statutory interpretation

Issues

Humberto Fernandez-Vargas is a Mexican citizen who has been deported from and illegally reentered the United States numerous times. In January of 1982, Fernandez-Vargas illegally reentered the United States, where he remained, living and working in Utah, until his most recent deportation in 2004. During those twenty years, Fernandez-Vargas began a relationship and had a child with an American woman whom he married in 2001. After marrying, Mr. and Mrs. Fernandez-Vargas applied to adjust his immigrant status so Fernandez-Vargas could legally remain in the United States. However, in 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which revised an earlier provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act and, consequently, might have eliminated Fernandez-Vargas’ ability to adjust his status. The Supreme Court must decide whether the revised law should apply to and eliminate relief for Fernandez-Vargas, who illegally reentered the country prior to the legislation’s enactment.

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This case asks the Court to determine whether 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act covers obstructive conduct interfering in official proceedings that are unrelated to investigations and evidence. Petitioner argues that the Court should interpret § 1512(c)(2) as only covering obstructive conduct interfering in official proceedings that involve investigations and evidence, and points to textual analysis, principles of statutory construction, and the Court’s interpretations of similar statutes in Yates v. United States and Begay v. United States for support. Respondent counters that the Court should interpret § 1512(c)(2) as a catch-all provision covering all obstructive conduct and rejects the textual analysis and principles of statutory construction argued by the petitioner while pointing to 18 U.S.C. § 1503 for support. This case touches on important questions regarding the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the usage of § 1512(c)(2) to cover rioters’ conduct during the January 6 Capitol Building storming, such as sentencing fairness and providing notice to parties.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

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Soon after Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11, it sought and received authorization from the Bankruptcy Court to sell its assets under Section 363(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. Piccadilly also sought and received an exemption, pursuant to Section 1146(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, from Florida state tax on this sale. The Florida Department of Revenue objected to this exemption because the sale took place before the bankruptcy plan was confirmed. On appeal, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit affirmed the decision of the Bankruptcy Court to exempt asset sales prior to confirmation of a bankruptcy plan. The Florida Department of Revenue argues that the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of the statute is not justified by the rules of statutory interpretation and claims that the lower court's decision will create much unnecessary litigation and ambiguity in the law. Piccadilly Cafeterias argues, however, that the text is ambiguous and therefore can be read to support both points of view. For this reason, Piccadilly suggests looking beyond the text to congressional intent and policy concerns. Whichever way the Court interprets this statute, this case will have a profound impact on state and local revenue collection.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the Food and Drug Administration’s (“FDA”) denial of Wages and White Lion Investments, L.L.C.’s (“White Lion”) application to market flavored e-cigarette products was arbitrary and capricious. White Lion submitted an application to the FDA to sell their flavored nicotine liquid, used in e-cigarettes, on the market. The FDA denied their application, claiming that White Lion did not include sufficient scientific study support in their application for the FDA to conclude that the benefits of the flavored nicotine liquid outweighed the risk of use by youth. White Lion claims that the FDA erroneously rejected their application for approval of their flavored nicotine liquid because they lacked a longitudinal comparative study, a requirement that White Lion claims was not communicated to the public. The FDA counters by claiming that longitudinal studies are not required and that White Lion’s application was rejected because they could not show that e-cigarette use reduced smoking. The outcome of this case has significant implications for youth e-cigarette use, public health, state budget stability, and product investment and innovation in the e-cigarette industry.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a semi-automatic rifle equipped with a bump stock device is considered a “machinegun” under the National Firearms Act of 1934. A bump stock device is a rifle attachment that increases a semi-automatic rifle’s rate of fire. In 2018, in response to a mass shooting in Las Vegas, the government issued a new regulation interpreting the National Firearms Act, which prohibits machineguns, to also prohibit bump stock devices. Michael Cargill, who was forced to surrender several bump stock devices to the government, argues that a bump stock is not a machinegun, because a bump stock does not allow a semi-automatic rifle to fire more than one shot “by a single function of the trigger” or allow such a weapon to fire “automatically.” The government contends that a bump stock is a machinegun, and that legislative history and congressional intent support its interpretation of the statute. The outcome of this case has important ramifications on the risk of mass shootings and deaths in crowded areas, Second Amendment rights, and the ability of federal agencies to interpret federal statutes.

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This case asks the Court to determine whether the Gun Control Act of 1968’s definition of “firearm” permits the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (“ATF”) to regulate weapons parts kits and incomplete frames and receivers. Merrick Garland, Attorney General, et al., argues that a natural reading of the word “firearm” includes weapon parts kits, incomplete frames, and receivers; and, that failing to regulate these items would create a loophole in the nation’s gun laws. Jennifer VanDerStok et al., counters that the rule is outside the scope of the ATF’s authority. This case touches on important questions regarding the Gun Control Act of 1968, and its ability to regulate ghost guns.

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This case asks the court to interpret whether the 60-day time limit for a federal employee to appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit imposed by U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) amounts to a jurisdictional requirement that strictly bars claims brought after 60 days. Stuart Harrow maintains that the language in 28 U.S.C. § 1295, which grants jurisdiction to claims “pursuant to” § 7703(b)(1)(A), is simply a cross-reference and not conditional. Harrow further argues that Congress likely did not intend to create such a harsh bar when enacting § 7703(b)(1)(A), considering that many federal employee claims are brought without a lawyer. The Department of Defense counters that “pursuant to” should mean “conforming to,” which sets a conditional requirement, not a reference. The Department of Defense further notes that the Court’s precedents have already decided that § 7703(b)(1)(A) is a jurisdictional requirement; and, Harrow is attempting to artificially parse the statute to reach a favorable result. The case’s outcome will significantly impact methods of Congressional intent interpretations and federal appeal procedures.

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This case concerns the scope of the First Step Act’s sentencing reforms regarding defendants who were sentenced before the Act’s passage but have been re-sentenced since. The Hewitt defendants and the United States argue that the First Step Act’s inclusion of sentences “not imposed” before the statute’s enactment should apply to the defendants’ sentences, since the re-evaluation of the defendants’ sentences means that the original judgements were not “imposed sentences.” However, the Hewitt defendants and the United States differ in their reasonings. The Hewitt defendants contend their re-sentencing is covered by the Act because of the general principles that courts must interpret ambiguous criminal laws in favor of defendants and that vacated sentences should be treated as not having occurred. The United States contends that the Hewitt defendants are covered by the Act because of the specific language of the Act referencing currently valid sentences, the larger statutory context, and the larger legislative goals motivating the Act. This case has implications for the application of criminal justice sentencing reforms, as well as for how the Court evaluates Congressional intent.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the EPA’s Renewable Fuel Standards (“RFS”) requires small refineries to have continuously received the hardship exemption since 2011 to qualify for a hardship exemption under Section 7545(o)(9)(B)(i). Specifically, the Court must determine whether the statutory phrase “extension” acquires one of two definitions: a narrow definition, preferred by the Tenth Circuit and Respondent Renewable Fuels Association (“RFA”), which supports the case for continuity; or a broad reading, supported by Petitioner HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining (“Cheyenne”), which effectively means to “grant” or “make available.” In selecting the appropriate definition, the Court must decide if and to what extent it should read “extension” apart from its broader statutory context, or consider other factors such as congressional purpose and whether the EPA’s interpretation receives deference. This case has policy implications for the finances of local refineries, economies of local communities, and environmental health.

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Section 507(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code states that “The following expenses and claims have priority in the following order: . . . Fourth, allowed unsecured claims for contributions to an employee benefit plan arising from services rendered within 180 days of the [filing of the petition].” Howard Delivery Service argues that it should not have to pay unpaid insurance premiums to Zurich American Insurance because workers compensation does not qualify as a “contribution to an employee benefit plan.” The Fourth and Ninth Circuits have held that workers compensation does fall within this language, while the Sixth,  Eighth  and Tenth Circuits have argued that it does not. The Supreme Court must now decide whether or not to interpret the language of § 507(a)(4) to include workers compensation policies as “contributions to an employee benefit plan,” which benefit from priority under the Bankruptcy Code.

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