The Latin phrase ex post facto means “from a thing done afterward.” In law, it refers to a criminal statute that retroactively punishes conduct that was legal at the time it was committed. The United States Constitution expressly prohibits such laws under:
Does a court’s dismissal without prejudice for failure to state a claim count towards a prisoner’s three strikes under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), which would ban him from filing future legal complaints without filing fees?
The Supreme Court will decide whether a dismissal without prejudice for failure to state a claim counts as a strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Section 1915 contains a “three-strikes rule” holding a prisoner liable for litigation costs incurred when filing a civil lawsuit if the prisoner has had three or more prior civil lawsuits dismissed. Petitioner Arthur J. Lomax argues that a court’s dismissal of a complaint without prejudice does not count towards the three-strikes rule that would ban him from filing future legal complaints without filing fees. Lomax supports this argument by noting that dismissal without prejudice does not fall within the meaning of “dismissal” in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Respondent Christina Ortiz-Marquez asserts that this type of dismissal does count towards the three-strike rule because the statute does not differentiate between dismissal with or without prejudice. The Court’s decision will affect a prisoner’s ability to bring civil actions while incarcerated.
Whether a dismissal without prejudice for failure to state a claim counts as a strike under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g).
Petitioner, Arthur Lomax, is currently a prisoner at Limon Correctional Facility. Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez at 2. Before being incarcerated at the Limon Facility, Lomax was incarcerated at the Centennial Correctional Facility in Colorado. Id.
May a judge imprison a defendant, or sentence a defendant to a longer prison term, in order for the defendant to participate in a rehabilitation program?
Alejandra Tapia was convicted of smuggling illegal aliens and sentenced to fifty-one months in prison. At her sentencing, the district court factored in her history of substance abuse in its decision to give her a sentence beyond the minimum term so that she could enter and complete an in-custody drug rehabilitation program. Tapia appealed her sentence to the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the district court's decision. Citing a circuit split, Tapia appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari to determine whether it was proper for the district court judge to cite Tapia's rehabilitative needs in ordering a longer prison sentence. Petitioner Tapia contends that the plain meaning of the Sentencing Reform Act and the legislative history behind this Act confirm that rehabilitation is an inappropriate consideration in prison sentencing. The United States agrees with Tapia and urges vacating the lower court decision. Writing as amicus curiae by invitation of the Supreme Court, Professor Stephanos Bibas asserts that under the Sentencing Reform Act, district courts may properly consider the rehabilitative potential of in-prison targeted treatment programs when determining a prison sentence. Ultimately, this decision will impact when a district court may use incarceration to punish defendants and may also affect particular groups of defendants sentenced to incarceration.
May a district court give a defendant a longer prison sentence to promote rehabilitation, as the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have held, or is such a factor prohibited, as the Second, Third, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have held?
Alejandra Tapia was arrested while crossing into California from Mexico after a border officer found her smuggling two illegal aliens in her vehicle’s modified gas tank. See Brief for Petitioner, Alejandra Tapia at 2;
· LII: Sentencing—An Overview
· Life Sentences Blog, Michael O’Hear: SCOTUS to Decide Whether Sentencing Judge Can Base Prison Term on Time Needed for Treatment Program (Dec. 12, 2010)
Does the First Step Act’s definition of a “covered offense” include violations of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) because they constitute a violation of a federal criminal statute for which the Fair Sentencing Act has modified the statutory penalties?
This case asks the Supreme Court to interpret the meaning of “covered offense” under Section 404(a) of the First Step Act to determine which crimes fall under its definition, and thus, may be subject to retroactive reduced sentencing. Petitioner Tarahrick Terry pled guilty to possessing with the intent to distribute an unspecified amount of cocaine base (or “crack cocaine”) in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) in 2008. In 2010, Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing Act, which amended parts of 21 U.S.C. § 841 to adjust the difference in sentencing between crimes involving crack cocaine and those involving powder cocaine. In 2018, Congress enacted the First Step Act, which made the Fair Sentencing Act’s amendments retroactive. Terry, in support of vacatur, argues that violations of Section 841(b)(1)(C) are “covered offenses” under Section 404 of the First Step Act, based on the text of Section 404(a), as well as the statute’s design and history. Adam K. Mortara, as amicus curiae in support of the judgment below, argues that Terry’s offense is not a “covered offense” under Section 404(a) based on a proper construction of the statute and the meaning of the phrases “violation of a Federal criminal statute” and “statutory penalties.” The case has implications for future retroactive sentencing statutory amendments, as well as inmates currently in custody for low-level crack-cocaine offenses before Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010.
Whether pre-August 3, 2010, crack offenders sentenced under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) have a “covered offense” under Section 404 of the First Step Act.
On March 11, 2008, a grand jury indicted Tarahrick Terry with three crimes: (1) being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C.
