parole

Blanche v. Lau

Issues

Does the government need clear and convincing evidence that a lawful permanent resident committed a crime to parole them into the United States when they reenter the country?

This case asks whether the government must show that it had clear and convincing evidence that a Lawful Permanent Resident committed a crime of moral turpitude at the time that the Lawful Permanent Resident was temporarily paroled by the Department of Homeland Security. Petitioner former Attorney General Pamela Bondi argues that the government only needs to present clear and convincing evidence that the Lawful Permanent Resident committed a crime at removal proceedings and not before. Bondi also argues that a court cannot review the discretionary decisions of the Department of Homeland Security. In response, Respondent Muk Choi Lau argues that Lawful Permanent Residents cannot be paroled unless the government can prove the noncitizen committed a crime at the time of their reentry. Lau also asserts that the decision to parole him was a mixed question of law and fact and therefore can be reviewed. The outcome of this case has implications for screening procedures at the border, the rights of noncitizens, and public safety.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, to remove a lawful permanent resident who committed an offense listed in Section 1182(a)(2) and was subsequently paroled into the United States, the government must prove that it possessed clear and convincing evidence of the offense at the time of the lawful permanent resident’s last reentry into the United States.
 

The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) governs how the U.S.

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ex post facto

The Latin phrase ex post facto means “from a thing done afterward.” In law, it refers to a criminal statute that retroactively punishes conduct that was legal at the time it was committed. The United States Constitution expressly prohibits such laws under:

Mont v. United States

Issues

If an individual on supervised release commits another crime and is detained while awaiting trial, should that detention period be credited toward his term of supervised release?

This case asks the Supreme Court to interpret 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) (“Section 3624(e)”), which provides that a defendant’s term of supervised release is tolled when the defendant is convicted of a crime. Jason Mont contends that his pretrial detention from an unrelated crime did not toll his supervised release. Instead, he claims that his supervised release expired during his pretrial detention period, and thus that the district court did not have proper jurisdiction over his case. The United States, on the other hand, argues that confinement in the form of pretrial detention is equivalent to a conviction for purposes of Section 3624(e), and that the statute tolls a defendant’s term of supervised release to avoid allowing a defendant to serve his term of supervised release while imprisoned. The outcome of this case has implications for understanding the connection between conviction, pretrial detention, and when a defendant’s supervised release is tolled.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a statute directed to the administration of imprisoned individuals serves as authority to alter or suspend the running of a criminal sentence of supervised release, when such "tolling'' is without judicial action, and requires the term "imprisonment" as used in the administrative statute, to include pretrial detention prior to an adjudication of guilt. Is a district court required to exercise its jurisdiction in order to suspend the running of a supervised release sentence as directed under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i) prior to expiration of the term of supervised release, when a supervised releasee is in pretrial detention, or does 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) toll the running of supervised release while in pretrial detention?

In December 2005, Jason Mont was convicted for possessing cocaine with intent to distribute and for being a felon in possession of a firearm. United States v. Mont at 1.

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