ISSUE PRECLUSION

B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc.

Issues

Does the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board’s (“TTAB”) likelihood-of-confusion determination have a preclusive effect in a trademark infringement claim; or, alternatively, should federal courts defer to the TTAB’s findings on likelihood-of-confusion absent strong evidence to rebut the finding?

The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will determine whether a Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”) likelihood-of-confusion finding has preclusive effect in a subsequent trademark-infringement claim. If the Court finds that issue preclusion does not apply, the Court will address whether federal courts should defer to the TTAB’s likelihood-of-confusion determination in the absence of strong contrary evidence. B&B Hardware argues that the concept of “likelihood of confusion” has the same meaning in both TTAB and federal court proceedings and applies equally to both trademark-registration proceedings and trademark-infringement actions. Hargis Industries counters that preclusion is inapplicable because TTAB administrative decisions are not binding on Article III courts. The Court’s ruling will have significant implications for judicial efficiency in TTAB infringement cases before both the TTAB and federal courts, and will potentially also impact consumer confidence in trademarks. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Whether the TTAB’s finding of a likelihood of confusion precludes Hargis from relitigating that issue in infringement litigation, in which likelihood of confusion is an element.
  2. Whether, if issue preclusion does not apply, the district court was obliged to defer to the TTAB’s finding of a likelihood of confusion absent strong evidence to rebut it.

For over fifteen years, B&B Hardware, Inc. (“B&B”), doing business as Sealtight Technology, and Hargis Industries, Inc. (“Hargis”), doing business as Sealtite Building Fasteners, have been involved in trademark litigation over the similarity of their marks. See B&B Hardware, Inc. v.

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Currier v. Virginia

Issues

Whether a criminal defendant with multiple charges on the same set of facts may be found guilty of a second charge when the second charge is severed from the first and the defendant is acquitted on the first charge?

Petitioner Michael Currier was charged with burglary, grand larceny, and possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. Currier and the prosecution agreed to sever the charges. At the first trial, a jury acquitted Currier of burglary and grand larceny. At the second trial, in which the prosecution introduced many of the same facts, the jury convicted Currier of possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. Michael Currier argues that issue preclusion bars the state from re-litigating an issue upon which the jury acquitted him in the first trial. Virginia contends that the defendant waived his right to issue preclusion when he consented to severing the criminal charges into successive trials. The Court’s determination on the scope of the Double Jeopardy Clause will have significant consequences for defendants charged with counts requiring evidence of prior criminal records and, more broadly, for national criminal procedure.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a defendant who consents to severance of multiple charges into sequential trials loses his right under the Double Jeopardy Clause to the issue-preclusive effect of an acquittal.

In March 2012, a large gun safe, containing cash, personal papers, and twenty firearms, was stolen from a home in Virginia. Currier v. Commonwealth at 1. A neighbor reported hearing loud noises coming from inside the home, and seeing an old, white pickup truck with an orange strip and at least two individuals inside leaving the driveway. Id. at 2. The neighbor identified one of these individuals as the Petitioner, Michael Currier.

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res judicata

San Remo Hotel v. San Francisco


In 1981 the City of San Francisco enacted the Hotel Conversion Ordinance ("the HCO") in order to stem the depletion of housing for the poor, elderly, and disabled by controlling the conversion of hotel units from residential to tourist use. The HCO, as revised in 1990, places harsh requirements on the owners of hotels who want to convert their property from residential to tourist use. These requirements include the construction of a new residential unit for each unit that is converted, or a payment to the city of 80 percent of the cost of constructing such a replacement. The owners of the San Remo Hotel sought to convert their hotel from residential to tourist use, and challenged the legality of the HCO under the takings clause of the California constitution. The California Supreme Court upheld the HCO, and the owners of the hotel then challenged it in federal court under the takings clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, ruled that they were precluded from raising this issue by virtue of the state court's prior ruling.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Is a Fifth Amendment Takings claim barred by issue preclusion based on a judgment denying compensation solely under state law, which was rendered in a state court proceeding that was required to ripen the federal Takings claim?

In 1981 the City of San Francisco ("the City") enacted its first Hotel Conversion Ordinance ("HCO"). The San Remo Hotel v. City and County of San Francisco, 145 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir.1998) ("San Remo I"). The HCO was designed to stop the depletion of housing for the poor, elderly, and disabled by controlling the conversion of hotel units from residential to tourist use. Id. at 1098.

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