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LONG-ARM STATUTE

Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co.

Issues

Does requiring a corporation to consent to personal jurisdiction as a condition to do business in a state violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether the Due Process Clause permits consent-by-registration as a basis for personal jurisdiction. Pennsylvania’s consent-by-registration statute requires that foreign corporations registered in the state consent to general personal jurisdiction there. Robert Mallory contends that consent-by-registration statutes produce valid consent to personal jurisdiction because consent-by-registration has been traditionally accepted as a basis of personal jurisdiction, and recent cases have not overruled this notion. Norfolk Southern Railway Company counters that consent-by-registration statutes fail to provide valid consent because registration jurisdiction is neither widely accepted nor consistent with modern personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for businesses and state sovereignty.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment prohibits a state from requiring a corporation to consent to personal jurisdiction to do business in the state.

Robert Mallory (“Mallory”) is a Virginia resident who was an employee of Norfolk Southern Railway Company (“Norfolk”) from 1988 to 2005. Mallory v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. at 551. Mallory sued Norfolk in a Pennsylvania state court for claims arising under the Federal Employers Liability Act.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Kevin M. Clermont for his guidance and insights into this case.

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