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VIOLENT FELONY

James v. United States

Issues

Whether attempted burglary is a felony that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another person, and thus is subject to the 15-year mandatory minimum sentencing requirements for violent felonies under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).

 

Alphonso James was convicted four times between 1997 and 2003: once for attempted burglary, twice for drug offenses, and the last time for illegal possession of a firearm. At the sentencing for his firearm offense the government argued that under the Armed Career Criminal Act a 15 year mandatory minimum sentence should be applied because James had three prior convictions for a violent felony and serious drug offenses. James is contesting the classification of attempted burglary as a violent felony, and the issue is now before the U.S. Supreme Court. The government argues that attempted burglary presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another person and thus fits one of the statutory definitions of a violent felony. James argues that determining whether his attempted burglary presented the specified risk would require the court to conduct impermissible fact-finding in opposition to the Court’s rulings in Taylor v. United States and Shepard v. United States. James also makes a statutory construction argument to support the exclusion of attempted burglary from the definition of a violent felony. Both the District Court for the Middle District of Florida and the Eleventh Circuit ruled that attempted burglary was a violent felony. If the Supreme Court upholds those rulings, more felons will be subject to this federal modified “three strikes” rule, thus adding fuel to the national debate about mandatory minimums and increasing prison populations.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether the Eleventh Circuit erred  by  holding that all convictions in Florida for attempted burglary qualify as a violent felony under 18  U.S.C. ?  924(e), creating a circuit conflict on the issue.

    In June of 1997, Alphonso James, Jr.

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    Johnson v. United States

    Issues

    Is possession of a short-barreled shotgun a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act?

    The Supreme Court will consider whether possession of a short-barreled shotgun can be considered a violent felony for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). Johnson argues that possession alone of a short-barreled shotgun is not inherently violent, unlike the other violent felonies listed in the ACCA. The United States asserts that possession of a short-barreled shotgun is a violent felony because the possession of a dangerous weapon greatly increases the likelihood that a possessor will injure or kill others. The Court’s ruling implicates the law of sentencing enhancements, the classification of violent felonies, and the scope of the ACCA. 

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether the mere possession of a short-barreled shotgun should be treated as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act?

    The Federal Bureau of Investigation started investigating Samuel James Johnson’s participation in the Aryan Liberation Movement (“Movement”) in 2010. See United States v. Johnson, No. 12-3123, 2013 WL 3924353, at *1 (8th Cir. 2013). Johnson intended to counterfeit United States currency in order to support the activities of the Movement.

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    Acknowledgments

    The authors would like to thank Professor Jens Ohlin from Cornell Law School for his insights into this case.

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    Johnson v. United States

    Issues

    Is the “residual clause” in the Armed Career Criminal Act unconstitutionally vague?

    (Note: this preview is for re-argument of Johnson v. United States. For the earlier arguments, see the preview for Johnson v. United States - Nov. 2014.)

    The Supreme Court will hear rearguments in this case to determine whether the “residual clause” in the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) is unconstitutionally vague. The original issue on appeal urged the Court to consider whether possession of a short-barreled shotgun is a violent felony under the ACCA, but after oral arguments, the Court ordered a rehearing to determine whether the ACCA’s residual clause itself is unconstitutionally vague. The Petitioner, Samuel Johnson, argues that the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague and violates due process. In opposition, the Respondent, the United States, contends that the clause is not unconstitutionally vague and successfully provides direction to judges and citizens when determining how to conform their actions to the law. The outcome of this case may effect the role of judges in interpreting the residual clause of the ACCA, the uniformity of sentencing across different states, and the level of notice people have regarding whether a crime is a violent felony under the ACCA. 

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether the residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) is unconstitutionally vague.

    The Federal Bureau of Investigation started investigating Samuel James Johnson’s participation in the Aryan Liberation Movement (“Movement”) in 2010. See United States v. Johnson, No. 12-3123, 2013 WL 3924353, at *1 (8th Cir. 2013). Johnson intended to counterfeit United States currency in order to support the activities of the Movement.

    Edited by

    Additional Resources

    Lyle Denniston: Court Orders New Look at Armed Criminal Law, SCOTUSblog (Jan. 9, 2015). 

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    murder

    Murder is when a person unlawfully kills another person. Murder is not the same as homicide because not all homicide is unlawful. Instead, murder is a category of homicide. The precise legal definition of murder varies by jurisdiction. Most states distinguish between different degrees of murder (first, second, and third).

    Sykes v. United States

    Issues

    Whether fleeing from a law enforcement officer in a vehicle is similar both in kind and in the degree of risk posed as the Armed Career Criminal Act's specifically enumerated felonies of burglary, arson, extortion, and crimes involving the use of explosives.

     

    Faced with a prison sentence of more than fifteen years for committing three “violent felonies” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), Marcus Sykes is challenging the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ ruling that his conviction under Indiana law for fleeing from law enforcement officers in a vehicle constitutes a “violent felony.” Sykes argues that classifying his offense as a “violent felony” presumes that there is violence associated with flight from police. According to Sykes, such speculation by the courts may undermine the Sixth Amendment rights of individuals faced with a mandatory sentence enhancement and is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s ruling that other offenses with a similar propensity for violence are not “violent felonies.” However, the United States contends that fleeing from police in a vehicle is both violent in nature and in practice, as it poses a risk of serious harm to law enforcement officers and members of the public. In light of this danger of violence, the United States believes that the Seventh Circuit properly treated vehicular flight as a “violent felony” under the ACCA. The Supreme Court’s decision would help resolve the disagreement between the Seventh and the Eleventh Circuit over this issue.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether using a vehicle while knowingly or intentionally fleeing from a law enforcement officer after being ordered to stop constitutes a "violent felony" under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).

    In 2008, police observed Marcus Sykes toss aside a gun after aborting his attempt to rob two individuals outside a liquor store in Indianapolis, Indiana. See United States v. Sykes, 598 F.3d 334, 335 (7th Cir. 2010). Police arrested Sykes for brandishing a gun, and Sykes subsequently pleaded guilty on July 22, 2008 to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C.

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    Additional Resources

    · Life Sentences Blog, Michael O’Hear: Rethinking the Categorical Approach to the ACCA (Jan. 4, 2011)

    · Wisconsin Law Journal Staff: High Court Accepts Five Criminal Cases (Oct. 1, 2010)

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