32 CFR Appendix G to Part 516 - Appendix G to Part 516—Figures
This appendix contains figures cited or quoted throughout the text of this part.
In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas Corpus Christi Division, No. C–90–100
The Complaint is barred by laches.
Figure C–3. Sample Answer to Judicial Complaint, with attached Certificate of Service. This is intended to be used as a guide in preparing a draft Answer as part of a Litigation Report.
For its answer to the complaint, defendant admits, denies and alleges as follows:
4. The allegations contained in paragraph 4 are conclusions of law to which no response is required; to the extent they may be deemed allegations of fact, they are denied.
5. Denies the allegations contained in the first sentence of paragraph 5; admits the allegations contained in the second sentence of paragraph 5; denies the remainder of the allegations in paragraph 5.
6. Denies the allegations in paragraph 6 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to their truth.
7. Denies each allegation in the complaint not specifically admitted or otherwise qualified.
The remainder of plaintiff's Complaint contains his prayer for relief, to which no answer is required. Insofar as an answer is required, denies that plaintiff is entitled to any relief whatsoever.
Defendant respectfully prays that the Court dismiss plaintiff's Complaint and award to defendant costs and such further relief as the Court deems proper.
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of Defendant's Answer has been placed in the mail, postage prepaid, this ____ day of __________, 1991, addressed to plaintiff's counsel as follows: Mr. Eugene Henderson, 777 Fourth Street, Corpus Christi, TX 78888.
I am Private Paul Jones, currently assigned to Company B, 4th Battalion, 325th Parachute Infantry Regiment, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. I have personal knowledge of the following matters.
On the evening of 3 June 1970, I was present at the company party at Lake Popolopen when the accident occurred. I saw a bright, full moon that evening.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. (28 U.S.C. § 1746).
Executed on: __________
I request that the Attorney General of the United States, or his agent, designate counsel to defend me in my official and individual capacities in the case of John Doe v. Private Paul Jones, now pending in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. I have read the complaint filed in this case and I declare that all my actions were performed in my official capacity, within the scope of my official duties, and in a good faith belief that my actions conformed to the law. I am not aware of any pending related criminal investigation.
I understand the following: if my request for representation is approved, I will be represented by a U.S. Department of Justice attorney; that the United States is not required to pay any final adverse money judgment rendered against me personally, although I can request indemnification; that I am entitled to retain private counsel at my own expense; and, that the Army expresses no opinion whether I should or should not retain private counsel.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. (28 U.S.C. § 1746).
Executed on: __________
I am currently the Commander of HHC, 6th Armored Division, Bad Vilbel, Germany. I have read the allegations concerning Private Paul Jones in the complaint of John Doe v. Private Paul Jones, now pending in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina.
At all times relevant to the complaint, I was Private Jones' company commander. His actions relevant to this case were performed within the scope of his official duties as Assistant Charge of Quarters, Company B, 4th Battalion, 325th Parachute Infantry Regiment, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct. (28 U.S.C. § 1746).
Executed on: __________
I am the President of the XYZ Corporation. I request the Attorney General of the United States designate counsel to defend me and my company in Doe v. XYZ, Inc., now pending in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina.
I understand that the assumption by the Attorney General of the defense of this case does not alter or increase the obligations of the United States under United States Contract No. WP–70–660415.
I further agree that such representation will not be construed as waiver or estoppel to assert any rights which any interested party may have under said contract.
Executed on: __________
Dear Mr. Taylor: We have learned that you subpoenaed Captain Roberta Selby to testify at a deposition in the case Kramer v. Kramer, currently filed in state court, and that you directed her to bring her legal assistance file concerning her client, SSG Kramer.
Under 32 CFR §§ 97.6(c), 516.35, and 516.40, the Army must authorize the appearance of its personnel or the production of official documents in private litigation. In this case, the Army cannot authorize Captain Selby to appear or produce the requested file absent the following:
You must request in writing her appearance and the production of the file in accordance with Department of Defense directives, 32 CFR § 97.6(c), and Army regulations, 32 CFR §§ 516.34–516.40. The request must include the nature of the proceeding, 32 CFR § 516.34(b), and the nature and relevance of the official information sought. Id. § 516.35(d). We cannot act on your request until we receive the required information. See, for example, United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1951); Boron Oil Co. v. Downie, 873 F.2d 67 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. Bizzard, 674 F.2d 1382 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Marino, 658 F.2d 1120 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v. Allen, 554 F.2d 398 (10th Cir. 1977).
To overcome Federal statutory restrictions on the disclosure of the requested file imposed by the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, you must provide either a written release authorization signed by the individual to whom the file pertains (that is, SSG Kramer) or a court ordered release signed by a judge of a court of competent jurisdiction. A subpoena signed by a clerk of court, notary, or other official is insufficient. See, for example, Doe v. DiGenova, 779 F.2d 74 (DC Cir. 1985).
In this case, because of the attorney-client relationship between Captain Selby and SSG Kramer, you must produce a written waiver of the attorney-client privilege from SSG Kramer. Because the privilege may protect both documents and testimony, Captain Selby may not divulge such information without SSG Kramer's consent. See, for example, Rule of Professional Conduct for Army Lawyers 1.6(a).
In addition to the above requirements, Captain Selby's supervisor must approve her absence from duty. See 32 CFR § 516.43. In this regard, we suggest you take the deposition at Fort Smith. In any event, however, you or your client must pay all travel expenses, as this is purely private litigation and witness' appearance must be at no expense to the United States. See id. § 516.48(c).
Finally, if Captain Selby does appear as a witness, she may only give factual testimony. She may not testify as an opinion or expert witness. This limitation is based on Department of Defense and Army policy that generally prohibits Government employees from appearing as expert witnesses in private litigation. See id. §§ 97.6(e), 516.42.
Our sole concern in this matter is to protect the interests of the United States Army; the Army will not block access to witnesses or documents to which you are lawfully entitled. So that the Army can adequately protect its interests in this matter, I request that you respond to this letter by 27 April 1993. If you have any questions, please call CPT Taylor at 919–882–4500.
Dear Mr. Taylor: This letter responds to your request to interview and depose Captain Buzz Sawyer as a witness in Morgan v. Jones. Subject to the following conditions, your request is approved.
This grant of authority is limited to factual testimony only. Captain Sawyer may not testify as an expert witness. This limitation is based on Army policy prohibiting Government employees from appearing as expert witnesses in private litigation. See 32 CFR § 516.42. Captain Sawyer may not provide official information that is classified, privileged, or otherwise protected from public disclosure.
The decision whether to testify in private litigation is within the discretion of the prospective witness. This authorization is also subject to the approval of the witness' supervisors to be absent during the period involved. Finally, because this is private litigation, the witness' participation must be at no expense to the United States. See 32 CFR § 516.48.
If you have any questions, please call CPT Taylor at 919–882–4500.
Dear Mr. Taylor: This responds to your request for Mr. Charles Montrose to appear as an expert witness in private litigation: Smithers v. ABC Video. For the following reasons, the request is denied.
Army Regulation 27–40 forbids Army personnel from providing expert testimony in private litigation, with or without compensation, except under the most extraordinary circumstances. See 32 CFR §§ 97.6(e), 516.42. Several reasons support the exercise of strict control over such witness appearances.
The Army policy is one of strict impartiality in litigation in which the Army is not a named party, a real party in interest, or in which the Army does not have a significant interest. When a witness with an official connection with the Army testifies, a natural tendency exists to assume that the testimony represents the official view of the Army, despite express disclaimers to the contrary.
The Army is also interested in preventing the unnecessary loss of the services of its personnel in connection with matters unrelated to their official responsibilities. If Army personnel testify as expert witnesses in private litigation, their official duties are invariably disrupted, often at the expense of the Army's mission and the Federal taxpayer.
Finally, the Army is concerned about the potential for conflict of interest inherent in the unrestricted appearance of its personnel as expert witnesses on behalf of parties other than the United States. Even the appearance of such conflicts of interest seriously undermines the public trust and confidence in the integrity of our Government.
This case does not present the extraordinary circumstances necessary to justify the requested witness' expert testimony. You have demonstrated no exceptional need or unique circumstances that would warrant (his or her) appearance. The expert testimony desired can be secured from non-Army sources. Consequently, we are unable to grant you an exception to the Army's policy.
If you have any questions, please call me or CPT Taylor at 919–882–4500.
Dear Mr. Taylor: This responds to your request to depose Dr. (MAJ) J. McDonald, Fort Smith Medical Treatment Facility. Pursuant to 32 CFR §§ 516.33–516.49, you may depose him subject to the following conditions:
He may testify as to his treatment of his patient, Sergeant Rock, as to related laboratory tests he may have conducted, or other actions he took in the regular course of his duties.
He must limit his testimony to factual matters such as his observations of the patient or other operative facts, the treatment prescribed or corrective action taken, course of recovery or steps required for treatment of injuries suffered, or contemplated future treatment.
His testimony may not extend to hypothetical questions or to a prognosis. He may not testify as an “expert.” This limitation is based on Department of Defense and Army policy prohibiting present or former military personnel and Army civilian employees from providing opinion or expert testimony concerning official information, subjects, or activities in private litigation. See 32 CFR §§ 97.6(e), 516.42.
The witnesses may not provide official information that is classified, privileged, or otherwise protected from public disclosure. To protect the Army's interests, CPT Taylor or another Army attorney will be present during the depositions.
To overcome restrictions imposed by the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, Dr. McDonald may not discuss matters derived from the patient's medical records absent the patient's written consent or a court order signed by a judge. A subpoena issued by someone other than a judge or magistrate is insufficient. See Doe v. DiGenova, 779 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Stiles v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 453 F. Supp. 798 (N.D. Ga. 1978).
The decision whether to testify in private litigation is within the discretion of the witness, subject to the approval of his supervisors to be absent during the period involved.
Finally, because this is private litigation, the witnesses' participation must be at no expense to the United States. See 32 CFR § 516.48.
If you have any questions, please call me or CPT Taylor at 919–882–4500.
1. During the identification of the government and services.
a. Need determinations for items currently scheduled for disposal or reprocurement, or which have predetermined reorder levels.
b. Excessive purchase of “expendables” such as drugs or auto parts.
c. Inadequate or vague need assessment.
d. Frequent changes in the need assessment or determination.
e. Mandatory stock levels and inventory requirements appear excessive.
f. Items appear to be unnecessarily declared excess or sold as surplus, while same items are being reprocured.
g. It appears that an item or service is being purchased more as a result of aggressive marketing efforts rather than in response to a valid requirement.
h. Need determination appears to be unnecessarily tailored in ways that can only be met by certain contractors.
i. Items and services are continually obtained from the same source due to an unwarranted lack of effort to develop second sources.
2. During the development of the statements of work and specifications.
a. Statements of work and specifications appear to be intentionally written to fit the products or capabilities of a single contractor.
b. Statements of work, specifications, or sole source justifications developed by or in consultation with a preferred contractor.
c. Information concerning requirements and pending contracts is released only to preferred contractors.
d. Allowing companies and industry personnel who participated in the preparation of bid packages to perform on subsequent contracts in either a prime or subcontractor capacity.
e. Release of information by firms or personnel participating in design or engineering to companies competing for prime contract.
f. Prequalification standards or specifications appear designed to exclude otherwise qualified contractors or their productions.
g. Requirements appear split up to allow for rotating bids, giving each contractor his or her “fair share.”
h. Requirements appear split up to meet small purchase requirements (that is, $25,000) or to avoid higher levels of approval that would be otherwise required.
i. Bid specifications or statement of work appear inconsistent with the items described in the general requirements.
j. Specifications appear so vague that reasonable comparisons of estimate would be difficult.
k. Specifications appear inconsistent with previous procurements of similar items of services.
3. During the presolicitation phase.
a. Sole source justifications appear unnecessary or poorly supported.
b. Statements justifying sole source or negotiated procurements appear inadequate or incredible.
c. Solicitation documents appear to contain unnecessary requirements which tend to restrict competition.
d. Contractors or their representatives appear to have received advanced information related to the proposed procurement on a preferential basis.
4. During the solicitation phase.
a. Procurement appears to be processed so as to exclude or impede certain contractors.
b. The time for submission of bids appears to be unnecessarily limited so that only those with advance information have adequate time to prepare bids or proposals.
c. It appears that information concerning the procurement has been revealed only to certain contractors, without being revealed to all prospective competitors.
d. Bidders conferences are conducted in a way that apparently invites bid rigging, price fixing, or other improper collusion between contractors.
e. There is an apparent intentional failure to fairly publish notice of the solicitation.
f. Solicitation appears vague as to the details such as time, place and manner, of submitting acceptable bids.
g. There is evidence of improper communications or social contract between contractors and government personnel.
h. Controls over the number and destination of bid packages sent to interested bidders appear inadequate.
i. Indications that government personnel or their families may own stock or have some other financial interest in either a contractor or subcontractor.
j. Indications that government personnel are discussing possible employment for themselves or a family member with a contractor or subcontractor or indications that a proposal for future employment from a contractor or subcontractor to a government employee or his or her family members has not been firmly rejected.
k. Indications that any contractor has received special assistance in preparation of his or her bid or proposal.
l. It appears that a contract is given an expressed or implied reference to a specific subcontractor.
m. Failure to amend solicitation to reflect necessary changes or modifications.
5. During the submission of bids and proposals.
a. Improper acceptance of a late bid.
b. Documents, such as receipts, appear falsified to obtain acceptance of a late bid.
c. Improperly attempting to change a bid after other bidders prices are known.
d. Indications that mistakes have been deliberately planted in a bid to support correction after bid opening.
e. Withdrawal by a low bidder who may later become a subcontractor to a higher bidder who gets the contract.
f. Apparent collusion or bid rigging among the bidders.
g. Bidders apparently revealing their prices to each other.
h. Required contractor certifications appear falsified.
i. Information concerning contractor's qualifications, finances, and capabilities appears falsified.
6. During the evaluation of bids and proposals.
a. Deliberately losing or discarding bids of certain contractors.
b. Improperly disqualifying the bids or proposals of certain contractors.
c. Accepting apparently nonresponsive bids from preferred contractors.
d. Unusual or unnecessary contacts between government personnel and contractors during solicitation, evaluation, and negotiation.
e. Any apparently unauthorized release of procurement information to a contractor or to non-government personnel.
f. Any apparent favoritism in the evaluation of the bid or proposal of a particular contractor.
g. Apparent bias in the evaluation criteria or in the attitude or actions of the members of the evaluation panel.
7. During contract formation and administration.
a. Defective pricing by the contractor usually associated with submitting false cost and pricing data under the Truth in Negotiation Act.
b. Cost/Labor mischarging.
c. Product substitution.
d. Progress payment fraud. For more details on these subjects see DA PAM 27–153, Contract Law, paragraph 23–5.
(Provide sufficient detail for reviewers of the plan to evaluate the appropriateness of the planned remedies. If information is “close-hold” or if grand jury secrecy applies, so state.)
(Describe any adverse impact on the DA/DOD mission. Adverse impact is described in DOD Directive 7050.5, paragraph E.1.g. Identify impact as actual or potential. Describe the impact in terms of monetary loss, endangerment to personnel or property, mission readiness, etc. This information should be considered in formulating your remedies as described below and provided to prosecutors for their use in prosecution of the offenses.)
A. Criminal Sanctions. (As a minimum, address the following: Are criminal sanctions appropriate? If so, which ones? If not, why not? Has the local U.S. Attorney or other civilian prosecutor been notified and briefed? What actions have been taken or are intended? If and when action is complete, describe action and final results of the action. Other pertinent comments should be included.)
B. Civil Remedies. (As a minimum address the following: Which civil remedies are appropriate? Has the local U.S. Attorney or other civilian prosecutor been notified and briefed? How, when, where and by whom are the appropriate civil remedies implemented? If and when action is completed, describe action and final results. Other pertinent comments should be included.)
C. Contractual/Administrative Remedies. (As a minimum, address the following: Are contractual and administrative remedies appropriate: If so, which ones? If not, Why? If contractual or administrative remedies are considered appropriate, describe how, when, and by whom the remedies are implemented. If and when action is completed, describe action and results of the action. Other pertinent comments should be included.)
D. Restrictions on Remedies Action. (Comment as to why obvious remedies are not being pursued. For example, the U.S. Attorney requests suspension action held in abeyance pending criminal action.)
1. Under no circumstances is testing to proceed unless the command has committed sufficient funding to cover the entire cost of the projected testing.
2. No testing will be initiated unless there has been a written request for the testing to the appropriate Procurement Fraud Advisor from a criminal investigator or Assistant United States Attorney or Department of Justice Attorney (AUSA is used in these procedures to indicate either an AUSA or Department of Justice attorney). If they have not already done so, criminal investigators should be requested to coordinate their testing requests with the AUSA overseeing the investigation.
3. Barring extraordinary circumstances, only one test will be conducted to support the criminal and civil recovery efforts of a procurement fraud/irregularity matter. Early coordination with the Civil Division of Department of Justice or the local United States Attorneys Office is necessary to ensure that testing funds are not wasted.
4. The request for testing should include a clear, concise statement of the purpose of the testing to include a statement of the allegations made and the contact number(s) involved. Any test plan which requires destructive testing must be approved by the AUSA.
5. No testing will be initiated unless a test plan has been developed which states the following:
6. The test plan shall be coordinated with the concurrence received in advance from the appropriate personnel in the Procurement Directorate, Product Assurance and Test Directorate, the Procurement Fraud Advisor, and the investigator/AUSA requesting the test. No testing will be initiated until the criminal investigator/AUSA who requested the testing has approved the test plan.
7. If the items tested are to be retained as evidence, the criminal investigator should arrange for retention of the evidence. While the Command will support evidence retention, this is primarily the responsibility of the criminal investigators. Agents should be advised that putting items in Code L or similar non-use status is insufficient to protect it from being released to the field. A decision not to retain the tested items as evidence must have the approval of the AUSA.
8. All items to be tested should be from a statistically valid random sample. The sample should conform with the inspection requirements of the contract or be in conformance with a random sample specifically developed for the instant test plan. It is recommended that a statistician be consulted to determine the feasibility of a random sample specifically created to support the test plan.
9. Results of testing should be available to Command and DA personnel for appropriate contractual and administrative remedies. Any request for testing results that indicates that dissemination of the testing results will be limited by Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is to be forwarded through the MACOM or AMC Procurement Fraud Coordinator to DA Procurement Fraud Division prior to the initiation of any testing.
10. Resolution of problems associated with testing requests should be conducted at the local level. In AMC the authority to refuse a testing request resides with the Office of Command Counsel. Any disputes which cannot be resolved at the local level will be forwarded to the AMC or MACOM Procurement Fraud Coordinator for resolution. This includes disputes regarding funding or any time sensitive issues.
11. Second requests for testing of the same item due to a change in the investigative plan require coordination by the PFA with the investigator and AUSA overseeing the investigation to determine the deficiencies in the earlier test. Disputes which cannot be resolved between the AUSA, PFA, and investigator regarding testing are to be forwarded simultaneously to the MACOM Procurement Fraud Coordinator and PFD for resolution. The procedures established in paragraphs 5 and 6 apply for second requests for testing with the additional requirement that the Assistant United States Attorney must be requested to approve the test plan.
a. DA employees or military members asked to provide information (testimonial or documentary) to OSC may obtain legal advice through the Labor Counselor from DA attorneys concerning their rights and obligations. This includes assistance at any interviews with OSC investigators. However, an attorney-client relationship will not be established unless the employee or military member—
(1) Is suspected or accused by the OSC of committing a prohibited personnel practice or other illegal or improper act; and
(2) Has been assigned counsel by the DA General Counsel.
b. Any military member or employee who reasonably believes that he or she is suspected or has been accused by OSC of committing a prohibited personnel practice or other illegal or improper act may obtain legal representation from DA. The counsel assigned will be from another DOD component whenever a DA attorney is likely to face a conflict between the attorney's ethical obligation to the client and DA, or when the suspected or accused individual has requested representation from another DOD component. Outside legal counsel may be retained by DA on behalf of the member or employee under unusual circumstances and only with the personal approval of the DOD General Counsel.
c. The DA General Counsel will determine whether a conflict is likely to occur if a DA attorney is assigned to represent a military member or civilian. If the DA General Counsel determines a conflict may occur, or if the suspected or accused employee has requested representation from another DOD component, the DA General Counsel will seek the assistance of another General Counsel in obtaining representation outside DA.
a. To obtain legal representation, military members or civilian employees must—
(1) Submit a written request for legal representation through the Labor and Employment Law Office, Office of the Judge Advocate General, Department of the Army, to DA General Counsel, explaining the circumstances that justify legal representation. Copies of all process and pleadings served should accompany the request.
(2) Indicate whether private counsel, at personal expense, has been retained.
(3) Obtain written certification from their supervisor that—
(a) They were acting within the scope of official duties; and
(b) DA has not initiated any adverse or disciplinary action against them for the conduct being investigated by the OSC.
b. Requests for DA legal representation must be approved by the DA General Counsel.
c. The conditions of legal representation must be explained and accepted in writing by the member or employee.
a. DA will not provide legal representation with respect to a DA initiated disciplinary action against a civilian employee for committing or participating in a prohibited personnel practice or for engaging in illegal or improper conduct. This prohibition applies regardless of whether the participation or conduct is also the basis for the disciplinary action proposed by the OSC.
b. In certain situations, counsel provided by DA may be limited to representing the individual only with respect to some of the pending matters, if other specific matters of concern to the OSC or MSPB do not satisfy the requirements contained in this regulation.
a. An attorney-client relationship will be established and continued between the suspected or accused individual and assigned DA counsel.
b. In representing a DA employee or military member, the DA attorney designated as counsel will act as a vigorous advocate of the individual's legal interests before the OSC or MSPB. The attorney's professional responsibility to DA will be satisfied by fulfilling this responsibility to the employee or military member. Legal representation may be terminated only with the approval of the DA General Counsel and normally only on the basis of information not available at the time the attorney was assigned.
c. The attorney-client relationship may be terminated if the assigned DA counsel determines, with the approval of the DA General Counsel, that—
(1) The military member or civilian employee was acting outside the scope of his or her official duties when engaging in the conduct that is the basis for the OSC investigation or charge; and
(2) Termination is not in violation of the rules of professional conduct applicable to the assigned counsel.
d. The DA attorney designated as counsel may request relief from the duties of representation or counseling without being required to furnish explanatory information that might compromise confidential communications between the client and the attorney.
This regulation authorizes cognizant DA officials to approve requests from military members or civilian employees for travel, per diem, witness appearances, or other departmental support necessary to ensure effective legal representation by the designated counsel.
A military member's or civilian employee's participation in OSC investigations, MSPB hearings, and other related proceedings will be considered official departmental business for time and attendance requirements and similar purposes.
The following advice to military members and civilian employees questioned during the course of an OSC investigation may be appropriate in response to these frequent inquiries:
a. A witness may decline to provide a “yes” or “no” answer in favor of a more qualified answer when this is necessary to ensure accuracy in responding to an OSC interviewer's question.
b. Requests for clarification of both questions and answers are appropriate to avoid misinterpretation.
c. Means to ensure verifications of an interview by OSC investigators are appropriate, whether or not the military member or civilian employee is accompanied by counsel. Tape recorders may only be used for this purpose when—
(1) The recorder is used in full view.
(2) All attendees are informed.
(3) The OSC investigator agrees to record the proceeding.
d. Any errors that appear in a written summary of an interview prepared by the investigator should be corrected before the member or employee signs the statement. The military member or civilian employee is not required to sign any written summary that is not completely accurate. A military member or civilian employee may receive a copy of the summary as a condition of signing.