary rule should not be extended to apply to information the government already possessed, since such an application would be unreasonable. The Supreme Court will have to balance the cost of suppressing highly probative evidence against the potential benefit of discouraging police from conducting random automobile stops without probable cause.
Whether pre-existing identity-related governmental documents, such as motor vehicle records, obtained as the direct result of police action violative of the Fourth Amendment, are subject to the exclusionary rule?
In 1961, the United States Supreme Court held that evidence resulting from a violation of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights was “fruit of the poisonous tree,” and could be suppressed by the defendant at trial. See Mapp v.
· California Law Review: Exclusion of Evidence Obtained By Illegal Searches
· New York Department of Motor Vehicles: Dial-In Search for New York DMV Records
· MSNBC, Bob Sullivan: ChoicePoint Files Found Riddled With Errors (Mar. 8, 2005)
Under the Fourth Amendment, is an officer’s intentional use of physical force to apprehend an individual a “seizure” even where the individual escapes?
This case asks whether an officer’s intentional use of physical force to apprehend an individual constitutes a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes, even if the officer does not successfully detain the individual or limit her freedom of movement. Officers Janice Madrid and Richard Williamson temporarily paralyzed Roxanne Torres’s arm after striking it with two bullets as Torres drove at them. Torres argues that based on the common law meaning of the Fourth Amendment and on the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment precedents, a person is seized where the officer intentionally applies physical force. Torres contends that although she drove over an hour away from the scene of where she was shot, the officers’ bullets striking her arm constituted a Fourth Amendment seizure. Officers Madrid and Williamson counter that a Fourth Amendment physical-force seizure requires more. The officers maintain that to successfully complete a Fourth Amendment seizure, they would have had to intentionally acquire physical control, which did not occur because Torres fled from the scene. The outcome of this case has important implications for the balancing of interests respecting police conduct and public safety.
Whether an unsuccessful attempt to detain a suspect by use of physical force is a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, as the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 8th, 9th and 11th Circuits and the New Mexico Supreme Court hold, or whether physical force must be successful in detaining a suspect to constitute a “seizure,” as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals hold.
In July 2014, two police officers approached an apartment complex in Albuquerque, New Mexico to apprehend Kayenta Jackson, a suspected criminal. Torres v. Madrid at 1–2. The officers first noticed two individuals standing in front of Jackson’s apartment next to a car that was backed into a parking spot. Id. at 2. The officers approached the individuals in case one of them was Jackson. Id.
Does a tribal police officer have authority to temporarily stop and search a non-Indian on public rights-of-way within tribal territories based on a potential violation of state or federal law?
This case asks the Supreme Court to rule on whether a tribal police officer has authority to temporarily stop and search a non-Indian on public rights-of-way within Indian jurisdiction based on a potential violation of state or federal law. Petitioner United States argues Indian tribes have broad sovereign authority to protect people and property within its borders, which includes the authority to temporarily stop and search non-Indians in Indian jurisdiction for potential state- or federal-law violations. Respondent Cooley counters that Indian tribes have no such authority because they do not have inherent sovereign authority to conduct this type of stop and search; in addition, neither Congress nor the courts have given tribal officers the authority to do so. The outcome of this case has significant policy implications raising concerns of the proper balance between public safety and individual rights on Indian jurisdiction. The case also implicates the scope of tribal sovereignty and the proper role of Congress and the courts in delineating the extent of tribal authority over non-Indians within tribal territory.
Whether the lower courts erred in suppressing evidence on the theory that a police officer of an Indian tribe lacked authority to temporarily detain and search the respondent, Joshua James Cooley, a non-Indian, on a public right-of-way within a reservation based on a potential violation of state or federal law.
On the morning of February 26, 2016, Officer James Saylor of the Crow Tribe Police Department was driving on a section of U.S. Highway 212 within the boundaries of the Crow Indian Reservation in Montana. United States v.
Anticipatory search warrants can only be executed after the occurrence of a “triggering event,” such as when a suspect takes possession of contraband from an undercover agent. If that event occurs as anticipated prior to the search, must the suspect receive notice of the triggering condition during the search through express reference to the triggering event in the language of the warrant itself or in a supporting affidavit accompanying the warrant?
Anticipatory search warrants are used by law enforcement to gain permission to perform a search where the probable cause mandated by the Fourth Amendment does not yet exist. Instead, probable cause is expected to materialize through the anticipated conduct of the suspect, such as when a suspect takes delivery of an illegal item or receives payment for an illegal act. Currently, there is a split between federal circuits as to how much information must be provided about a party against whom such a warrant is served. In this case, the Ninth Circuit reiterated its position that the Fourth Amendment requires the warrant to enumerate plainly the triggering event, just as it requires a particular description of the place to be searched and persons or items to be seized. The Ninth Circuit believes anticipatory warrants are particularly vulnerable to abuses of police power, and requiring the warrant to articulate the triggering event allows citizens to ensure that such searches are lawfully executed. The government argues, and other Federal Courts of Appeal have agreed, that the Fourth Amendment contains no such requirement, and the unique aspects of anticipatory warrants are adequately shielded from abuse by existing probable cause requirements inherent in the warrant application process.
Whether the Fourth Amendment requires suppression of evidence when officers conduct a search under an anticipatory warrant after the warrant’s triggering condition is satisfied, but the triggering condition is not set forth either in the warrant itself or in an affidavit that is both incorporated into the warrant and shown to the person whose property is being searched.
The following Facts is derived from the United State’s Supreme Court Brief, see Brief of the United States as Petitioner, and the Ninth Circuit’s amended opinion, see United States v. Grubbs, 377 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2004).
Whether law enforcement’s installation and use of a GPS tracking device to continuously monitor a person’s vehicle movements for an extended period of time violates that person’s Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable or warrantless searches and seizures.
FBI agents installed a Global Positioning System (“GPS”) tracking device on Antoine Jones’s vehicle as part of a drug trafficking investigation. The United States used the locational data from the GPS in a federal trial that resulted in Jones’s conviction for conspiracy. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed that conviction, holding that the agents needed a warrant before installing the GPS. The United States argues that a warrant was unnecessary because Jones had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements in public and was never deprived use of his Jeep. Jones responds that he has a privacy interest in the aggregation of his movements over a prolonged period and that the aggregation of such information interferes with his use of the Jeep. The Supreme Court’s decision will affect how police employ new technologies to reduce the manpower and cost required for criminal investigations. The Court’s decision will also consider how citizens can protect themselves from government officials’ possible abuse of new technologies, particularly where misuse threatens fundamental privacy rights.
Whether the warrantless use of a tracking device on respondent's vehicle to monitor its movements on public streets violated the Fourth Amendment.
In addition to the question presented by the petition, the parties are directed to brief and argue the following question: “whether the government violated respondent's fourth amendment rights by installing the GPS tracking device on his vehicle without a valid warrant and without his consent.”
In 2004, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) launched an investigation on two business partners, Antoine Jones and Lawrence Maynard, for possible drug trafficking. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 549 (D.C. Cir.
The authors would like to thank Professor Sherry Colb for her insights into this case and former Supreme Court Reporter of Decisions Frank Wagner for his assistance in editing this preview.
• Wex: Privacy
• Verdict, Sherry Colb: One Way or Another, I’m Gonna Find Ya: The U.S. Supreme Court Considers Whether GPS Tracking of Suspects’ Cars Requires a Search Warrant (Sept. 21, 2011)
When served with a warrant under the Stored Communications Act, is an email service provider obligated to disclose communication information that they control but store outside of the United States?
This case asks the Court to decide whether an email service provider must comply with a warrant issued pursuant to the Stored Communications Act to disclose communication information if they exercise control over the information but physically store it outside the United States. This case implicates the presumption against application of U.S. law outside of U.S. borders, as well as the true focus of section 2703 of the Stored Communications Act. The Government argues that the focus of the statute is “disclosure” and the relevant conduct occurs in the U.S., and therefore the information must be disclosed. Microsoft argues that the focus is “privacy” and the relevant conduct occurs outside the U.S., and therefore outside the reach of the statute. This decision could impact international cooperation and comity due to potential conflict-of-laws issues, as well as other nations’ willingness to do business with U.S.-based carriers.
Whether a United States provider of email services must comply with a probable-cause-based warrant issued under 18 U.S.C. § 2703 by making disclosure in the United States of electronic communications within that provider's control, even if the provider has decided to store that material abroad.
Microsoft Corporation (“Microsoft”) is a United States corporation incorporated and headquartered in Washington state. Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 829 F.3d 197, 202. Microsoft operates a web-based email service, known as “Outlook.com,” that allows customers to send and receive correspondence with other email accounts.
The authors would like to thank Cornell Law School Professor James Grimmelmann for his insights into this case.
Does the Fourth Amendment require the police to obtain a warrant before searching an arrestee’s cellphone call log?
Boston police officers arrested Brima Wurie in 2007 for distributing crack cocaine. Among the items confiscated from Wurie was his cell phone, which rang repeatedly while he was detained. Without obtaining a warrant, officers looked through the phone’s call log, and with that information, determined the address of a residence where they found drugs, a firearm, and ammunition. At his criminal trial, the federal district court denied Wurie’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the police’s warrantless search of his cellular phone. The court found Wurie guilty of possession of narcotics with intent to distribute, distributing cocaine base, and being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. The First Circuit reversed the district court’s denial and vacated Wurie’s conviction, holding that the Fourth Amendment requires the police to obtain a warrant before searching an arrestee’s cell phone. The Supreme Court’s ruling in this case will help shape the contours of the Fourth Amendment’s protections against unreasonable searches and seizures in light of new technologies.
Whether the Fourth Amendment permits the police, without obtaining a warrant, to review the call log of a cellphone found on a person who has been lawfully arrested.
On September 5, 2007, Boston police officers spotted an apparent drug deal inside Brima Wurie’s car, a Nissan Altima. See United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 1 (1st Cir. 2013). Upon stopping Fred Wade, the man identified with the alleged drug sale, police discovered two bags of crack cocaine in his pocket.
An unreasonable search and seizure is a search and seizure executed 1) without a legal search warrant signed by a judge or magistrate describing the place, person, or things to be searched or seized or 2) without probable cause to believe that certain person
