SOVEREIGNTY

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The Supreme Court will determine whether or not to overrule Nevada v. Hall, which held that states do not enjoy immunity from suit in the courts of their sister states. Petitioner Franchise Tax Board of California (“Franchise Tax Board” or “the Board”) contends that historical evidence and Hall’s inconsistency with the Court’s other precedent regarding sovereign immunity require that the Court overrule Hall. Franchise Tax Board further argues that preserving Hall’s holding, thereby allowing states to be sued in the courts of other states, infringes on state sovereignty and unfairly burdens state tax collection practices. Respondent Gilbert Hyatt (“Hyatt”) counters that the Constitution does not grant states sovereign immunity in each other’s courts and that Hall is consistent with the Court’s jurisprudence on sovereign immunity. Hyatt also asserts that states have a vested interest in protecting their citizens and providing them with a forum to vindicate their rights—if Hall were overruled, individuals similarly situated to Hyatt would have no means of litigating this type of dispute. From a policy perspective, this case is important because it will determine whether states can be sued in the courts of other states without their consent.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the New Jersey Transit Corporation (“NJ Transit”) is an arm of the State of New Jersey entitled to interstate sovereign immunity. Cedric Galette initiated a negligence lawsuit against NJ Transit under Pennsylvania law. NJ Transit filed a motion to dismiss the suit based on interstate sovereign immunity, a common law doctrine under which a sovereign cannot be sued without its consent. Galette argues that although the Legislature of the State of New Jersey (“the State”) established the entity as an “instrumentality” of the State, NJ Transit’s structure, as well as the lack of direct state liability for its adverse judgements, demonstrate it is not an arm of the State for sovereign immunity purposes. NJ Transit counters that NJ Transit was created as an arm of New Jersey entitled to sovereign immunity, emphasizing statutory language calling it an instrumentality of the State, its governmental powers, essential public function, gubernatorial control, and dependence on state funding. The outcome of this case will impact federalism and state sovereignty as well as economic consequences for state-affiliated commercial entities.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents a defendant from being retried on a count where he was acquitted by a jury’s verdict. Petitioner McElrath argues that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits defendants from being retried once they are acquitted. Petitioner also contends that the Georgia Supreme Court’s “repugnancy rule,” a rule that voids a jury’s verdicts if its findings on the record are extremely inconsistent, conflicts with the purpose and history of the Double Jeopardy Clause. In response, Respondent Georgia contends that state law, not the Double Jeopardy Clause, defines when a verdict is valid. It further asserts that Georgia’s “repugnancy rule” is consistent with the Constitution because repugnant verdicts and inconsistent verdicts are different, and the Supreme Court has never ruled on contradictory jury findings. The outcome of this case will affect the balance between judicial and jury power, as well as how far a federal court’s power can go in reversing a state court’s decision.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the State of Oklahoma has, for decades, been improperly exercising criminal jurisdiction over land within the historical boundaries of the Muscogee (Creek) Native American tribe in Eastern Oklahoma. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held that Oklahoma had jurisdiction to prosecute a Native American defendant, Jimcy McGirt, for crimes that he committed within Oklahoma’s borders but entirely on the Muscogee (Creek) Nation’s historically tribal lands. McGirt, as the Petitioner, argues that because his crime took place on the Muscogee (Creek) reservation and he is an enrolled Seminole-tribe member, only the federal government has jurisdiction to prosecute him in this case. Oklahoma, as the Respondent, counters that the land on which McGirt committed his crimes was never an Indian reservation—instead, Congress classified the land as a dependent Indian community until Congress removed this classification and gave Oklahoma criminal jurisdiction over the community’s land. From a policy perspective, this case is important because it will likely determine whether a substantial portion of Oklahoma is exclusively controlled by the Muscogee (Creek) Nation and the federal government, which in turn would have enormous legal, economic, and social implications

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This case asks the Court to determine whether New Jersey can unilaterally withdraw from the Waterfront Commission Compact, which it signed with New York in 1953. New York argues that New Jersey cannot withdraw without New York’s agreement because the Compact’s writers intended to bar unilateral withdrawal. New York also argues that unilateral withdrawal would violate New York sovereignty. New Jersey argues that indefinite compacts with continuing duties, like the Waterfront Commission Compact, always allow unilateral withdrawal unless specifically stated otherwise. New Jersey further alleges that requiring mutual withdrawal would prevent New Jersey from reclaiming its sovereign powers. The outcome of this case will impact interstate compacts throughout the nation, state sovereignty, and anti-crime and anti-corruption efforts within the waterfront of New York and New Jersey.

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Two defendants were charged in Puerto Rico court and federal court on the same set of facts and for largely the same crimes. See Luis M. Sanchez Valle v. The People of Puerto Rico, 2015 WL 1317010 (P.R. 2015), at 2a, 4a (pincited to linked document). Each defendant was convicted and sentenced in federal court first, and then moved to dismiss the pending state charges. The defendants argued that the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibited Puerto Rico from prosecuting them for the same crimes they were convicted of in federal court. See id. at 2a–5a. The trial courts granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss, but the Puerto Rico Court of Appeals reversed. Relying on the dual sovereignty doctrine, the court held that Puerto Rico, an independent sovereign, could charge the defendants for crimes under the Puerto Rico Constitution. See id. However, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court reversed, deciding that Puerto Rico had no sovereign status, derived its power to prosecute from the U.S. Constitution, and thereby could not charge the defendants for the same crime. The Supreme Court will decide whether the Puerto Rico Supreme Court was right. See Brief for Petitioner, The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico at i. Puerto Rico argues that the island is a sovereign state, and that under the dual sovereignty doctrine, there are no double jeopardy concerns. See id. at 19, 22. However, Valle contends that the Puerto Rico has no sovereign status. See Brief of Respondents, Luis M. Sánchez Valle and Jaime Gómez Vásquez at 3. The Court’s decision will affect the balance of the federal system and the dignity of the people of Puerto Rico. See id. at 61.

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This case asks whether the Alaska Native Corporations (“ANCs”) are entitled to relief provided to “Indian Tribes” under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”). The CARES Act incorporates the definition of “Indian tribe[s]” from the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act. Petitioners U.S. Treasury and ANCs argue that Congress expressly included the Alaska Native Corporations in the definition of Indian tribes and that the plain-meaning of the term “recognition” in the statute supports this inclusion. Respondent Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation and Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation argue that the ANCs do not qualify as Indian tribes because they are not formally recognized by a governmental authority or Congress as a sovereign tribe. The Supreme Court’s decision will impact the ability of Alaska Native Corporations to access funding through federal programs. 

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether Texas can regulate bingo and other gaming activities on tribal lands. Petitioner Ysleta del Sur Pueblo argues that the Court's precedent of Cabazon Band should control for purposes of statutory interpretation. Under Cabazon Band, tribes cannot operate games that state law prohibits; however, tribes do not have to follow state regulations governing games that are not otherwise prohibited. Respondent Texas maintains that the Restoration Act controls this issue, and that the Act does not incorporate the Cabazon Band interpretation. Therefore, Texas asserts that all gaming activities on tribal lands are subject to Texas regulations. The outcome of this case is limited to two tribes in Texas but could have implications on their tribal sovereignty.

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