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This case presents the Supreme Court with an opportunity to interpret § 3345 of the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 (“FVRA”) and to determine if a person performing the acting duties of an office that requires Senate confirmation may continue to do so after the president nominates them to fill the vacancy permanently. The parties disagree over the meaning of § 3345(b)(1) of the FVRA, which dictates that officials serving in an acting capacity may continue to do so after being nominated for permanent status only if they served as first assistant to the vacant office for 90 days in the year prior to the vacancy. Petitioner, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”), argues that this limitation only applies to first assistants who automatically assume acting duties under § 3345(a)(1). The NLRB contends that this interpretation accords with both the language and objectives of the FVRA, and also with the historical practices of prior presidents and the Senate. Respondent, SW General, Inc., maintains that § 3345(b)(1) applies to all acting officials appointed pursuant to § 3345(a). SW General argues that § 3345(b)(1)’s language and purpose are clear and that core principles like separation of powers and the protection of the balance between the state and federal governments support its interpretation. The outcome of this case will affect presidential appointments that require Senate confirmation. 

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide how plaintiffs can demonstrate intent (also called “scienter”) under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”) for the purpose of alleging securities fraud. More specifically, this case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether plaintiffs can allege intent based on allegations about internal company documents without referring to specific content in those documents. It also asks the Supreme Court to determine if plaintiffs can satisfy the Act's falsity requirement by relying on an expert opinion in lieu of particularized allegations of fact. NVIDIA argues that Öhman’s failure to allege with particularity the contents of the internal documents to show that NVIDIA misrepresented its finances to investors does not show a strong inference of scienter that the PSLRA requires in order to reduce frivolous lawsuits, and that Öhman’s reliance on expert testimony to satisfy the PSLRA’s rigorous particularity standard would allow plaintiffs to circumvent it. Öhman counters that the PSLRA evinces a holistic approach in meeting the burden of showing a strong inference of scienter rather than requiring one specific allegation. Öhman also claims that an expert’s conclusion is an allegation of fact since the experts’ assertion is backed by embedded statements of fact to arrive at such a conclusion. The outcome of this case has strong implications for the national economy and access to justice.

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Juan Valladolid, an employee of the Petitioner, Pacific Operators Offshore, died when a forklift crushed him at Pacific's oil-processing facility on the California coast. Valladolid’s widow filed a claim for federal workers’ compensation under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”), but the claim was rejected because Valladolid died on land rather than on the outer continental shelf. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that OCSLA benefits are not limited to injuries or deaths that occur on the outer continental shelf. Rather, the court held, coverage depends on the existence of a causal nexus between the injury or death and operations on the outer continental shelf. Petitioner Pacific argues that OCSLA contains a strict “situs-of-injury” requirement, while Respondent Valladolid contends that such a requirement would defeat Congressional intent. The Supreme Court’s decision will resolve a longstanding question of statutory interpretation, and may shed light on the Court’s current approach to workers’ compensation laws.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether 28 U.S.C. § 2342, commonly known as the Hobbs Act, required a federal district court to adhere to the Federal Communication Commission’s (“FCC”) interpretation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”). In 2016, Carlton & Harris Chiropractic sued PDA Network, after the latter sent an unsolicited facsimile announcing a free eBook edition of The Physician’s Desk Reference. Carlton & Harris argued that the fax constituted an advertisement for the purposes of the TCPA, which prohibits unsolicited advertisements. The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia held that the fax was not an advertisement. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that, under the Hobbs Act, the district court had failed to properly defer to the FCC’s interpretation of the TCPA. PDR Network contends that the Hobbs Act does not undermine district courts’ ability to interpret the TCPA in civil suits between private litigants, and that the Hobbs Act should be construed narrowly, to facilitate judicial review and preserve separation of powers. Carlton & Harris argue that the Hobbs Act required the district court to defer to the FCC’s legal interpretation of the TCPA, maintaining that in agency actions such as this one, Congress has explicitly reserved interpretive powers to appellate courts. The outcome of this case will affect judicial decision-making, agency determinations and the corresponding deference, and the scope of the Hobbs Act.

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This case asks the U.S. Supreme Court to clarify the procedure for determining whether a noncitizen who has committed a state-level crime is eligible for cancellation of removal from the United States. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1940 (“INA”) gives the U.S. Attorney General discretion to cancel a noncitizen’s removal if the noncitizen has not committed a crime involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”). Clemente Avelino Pereida was convicted of a state-level crime under a divisible statute. Three of the four crimes listed within the statute individually constitute CIMTs, but one crime does not. The convicting court did not specify Pereida’s crime of conviction. Pereida contends that he is not required to prove that he did not commit a CIMT and, therefore, that he is eligible for cancellation of removal because his conviction does not necessarily establish that he committed a CIMT. Attorney General William P. Barr counters that the INA requires noncitizens to prove that they did not commit a CIMT in such instances of ambiguity and that Pereida failed to carry his burden of proof. The outcome of this case has important implications for statutory interpretation and the removability of noncitizens who have prior criminal convictions.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the term “expenses” in 35 U.S.C. § 145 should be interpreted to include attorneys’ fees. To appeal a denied patent application under § 145, the patent applicant must be willing to pay the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s (“PTO”) “expenses” related to the litigation. The PTO contends that its attorneys’ fees incurred from litigating § 145 appeals should count as reimbursable “expenses.” NantKwest counters that the American Rule, a presumption that each party in litigation will pay its own attorneys’ fees unless there is explicit and specific statutory language allowing fee-shifting, is not defeated by the vague § 145 language regarding “expenses,” and that accordingly the PTO must pay its own attorneys’ fees in § 145 actions. The outcome of this case has important implications for the future of the American Rule, the interpretation of the term “expenses” in other statutes, and the cost of making a § 145 appeal from a rejected patent application.

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The Coca-Cola Company sells a “Blueberry Pomegranate” beverage blend containing less than 1% pomegranate and blueberry juice.  Federal statutes and regulations provide specific guidelines for juice labeling, which are enforced by the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”). However, the FDA has not sued Coca-Cola, and Coca-Cola asserts that it has followed the federal law. Pom Wonderful LLC, a competitor that sells pomegranate juice, alleges that Coca-Cola’s juice label constitutes an unfair trade practice and sued Coca-Cola under the Lanham Act. Pom argues that the Lanham Act’s provisions deterring unfair trade practices complement federal food-labeling laws. Coca-Cola, however, argues that the Lanham Act cannot apply to issues of food labeling, and that food-labeling statutes narrow the scope of a general statute for unfair trade practices. The Court’s decision will impact the uniformity of food-labeling rules, and private parties’ right to sue for unfair trade practices in the food and drug industries. 

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This case asks the court to analyze 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1), which establishes which criminal defendants can receive reduced sentences under the federal “safety valve” provision and determine whether a defendant is ineligible for safety valve relief only when they meet all three of § 3553(f)(1)’s listed criteria, or if they become ineligible after meeting even one of the three criteria. Pulsifer argues that all three listed criteria must be met for the defendant to be disqualified from safety valve relief, because the “and” which connects the three offense categories is used in the joint sense and bundles the three offense categories together. Pulsifer points to the plain meaning of the statute and Congress’s intent to introduce lenity in sentencing for some criminal defendants. In opposition, the United States argues that the “and” is distributive in this context and effectively functions as an “or”. Therefore, the United States argues, a defendant is disqualified from safety valve relief if they meet even one of the three offense criteria. The United States further maintains that a distributive “and” is required for a proper reading because reading the statute otherwise would render its text arbitrary and redundant. The United States also posits that a distributive “and” would protect the general public from habitual offenders and satisfy Congress’s goal of combating recidivism. This case touches on important questions regarding sentencing guidelines for drug offenses, leniency in sentencing, and the interpretation of federal sentencing statutes.

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