Fourth Amendment

County of Los Angeles v. Mendez

Issues

Does a police officer violate the Fourth Amendment when the officer uses reasonable force in response to a hazardous situation the officer created, and does an injured individual’s actions that give rise to the need for use of force constitute an intervening, superseding event that severs the causal relationship between the police officers’ conduct and the individual’s injuries?

In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether a police officer’s conduct leading up to her use of force against a citizen is relevant to the inquiry of whether that force was reasonable, and if so, what the limits are on holding that officer liable. The deputies of the County of Los Angeles argue that no liability should attach to their decision to open fire on Angel and Jennifer Mendez, because they were responding to the Mendezes’ threatening behavior. The Mendezes argue that the deputies provoked their threatening behavior, so they should be liable for opening fire on the Mendezes. The parties disagree as to whether the Ninth Circuit’s provocation rule, which would hold the deputies liable under the Fourth Amendment, conforms to Supreme Court precedent. A win for the deputies could promote police officer safety and help preserve the integrity of the qualified immunity doctrine by keeping standards of behavior clear. A win for the Mendezes could preserve the balance of protections for police officers and citizens and provide better incentives for officer reasonableness during every stage of an investigation.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. The Ninth Circuit’s provocation rule holds officers liable under the Fourth Amendment for objectively reasonable force, vitiates qualified-immunity protections, and permits tort liability in the absence of proximate cause. Should this Court reject the provocation rule and continue to analyze police use of force under the established legal framework set out in Graham?
  2. The Court of Appeals held alternatively that the Deputies were liable for the shooting “under basic notions of proximate cause.” Did the court err in holding that the failure to secure a warrant proximately caused the shooting, particularly where the Deputies shot in reasonable self-defense after one of the Plain-tiffs pointed a gun at them and the outcome would not have changed if the Deputies had a warrant?

On October 1, 2010, a group of police officers and deputies were searching for a wanted parolee in a California neighborhood. See Mendez v. Cty. Of Los Angeles, 815 F.3d 1178, 1184–85 (9th Cir. 2016); Brief for Petitioners, County of Los Angeles et al.

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0

Davis v. United States

Issues

Where Supreme Court precedent is retroactively applied to invalidate a search, should the results of the search be allowed into evidence as a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule?

 

Officer Curtis Miller arrested Petitioner Willie Davis for using a false name during a routine traffic stop. Incident to the arrest, Officer Miller searched the vehicle and discovered a gun. Davis was subsequently charged with being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. At trial, Davis made a motion to suppress the gun as evidence, but the district court denied the motion and let the evidence come in. While Davis’s appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Arizona v. Gant, holding that searches like the one conducted in Davis’s case violate the Fourth Amendment. Davis argued on appeal that the retroactive application of Gant to his case should result in exclusion of the gun as evidence. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Davis, who now appeals to the Supreme Court. The United States maintains that the evidence of the gun should not be suppressed because Officer Miller, in objectively reasonable good faith, believed his search was proper when it was conducted. This case will determine whether retroactive application of the rule in Arizona v. Gant requires exclusion of evidence acquired under a prior rule, or whether a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule should apply.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to a search authorized by precedent at the time of the search that is subsequently ruled unconstitutional.

In 2007, Officer Curtis Miller made a routine traffic stop of a car in which Petitioner Willie Davis was riding. See United States v. Davis, 598 F.3d 1259, 1261 (11th Cir.

Written by

Edited by

Submit for publication
0

Devenpeck v. Alford

Issues

Whether a police officer can arrest a person for one offense, but later charge that person with another offense even if the charged offense is wholly unrelated to the arresting offense?
Whether a law or doctrine is "clearly established" when several courts have differing opinions?

 

In Devenpeck v. Alford, the Supreme Court will consider two issues. First, the Court will settle a conflict among the circuit courts in determining how precise an officer's stated reasons for probable cause must be to the actual arresting offense. Two judicial circuits find an arrest reasonable if, based on an objective assessment by a reasonable officer, there is probable cause to arrest for any offense. On the other hand, at least five judicial circuits find an arrest to be reasonable only if there is probable cause to arrest for crimes "closely related" to the crime or crimes articulated by the arresting officer. The Court will likely find the narrow approach more appealing and allow arrests for only "closely related" offenses. Second, the Court will decide if the law regarding arrests for "closely related" offenses was clearly established at the time of Alford's arrest. The Court will likely find the law was not settled, and thereby overrule the Ninth Circuit's decision in Alford v. Haner, et al. 333 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2003).

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does an arrest violate the Fourth Amendment when a police officer has probable cause to make an arrest for one offense, if that offense is not closely related to the offense articulated by the officer at the time of the arrest?
 
For the purpose of qualified immunity, was the law clearly established when there was a split in the circuits regarding the application of the "closely related offense doctrine," the Ninth Circuit had no controlling authority applying the doctrine, and Washington state law did not apply the doctrine?
Submit for publication
0

District of Columbia v. Wesby

Issues

What is the scope of probable cause for trespass under the Fourth Amendment, and was this law so clearly established prior to the arrests involved as to entitle the police officers to qualified immunity?  

The Supreme Court will decide whether a police officer has probable cause to arrest a suspect for trespassing under the Fourth Amendment when the owner of a house says that the suspects do not have authority to enter and the officers find circumstantial evidence of trespass, but the suspects claim that they thought that they had authority to be there. Additionally, the Court will decide whether, if the officers did not have probable cause to arrest the suspects in this case, the law of probable cause for trespass was unclear enough to entitle the officers to qualified immunity. Petitioners District of Columbia, et al. argue that an officer, in order to be able to make timely probable cause determinations, should not be required to exactly determine the criminal intent of a suspect; at the very least, the District of Columbia argues, officers should not be required to rely on a suspect’s claims of an innocent mental state. The District of Columbia also argues that the law was not “clearly established” in this area and so the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. Respondents Theodore Wesby, et al. argue that the officers did not have probable cause to arrest the suspects for trespassing because the suspects indicated that they thought that they had permission to be in the home and, thus, the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity. This case will address the scope of the probable cause standard for trespass claims under the Fourth Amendment and will clarify the standard for qualified immunity.  

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Police officers found late-night partiers inside a vacant home belonging to someone else. After giving conflicting stories for their presence, some partiers claimed they had been invited by a different person who was not there. The lawful owner told the officers, however, that he had not authorized entry by anyone. The officers arrested the partiers for trespassing. The questions presented are:

  1. Whether the officers had probable cause to arrest under the Fourth Amendment, and in particular whether, when the owner of a vacant home informs police that he has not authorized entry, an officer assessing probable cause to arrest those inside for trespassing may discredit the suspects’ questionable claims of an innocent mental state.
  2. Whether, even if there was no probable cause to arrest the apparent trespassers, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established in this regard.

Early in the morning on March 16, 2008, Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) officers responded to a complaint of illegal activity occurring in a vacant house. See Wesby v. District of Columbia, 765 F.3d 13 at 3–4 (D.C. Cir. 2014). When the officers entered the house, they saw “scantily-clad” women who they believed were “stripping” for other guests of the party.

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0

Egbert v. Boule

Issues

Does a plaintiff have a Bivens implied right of action against a federal officer under either the First Amendment or under the Fourth Amendment when the officer is engaged in immigration enforcement functions?


This case asks the Supreme Court to consider extending the implied right of action from Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents to a situation involving a federal officer carrying out immigration enforcement functions. In Bivens, the Court recognized a limited federal cause of action for damages when federal officers, acting under color of federal authority, violate an individual’s constitutional rights. Currently, the Court recognizes Bivens actions for Fourth Amendment violations committed by law enforcement officers, as well as violations of rights secured by the Fifth and Eighth Amendments. Erik Egbert argues that extending Bivens to encompass First Amendment retaliation claims and Fourth Amendment claims involving immigration enforcement officials is unwarranted. Robert Boule counters that extending Bivens to his two claims ensures that individuals are provided with a constitutional remedy when federal officers violate fundamental rights. This case has significant implications for civil rights, separation of powers, and questions related to judicial overreach in matters involving alleged constitutional violations.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1) Whether a cause of action exists under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics for First Amendment retaliation claims; and (2) whether a cause of action exists under Bivens for claims against federal officers engaged in immigration-related functions for allegedly violating a plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights.

Robert Boule is the owner of a bed and breakfast in Blaine, Washington. Boule v. Egbert at 1312. Boule’s property directly adjoins the United States-Canada border. Id. In March 2014, Boule encountered Erik Egbert, a Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) agent. Id. Egbert asked Boule about guests staying at Boule’s inn.

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0

electronic surveillance

Fernandez v. California

Issues

Can police obtain consent from a cotenant to search a dwelling after another cotenant who objected to the search is lawfully removed?

Court below: California 2nd District Court of Appeal

Walter Fernandez was a suspect in a robbery and police came to his apartment and asked for permission to search it. He refused to let them in and the police arrested him for the robbery and removed him from the apartment. A short time later, the police returned and got permission from Fernandez’s girlfriend to search the apartment. At trial, Fernandez moved to suppress the evidence found in his apartment because he claimed it was obtained as a result of an unreasonable warrantless search and seizure. The Supreme Court, in Georgia v. Randolph,has previously held that when one cotenant refused to consent to a search of the dwelling, the police could not immediately obtain consent from another cotenant. A key reason for that holding was that it provides a clear rule for law enforcement to follow in the field. Fernandez argues this his refusal to let police search his apartment remained in effect after his lawful arrest. California argues that the defendant needed to be present in order to override his girlfriend’s consent to the search. The outcome of this case will clarify both Georgia v. Randolph andlaw enforcement procedures when obtaining consent to search. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Under Georgia v. Randolph, must a defendant be personally present and objecting when police officers ask a cotenant for consent to conduct a warrantless search or is a defendant's previously-stated objection, while physically present, to a warrantless search a continuing assertion of Fourth Amendment rights which cannot be overridden by a cotenant?

top

Facts

On October 12, 2009, Detective Kelly Clark and Officer Joseph Cirrito responded to a radio dispatch about a robbery involving the Drifters gang. See People v. Fernandez, 208 Cal. App. 4th 100, 105 (2012). Clark and Cirrito went to Magnolia and 14th Street, a place where they knew Drifters gathered.

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

top

Submit for publication
0

Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders

Issues

Can a prison perform a strip search of each detainee regardless of the reason for the arrest?

 

Petitioner Albert Florence was arrested on an outdated bench warrant for a non-indictable offense and was subjected to “strip searches” in two separate prison facilities. Florence sued both facilities, alleging that their blanket policies of strip searching all detainees, regardless of their offense, violates the Fourth Amendment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed a District Court opinion, holding that the policies in this case did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Florence argues that the Fourth Amendment protects detainees from suspicionless strip searches when less intrusive alternatives better serve penological interests. The Respondents contend that the prison context diminishes the Fourth Amendment’s privacy expectation, and that the privacy expectation is outweighed by the security interest promoted by blanket strip searches. The decision in this case could affect prison security, the psychological wellbeing of detainees, and the future volume of prison litigation.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Fourth Amendment permits a jail to conduct a suspicionless strip search of every individual arrested for any minor offense no matter what the circumstances.

On March 3, 2005, police arrested Petitioner Albert Florence in New Jersey on an Essex County bench warrant while he was a passenger in his sport utility vehicle. See Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 595 F.Supp.2d 492, 496 (D.N.J.

Written by

Edited by

Submit for publication
0
Subscribe to Fourth Amendment