suffrage
Suffrage refers to the right to vote in an election.
Criminal syndicalism laws were used primarily in the early 1900s to suppress economic and political radicals, anti-war efforts, and to undermine labor movements, such as the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW). These laws made acts intended to incite such change against the U.S. government illegal.
A cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) is an annual increase to compensation or benefits to account for increases in the cost of living, which is primarily driven by inflation.
Does federal law require mail-in ballots for federal elections to be cast and received by Election Day, or can states count ballots received after Election Day as long as ballots are postmarked by Election Day?
In this case the Supreme Court will consider how federal election-day statutes impact state laws that allow for the counting of ballots received after Election Day. Currently, Mississippi allows mail-in ballots sent by Election Day and received at the appropriate location within five business days to be counted. Mississippi Secretary of State Michael Watson argues that the act of marking and submitting a ballot constitutes a voter’s conclusive choice, or the casting of their ballot, and therefore Mississippi’s practice of receiving ballots after Election Day remains valid because ballots are still cast by Election Day. The Republican National Committee contends that Mississippi’s election laws violate federal election laws, because an election is only complete when all ballots are received, and thus receiving ballots later extends the election past the federally required Election Day deadline. The ruling could have major impacts on federal elections, as it would affect election practices in twenty-eight states, impact the feasibility of elections for both voters and administrators, and could further polarize issues of election integrity.
Whether the federal election-day statutes, 2 U.S.C. § 7, 2 U.S.C. § 1, and 3 U.S.C. § 1, preempt a state law that allows ballots that are cast by federal Election Day to be received by election officials after that day.
Current Mississippi law allows mail-in ballots sent by Election Day and received at the appropriate location within five business days to be counted in federal elections. RNC v.
Has a noncitizen who was stopped on the Mexican side of the U.S.–Mexico border “arrived in the United States” under the Immigration and Nationality Act, rendering them eligible to apply for asylum and be inspected by an immigration officer?
This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether a noncitizen stopped on the Mexican side of the U.S.–Mexico border “arrived in the United States” within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). Petitioners Kristi Noem, et al., argue that the plain meaning and history of the statute, as well as the presumption against extraterritoriality, support the requirement of a physical presence in the United States. Respondents Al Otro Lado, et al., counter that the statute applies to people on both sides of the border. Respondents also maintain that the presumption against extraterritoriality does not apply because the INA regulates the domestic conduct of immigration officers. The outcome of this case will have significant ramifications for the administration of border security and separation of powers.
Whether a noncitizen who is stopped on the Mexican side of the U.S.–Mexico border “arrives in the United States” within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., which provides that a noncitizen who “arrives in the United States” may apply for asylum and must be inspected by an immigration officer.
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), noncitizens are eligible to apply for asylum in the United States if they are “physically present” or “arrive in” the United States and can demonstrate a credible fear of persecution in their home country.
Can judicial estoppel prevent a plaintiff from pursuing a civil claim that he failed to disclose during bankruptcy proceedings, even without evidence that the plaintiff acted in bad faith?
This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a bankruptcy debtor who fails to disclose a civil claim during bankruptcy proceedings can later pursue that claim in federal court. The case also asks whether courts can prohibit undisclosed claims when a bankruptcy trustee, instead of the debtor, seeks to continue the lawsuit. Keathley argues that the Fifth Circuit’s rigid judicial estoppel test is inconsistent with equitable principles and suggests a flexible, totality of the circumstances approach that allows debtors to correct mistakes without forfeiting valuable claims. On the other hand, Buddy Ayers Construction, Inc. contends that an objective judicial estoppel rule best aligns with bankruptcy’s goal of protecting creditors while conditioning a debtor’s fresh start on full disclosure of known assets. The Court’s decision has sweeping implications for debtors and creditors and fairness in bankruptcy proceedings.
Whether the doctrine of judicial estoppel can be invoked to bar a plaintiff who fails to disclose a civil claim in bankruptcy filings from pursuing that claim simply because there is a potential motive for nondisclosure, regardless of whether there is evidence that the plaintiff in fact acted in bad faith.
To discharge his debts, Thomas Keathley filed a bankruptcy petition and Chapter 13 repayment plan in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas on De
Are last-mile delivery drivers exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act, which exempts “seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign and interstate commerce?"
This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether last-mile delivery drivers—drivers who transport interstate goods to their final destination but who do not themselves cross state lines—are exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), which mandates arbitration of certain employer-employee disputes. The FAA exempts “seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign and interstate commerce.” Driver Angelo Brock argues that last-mile drivers engage in interstate commerce, even though they themselves do not cross state lines, because their work entails transporting goods along their interstate journey. Brock’s employer, Flowers Foods, contends that last-mile drivers are not engaged in interstate commerce, because they work entirely within one state and do not directly interact with vehicles that crossed state lines. This case carries implications impacting employee welfare and judicial resources.
Whether workers who deliver locally goods that travel in interstate commerce—but who do not transport the goods across borders nor interact with vehicles that cross borders—are “transportation workers” “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” for purposes of the exemption in Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act.
Petitioners Flowers Foods, Inc. and its subsidiaries (collectively, “Flowers”) operate a company that makes and sells prepackaged baked goods like small breads and cakes. Brock v.
Constructive force is when a person or party uses threats or coercion to gain control over another and achieve their desired outcome. Unlike actual force, which is physical force applied directly to a person’s body, constructive force need only produce sufficient fear of harm to suspend a victim's free will.