removal proceeding

Barton v. Barr, Att’y Gen.

Issues

Can a lawful permanent resident seeking cancellation of removal be deemed “inadmissible” under the stop-time rule if the alien has already been admitted into the United States?

This case asks the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve the circuit split regarding the interpretation of the stop-time rule in the context of removal proceedings and to determine what it means to be considered “inadmissible” under the rule. The stop-time rule is a limitation on the Attorney General’s power to cancel the removal of an alien and applies, in part, when the alien commits an offense listed under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) that renders the alien “inadmissible.” Andre Martello Barton (“Barton”) argues that he cannot be deemed “inadmissible” under the stop-time rule because he was not seeking admission into the United States and, as a result, was never adjudicated as inadmissible. Alternatively, Barton asserts that it is a legal impossibility for him to be rendered “inadmissible” because he is an already-admitted lawful permanent resident of the United States. U.S. Attorney General William Barr counters that, for stop-time purposes, an alien is “inadmissible” if the alien is convicted of or admits to committing an offense listed under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2), regardless of whether the alien is seeking admission or already admitted. The outcome of this case has important implications for the removability of lawful permanent residents who have prior criminal convictions.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a lawfully admitted permanent resident who is not seeking admission to the United States can be “render[ed] ... inadmissible” for the purposes of the stop-time rule, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1).

On May 27, 1989, Petitioner Andre Martello Barton was admitted into the United States on a tourism visa. Barton v. U.S. Att’y Gen. at 3. Barton was born in Jamaica and has citizenship there. Id. After three years in the U.S., Barton became a lawful permanent resident. Id.

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Dada v. Mukasey

Issues

Whether the time allotted for departure under a voluntary departure order is suspended when an alien files a motion to reopen removal proceedings.

 

Samson Taiwo Dada, a citizen of Nigeria, overstayed a temporary visitor's visa. After removal proceedings, Dada was granted voluntary departure. Dada failed to leave the United States within the voluntary departure period and instead moved before the Board of Immigration Appeals to reopen his removal proceedings. Dada argued that the voluntary departure period should be tolled pending the outcome of his motion. Dada contended that otherwise, he and similarly situated aliens would be forced either to abandon their motions to reopen or illegally remain in the United States beyond the voluntary departure period. The Board denied Dada's motion and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The outcome of this case will settle a circuit split concerning the legal effect of motions to reopen and will influence aliens' decisions to seek to reopen removal proceedings.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the filing of a motion to reopen removal proceedings automatically tolls the period within which an alien must depart the United States under an order granting voluntary departure.

Samson Taiwo Dada, a citizen of Nigeria, was legally admitted into the United States on a nonimmigrant visa in 1998. Brief for Petitioner at 9. After Dada's visa expired, he married an American citizen who filed a Petition for Alien Relative, Form I-130, on Dada's behalf in 1999. Id. The I-130 petition was subsequently denied for failure to present documents requested by the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services.

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Pereida v. Barr

Issues

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, does a noncitizen’s criminal conviction bar him from seeking relief from removal where his underlying conviction record is only ambiguous as to whether it meets a listed offense?

This case asks the U.S. Supreme Court to clarify the procedure for determining whether a noncitizen who has committed a state-level crime is eligible for cancellation of removal from the United States. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1940 (“INA”) gives the U.S. Attorney General discretion to cancel a noncitizen’s removal if the noncitizen has not committed a crime involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”). Clemente Avelino Pereida was convicted of a state-level crime under a divisible statute. Three of the four crimes listed within the statute individually constitute CIMTs, but one crime does not. The convicting court did not specify Pereida’s crime of conviction. Pereida contends that he is not required to prove that he did not commit a CIMT and, therefore, that he is eligible for cancellation of removal because his conviction does not necessarily establish that he committed a CIMT. Attorney General William P. Barr counters that the INA requires noncitizens to prove that they did not commit a CIMT in such instances of ambiguity and that Pereida failed to carry his burden of proof. The outcome of this case has important implications for statutory interpretation and the removability of noncitizens who have prior criminal convictions.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a criminal conviction bars a noncitizen from applying for relief from removal when the record of conviction is merely ambiguous as to whether it corresponds to an offense listed in the Immigration and Nationality Act.

Clemente Avelino Pereida, (“Pereida”) a Mexican citizen, entered the United States in 1995 without authorization. Pereida v. Barr at 1130. Pereida has remained in the U.S. since then, and he has been steadily employed, paid his taxes, and raised a family. Id.

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