statutory interpretation

Issues

Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1), when a party, without the authority to do so, ships from the United States either “all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented invention” or “any component . . . that is especially made or especially adapted for use in the invention” in a way that would induce another party abroad to combine the component(s) to form the patented invention, that party commits patent infringement. Section 271(f)(1) prevents parties from evading domestic patent law when engaging in international transactions. The parties differ on how broad § 271(f)(1) should be construed. Life Technologies Corporation argues that courts should construe § 271(f)(1) narrowly to refer to the percentage of components for the invention that a party ships abroad. Promega Corporation, on the other hand, argues that the statute takes into account a combination of quantity and relative importance of the component(s) shipped abroad. The outcome of this case will determine the limits of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) and, consequently, the limits of private action in shipping materials abroad. 

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Under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2), a mandatory minimum sentence is imposed on a defendant with a prior state conviction relating to “aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward.” In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether the clause “involving a minor or ward” modifies only “abusive sexual conduct” or the entire series of terms preceding it. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Lockhart v. United States, No. 14-8358, at 13 (Apr. 10, 2015). The convicted offender, Avondale Lockhart, urges the Court to adopt the series-qualifier principle of statutory interpretation by applying “involving a minor or ward” to the entire preceding series of terms contained in section 2252(b)(2). See Brief for Petitioner, Avondale Lockhart at 13. Lockhart contends that because his prior state conviction does not involve a minor or ward, he does not qualify for section 2252(b)(2)’s ten-year mandatory minimum sentence. Id. However, the United States argues that the Court should interpret section 2252(b)(2) using the last-antecedent rule by applying “involving a minor or ward” only to the immediately preceding clause, “abusive sexual conduct,” thereby upholding Lockhart’s jail sentence. See Brief for Respondent, United States at 18. The Court’s decision will determine the scope of offenses covered by mandatory minimum sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2), and could impact the degree of protection afforded to federal defendants with prior state convictions. See Petition for Writ at 13; Brief for Petitioner at 41–42.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to consider the deadline by which 29 U.S.C. § 1391 requires multiemployer pension plans to calculate the liability an employer would have should they choose to withdraw from that plan. The Employers argue that the plain text of § 1391 supports a bright-line rule that requires multiemployer pension plan actuaries to calculate the unfunded vested benefits, or the plan’s underfunding, as of the end of the year prior to the year a given employer withdraws from the plan. Trustees of the IAM National Pension Fund argue that because § 1391 is silent on the date as of which actuarial assumptions must be calculated, unlike other statutes addressing similar subject matters, that silence is controlling. The Employers further argue that Congress intended the statute to provide employers information about their potential withdrawal liability, which limits the information actuaries can use in determining this liability. The Trustees counter that Congress did not intend for employers to have advanced notice of the assumptions an actuary will use to calculate withdrawal liability, nor is it practical to do so. This case will directly impact how employers make business decisions related to multiemployer pension plans. Additionally, this case raises fairness concerns related to who will bear the risks when employers withdraw from multiemployer pension plans.

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This case consolidates four lawsuits, together asking the Court to determine if Section 1342 of the Affordable Care Act statutorily obliges Congress to fulfill outstanding payments to insurance companies after Congress failed to appropriate funds for these payments. Section 1342 established a “risk-corridors program,” whereby health insurers and the United States government would share unforeseen costs associated with providing universal healthcare on “health benefit exchanges.” Petitioners argue that Section 1342 statutorily requires the government to make full “payments out” to insurance companies who have suffered a loss—regardless of whether Congress appropriated enough money to cover these losses. Respondent, the United States, counters that Section 1342 merely created a program to oversee “payments out” to health insurers, and even if it does oblige the government to make payments, Congress’s appropriations riders repealed that obligation. The outcome of this case has implications for the separation of powers principles and the future of public-private partnerships.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether economic harms resulting from personal injuries are injuries to “business or property” for the purposes of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). Commercial truck driver Horn ingested Dixie X to alleviate his back pain, after learning from the sellers that it contained no THC, even though it did. After testing positive for THC in a random drug test from his employer, Horn was fired. He then sued the sellers for injury to his business under RICO. Medical Marijuana, Inc. argues that ingestion of an unwanted substance like THC is a personal injury, and that economic damages from such an injury do not turn it into an injury to “business or property.” Horn claims that losing his job because of Medical Marijuana’s alleged fraud is an injury to “business or property.” This case has significant implications for the rights of human trafficking victims, the cost of doing business in consumer products, and the vitality of the hemp industry.

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This case presents the Supreme Court with an opportunity to interpret § 3345 of the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 (“FVRA”) and to determine if a person performing the acting duties of an office that requires Senate confirmation may continue to do so after the president nominates them to fill the vacancy permanently. The parties disagree over the meaning of § 3345(b)(1) of the FVRA, which dictates that officials serving in an acting capacity may continue to do so after being nominated for permanent status only if they served as first assistant to the vacant office for 90 days in the year prior to the vacancy. Petitioner, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”), argues that this limitation only applies to first assistants who automatically assume acting duties under § 3345(a)(1). The NLRB contends that this interpretation accords with both the language and objectives of the FVRA, and also with the historical practices of prior presidents and the Senate. Respondent, SW General, Inc., maintains that § 3345(b)(1) applies to all acting officials appointed pursuant to § 3345(a). SW General argues that § 3345(b)(1)’s language and purpose are clear and that core principles like separation of powers and the protection of the balance between the state and federal governments support its interpretation. The outcome of this case will affect presidential appointments that require Senate confirmation. 

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether a noncitizen stopped on the Mexican side of the U.S.–Mexico border “arrived in the United States” within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). Petitioners Kristi Noem, et al., argue that the plain meaning and history of the statute, as well as the presumption against extraterritoriality, support the requirement of a physical presence in the United States. Respondents Al Otro Lado, et al., counter that the statute applies to people on both sides of the border. Respondents also maintain that the presumption against extraterritoriality does not apply because the INA regulates the domestic conduct of immigration officers. The outcome of this case will have significant ramifications for the administration of border security and separation of powers.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide how plaintiffs can demonstrate intent (also called “scienter”) under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”) for the purpose of alleging securities fraud. More specifically, this case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether plaintiffs can allege intent based on allegations about internal company documents without referring to specific content in those documents. It also asks the Supreme Court to determine if plaintiffs can satisfy the Act's falsity requirement by relying on an expert opinion in lieu of particularized allegations of fact. NVIDIA argues that Öhman’s failure to allege with particularity the contents of the internal documents to show that NVIDIA misrepresented its finances to investors does not show a strong inference of scienter that the PSLRA requires in order to reduce frivolous lawsuits, and that Öhman’s reliance on expert testimony to satisfy the PSLRA’s rigorous particularity standard would allow plaintiffs to circumvent it. Öhman counters that the PSLRA evinces a holistic approach in meeting the burden of showing a strong inference of scienter rather than requiring one specific allegation. Öhman also claims that an expert’s conclusion is an allegation of fact since the experts’ assertion is backed by embedded statements of fact to arrive at such a conclusion. The outcome of this case has strong implications for the national economy and access to justice.

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