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INDIANS

Arizona v. Navajo Nation

Issues

Is there a trust relationship between the Navajo Nation and the U.S. government and no jurisdictional prohibitions such that the Navajo Nation can compel the U.S. Government to assess and manage the Nation’s water interests in the Colorado River?

NoteThe authors mirror the parties’ and courts’ use of the term “Indian” as a legal term in this Preview.

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether there is a trust relationship between the Navajo Nation (“the Nation) and the U.S. government regarding the Nation’s water rights. Arizona contends that the Nation’s claim infringes upon the Supreme Court’s retained and exclusive jurisdiction over the allocation of water from the Colorado River mainstream in Arizona v. California. Furthermore, Arizona argues that the Nation has failed to state a cognizable breach-of-trust claim because the Nation did not specify a source of law establishing the government’s fiduciary duty. The Nation counters that the claim does not fall under the Supreme Court’s reserved jurisdiction because the Nation did not seek a quantification of its rights to the Colorado River mainstream. The Nation further contends that it has identified provisions in treaties, statutes, and the Winters doctrine to establish the trust duty on the federal government to ensure an adequate water supply for the Navajo Reservation. The outcome of this case will have far-reaching implications for the Navajo Nation’s water resources, the stability of water rights, and the water allocation system.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether the opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, allowing the Navajo Nation to proceed with a claim to enjoin the secretary of the U.S. Department of the Interior to develop a plan to meet the Navajo Nation’s water needs and manage the mainstream of the Colorado River in the Lower Basin so as not to interfere with that plan, infringes upon the Supreme Court’s retained and exclusive jurisdiction over the allocation of water from the LBCR mainstream in Arizona v. California; and (2) whether the Navajo Nation can state a cognizable claim for breach of trust consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation based solely on unquantified implied rights to water under the doctrine of Winters v. United States?

The Navajo Nation (“the Nation”) is a federally recognized Indian tribe that signed the 1849 Treaty and the 1868 Treaty with the United States. Navajo Nation v.

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Becerra v. San Carlos Apache Tribe

Issues

Is requiring the Indian Health Service (“IHS") to pay contract support costs to cover the administrative costs of Indian tribal healthcare expenditures, which are funded by revenue earned from third-party Medicaid, Medicare, and private insurance companies instead of directly funded by the IHS, consistent with the Indian Self-Determination Act?

In this case, the Supreme Court must decide whether the Indian Health Service (“IHS”) is required to pay contract support costs to cover the administrative burden of tribal healthcare expenditures of income the tribes earned from Medicaid, Medicare, and private insurance companies. Secretary of Health and Human Services Xavier Becerra argues that the text and structure of the Indian Self-Determination Act (“ISDA”) unambiguously requires IHS to only pay contract support costs for activities the IHS directly funds, and to do otherwise would be overly burdensome. The San Carlos Apache Tribe and Northern Arapaho Tribe claim that the ISDA’s text mandates contract support payments for third-party revenue expenditures, and that the Indian canon, which states that any statutory ambiguities must be resolved in favor of the Indian party in a case, mandates that the Court must rule for them if they can show their interpretation of the ISDA is at least plausible enough to render it ambiguous. This case could have implications for the ability of tribes to fund tribal healthcare, as well as the funding of the IHS and its allocation of internal funds.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Indian Health Service must pay “contract support costs” not only to support IHS-funded activities, but also to support the tribe’s expenditure of income collected from third parties.

The Indian Health Service (“IHS”) is a federal agency that administers healthcare programs for Indian tribes. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Xavier Becerra, et al. at 2. Most IHS funding comes from the federal government, but it also bills insurance companies and Medicare and Medicaid for its services. Id.

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McGirt v. Oklahoma

Issues

Can the State of Oklahoma prosecute a defendant for crimes committed on historic lands of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation, or may only the federal government do so?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the State of Oklahoma has, for decades, been improperly exercising criminal jurisdiction over land within the historical boundaries of the Muscogee (Creek) Native American tribe in Eastern Oklahoma. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held that Oklahoma had jurisdiction to prosecute a Native American defendant, Jimcy McGirt, for crimes that he committed within Oklahoma’s borders but entirely on the Muscogee (Creek) Nation’s historically tribal lands. McGirt, as the Petitioner, argues that because his crime took place on the Muscogee (Creek) reservation and he is an enrolled Seminole-tribe member, only the federal government has jurisdiction to prosecute him in this case. Oklahoma, as the Respondent, counters that the land on which McGirt committed his crimes was never an Indian reservation—instead, Congress classified the land as a dependent Indian community until Congress removed this classification and gave Oklahoma criminal jurisdiction over the community’s land. From a policy perspective, this case is important because it will likely determine whether a substantial portion of Oklahoma is exclusively controlled by the Muscogee (Creek) Nation and the federal government, which in turn would have enormous legal, economic, and social implications

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the prosecution of an enrolled member of the Creek Tribe for crimes committed within the historical Creek boundaries is subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction.

In 1997, an Oklahoma jury convicted Jimcy McGirt of committing multiple crimes, including first-degree rape, against a four-year-old girl. McGirt v.

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Nebraska, et al. v. Parker, et al.

Issues

Despite an unclear congressional intent to diminish an Indian reservation through the sale of land, can a reservation also be diminished if the land has lost its Indian-character? 

 

In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether an Indian reservation can be diminished through events occurring after the sale of land to non-Indian settlers despite an absence of clear congressional intent to diminish the reservation. See Brief for Petitioners, Nebraska, et al., at i. In 1882, Congress passed a statute (“Act of 1882”) to sell a portion of the Omaha Indian Tribe’s (“Omaha Tribe”) reservation in Nebraska. See Brief for Petitioners at 9. Since the enactment of the Act of 1882, it has been unclear whether the portion sold still belongs to the Omaha Tribe’s reservation or if the reservation was diminishedSee id. Petitioners (“Nebraska”) argue that de facto diminishment has occurred because the Omaha Tribe has declined to exercise their jurisdiction over the land and the land has lost its Indian character. See Brief for Petitioners at 24–26. The Omaha Tribe denies that the land has lost its Indian character and argues that jurisdiction over the land was never abandoned. See Brief for Respondents at 7. Significantly, the Omaha Tribe argues that neither the statutory language nor legislative history of the Act of 1882 supports the inference that Congress intended to diminish the reservation by selling the land. See id. at 10.

The Court’s decision in this case will implicate the reading of Solem v. Bartlett, which articulated a three-part analysis to evaluate when diminishment of an Indian reservation has occurred: (1) the statutory language used to sell Indian land; (2) events surrounding the passage of the sale of Indian land; and (3) events occurring after the sale of Indian land. See Brief for Petitioners at 21. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Whether ambiguous evidence concerning the first two factors in the test from Solem v. Bartlett (the statutory language used to open the Indian lands, and events surrounding the passage of a surplus land Act) necessarily forecloses any possibility that diminishment of a federal Indian reservation could be found on a de facto basis.

     

  2. Whether the original boundaries of the Omaha Indian Reservation were diminished following passage of the Act of August 7, 1882.

The Omaha Tribe, claiming that several residents and business owners resided within the boundaries of their reservation, attempted to enforce the Tribe’s Beverage Control Ordinance upon them. See Smith v. Parker, 996 F. Supp. 2d 815, 820 (D. Neb.) aff'd, 774 F.3d 1166 (8th Cir. 2014) cert. granted sub nom. Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 27 (2015).

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  1. Matthew H. Birkhold, “Judging Indian Character in Nebraska v. Parker,” Indian Country Today Media Network (Dec. 19, 2015).
  2. Lindsay M. Thane, “Smith v. Parker,” Public Land and Resources Law Review
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Washington State Department of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc.

Issues

Does a Washington State fuel tax violate an 1855 treaty between the Yakama Nation and the United States that protects the Yakama’s “right to travel” when the tax is applied to a Yakama corporation that uses a public highway to transport fuel into Washington?

In this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether the Yakama Treaty of 1855 (“the Treaty”), which guarantees to the Yakama Indians the right to travel upon Washington public highways, creates a right for tribal members to avoid the Washington State fuel tax, which imposes a tax on fuels used for the propulsion of motor vehicles on Washington highways. Petitioner Washington State Department of Licensing (“the State”) argues that the tax applies because the Treaty does not expressly preempt the tax and because the tax attaches to the possession of fuel, not the transportation of fuel. Respondent Cougar Den, Inc. contends that, according to well-established rules of Indian treaty interpretation, the Treaty preempts the fuel tax and, further, the tax is an importation tax necessarily implicating the Yakama Indians right to travel. From a policy perspective, the Court’s decision in this case will have potential implications on Washington tax revenues, environmental concerns, and competitiveness in the fuel market.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Yakama Treaty of 1855 creates a right for tribal members to avoid state taxes on off-reservation commercial activities that make use of public highways.

The Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation (“Yakama Nation”) is an Indian Tribe recognized by the federal government. Brief for Respondent, Cougar Den, Inc. at 2. The Yakama Nation and the United States entered into a treaty (“the Treaty”) in 1855.

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Washington v. United States

Issues

Do treaties between the State of Washington and Native American Tribes require Washington to protect the salmon population from land development; and, if so, must Washington pay to undo the development when the development was ordered by the United States and undoing it may not increase the salmon population?

In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether treaties between the State of Washington (“Washington” or “the state”) and Native American tribes (“the Tribes”) guaranteeing the Tribes the right to fish in certain areas of the state require Washington to protect salmon against despoliation from land development. The present case arises out of a series of barrier culverts—tunnels that allow water to pass underneath roads but prevent fish from passing—that Washington constructed, some pursuant to federal specifications. The culverts prevent salmon from returning, thus inhibiting the Tribes’ ability to fish. Washington argues that the treaties were not created to address such environmental concerns. Moreover, Washington argues that it is not fair for it to be forced to replace the culverts, because the culverts were part of a federally-initiated roadbuilding program, and their design was suggested by the United States. Further, Washington argues that replacing the barrier culverts would not increase the salmon population. The United States and the Tribes disagree, asserting that the parties to the treaties intended to protect the salmon population against man-made despoliation. The United States and the Tribes also assert that no one forced Washington to create the culverts using the design that blocks salmon re-entry and that replacing those culverts would benefit the salmon population. At stake are the future of the salmon populations near the Tribes and potential limitations on state powers to make regulatory decisions.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether a treaty “right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations ... in common with all citizens” guaranteed “that the number of fish would always be sufficient to provide a ‘moderate living’ to the tribes”; (2) whether the district court erred in dismissing the state's equitable defenses against the federal government where the federal government signed these treaties in the 1850s, for decades told the state to design culverts a particular way, and then filed suit in 2001 claiming that the culvert design it provided violates the treaties it signed; and (3) whether the district court’s injunction violates federalism and comity principles by requiring Washington to replace hundreds of culverts, at a cost of several billion dollars, when many of the replacements will have no impact on salmon, and plaintiffs showed no clear connection between culvert replacement and tribal fisheries.

In the mid-eighteenth century, Native American Tribes of the Pacific Northwest entered into a series of treaties whereby they relinquished territory but were guaranteed a right to off-reservation fishing. United States v. Washington, No. 13-35474, at 11–12 (9th Cir. 2017). Every treaty contained a “fishing clause,” which guaranteed “the right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations . . .

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