DUE PROCESS CLAUSE

Kahler v. Kansas

Issues

Does abolishing the insanity defense violate the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments?

Court below

This case asks the Supreme Court to balance states’ rights to write their own criminal code with individual rights under the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment. The statute at issue, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-3220, abolished the traditional right-and-wrong test for the insanity defense in favor of a mens rea approach to insanity. Kahler argues that history and tradition demonstrate that the right-and-wrong test for insanity is a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause. He also contends that disallowing this test essentially abolishes the insanity defense, which is cruel and unusual because it punishes individuals who lack moral culpability for their crimes. Kansas counters that the right-and-wrong test for insanity is not a fundamental right because it is not deeply entrenched in tradition, and that disallowing the defense would not have been deemed cruel and unusual when the Eighth Amendment was adopted. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for states’ authority over their own criminal code, just punishment, and protecting individuals who lack moral culpability.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments permit a state to abolish the insanity defense.

James Kahler and his wife, Karen, had two daughters and one son. State v. Kahler at 113. During the summer of 2008, Karen began a sexual relationship with another female, and their marriage soon began to fall apart. Id. Ultimately, Karen filed for divorce in January 2009 and moved out with their kids that Spring. Id. Kahler did not handle the divorce well, and it affected his life, both professionally and personally.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Stephen P. Garvey for his guidance and insights into this case.

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Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co.

Issues

Does requiring a corporation to consent to personal jurisdiction as a condition to do business in a state violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether the Due Process Clause permits consent-by-registration as a basis for personal jurisdiction. Pennsylvania’s consent-by-registration statute requires that foreign corporations registered in the state consent to general personal jurisdiction there. Robert Mallory contends that consent-by-registration statutes produce valid consent to personal jurisdiction because consent-by-registration has been traditionally accepted as a basis of personal jurisdiction, and recent cases have not overruled this notion. Norfolk Southern Railway Company counters that consent-by-registration statutes fail to provide valid consent because registration jurisdiction is neither widely accepted nor consistent with modern personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for businesses and state sovereignty.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment prohibits a state from requiring a corporation to consent to personal jurisdiction to do business in the state.

Robert Mallory (“Mallory”) is a Virginia resident who was an employee of Norfolk Southern Railway Company (“Norfolk”) from 1988 to 2005. Mallory v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. at 551. Mallory sued Norfolk in a Pennsylvania state court for claims arising under the Federal Employers Liability Act.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Kevin M. Clermont for his guidance and insights into this case.

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