United States v. Stitt

TAYLOR’S DEFINITION OF BURGLARY UNDER THE ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT

The United States contends that the Sixth Circuit’s ruling was inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor v. United States, in that the Taylor definition of burglary under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) includes nonpermanent and mobile structures adapted for overnight lodging within the meaning of “building” or “structure.” The United States indicates that the various sources of law cited in Taylor to define burglary all point to inclusion of such structures.

Firstly, the United States asserts that Taylor construed the ACCA’s definition of burglary to be based on the criminal codes of most states at the time the ACCA was enacted. They then point to how the criminal codes of most states at the time included nonpermanent and mobile structures adapted for overnight lodging in their definitions of burglary. The United States then argues that, during the 1986 ACCA amendments, forty-three states and the District of Columbia included nonpermanent or mobile structures in the definition of burglary in at least one of their statutes. Furthermore, the United States claims that Taylor also based its burglary definition on the Model Penal Code, which explicitly includes vehicles, places, and structures adapted for overnight lodging in its definition of burglary. Finally, the United States contends that Taylor also relied on a treatise by Professor Wayne LaFave that treated the inclusion of nonpermanent and mobile structures in the definition of burglary as commonplace.

Stitt argues that Taylor recognized that Congress could not have intended to rely on state law’s definition of burglary, because burglary has never had a uniformly accepted meaning among the states. Stitt also rejects that Taylor intended to use the state statute at hand in Taylor, the Model Penal Code or Professor LaFave’s treatise as bases for the definition of burglary, given that Taylor considered but did not adopt the language of any of the sources. In line with this point, both Stitt and Sim argues that, since that stare decisis has special weight in cases of statutory interpretation and because the majority of circuit courts read Taylor to define burglary as excluding mobile structures, stare decisis weighs heavily in favor of excluding mobile structures.

Stitt also contends that if Taylor’s definition of burglary is not upheld, the Court must hold that the ACCA’s sentencing model is unconstitutional, and violates the Sixth Amendment. This would require overruling Almendarez-Torres v. United States, which Stitt claims unconstitutionally carved out an exception to the rule preventing judges from increasing the sentence for an offense beyond the statutory maximum. Sims contends that Almendarez-Torres should be overruled because it breaks with historical jurisprudence holding that a defendant cannot be given a harsher sentence on the basis of any fact not proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

TAYLOR’S INTERPRETATION OF CONGRESSIONAL INTENT

The United States argues that the Supreme Court in Taylor understood Congress’s intent in enacting the ACCA was to favor a broad understanding of burglary under the belief that burglary was an inherently dangerous crime. The United States also contends that Congress enacted the ACCA in response to data indicating that the majority of robbery and burglary offenses were committed by repeat “career criminals.” The United States argues that Congress’s intentions in enacting the ACCA apply in equal force to burglary of permanent and nonpermanent structures because they are targeted for violent crimes and property offenses with equal frequency, and therefore that burglary should be construed to include both for the purposes of the ACCA.

Stitt, however, contends that, since the original ACCA issued in 1984 included a definition of burglary, it is likely that the definition of burglary was unintentionally deleted during the act's amendment in 1986, as the original ACCA included. Given this, Stitt argues, Congress never meant for the statute to include nonpermanent or mobile structures, as the original definition did not include them. Stitt also points to the fact that that no Congressional proposal for amendment of the definition of burglary in the ACCA since Taylor—of which there were many—included language about nonpermanent or mobile structures. Stitt specifically points out that Congress made fifteen attempts over a period of four years to reintroduce the original deleted definition of burglary, including the word “building.” This, Stitt claims, corroborates that Congress never intended to broaden the definition of burglary to the United States’ definition. Sims further argues that Congress must have approved of the Taylor holding, as Congress not make efforts to alter the limitation of burglary.

FUNCTION OF STRUCTURES AND RISK OF HARM

The United States argues that the Sixth Circuit misinterpreted the Supreme Court’s holding in Taylor by reading Taylor to focus on the nature of a structure, rather than the structure’s use, when deciding whether the structure ought to be included in the ACCA’s definition of burglary. The United States contends that there is no support for this conclusion from the Taylor opinion, and notes that that the nature and use of a structure are interrelated, given that a structure will likely be physically altered for uses such as overnight lodging. The United States further asserts, in response to the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of Taylor, that a definition that takes function into consideration better fits with Congress’s intention to prevent violence. The United States argues it would be counterintuitive for permanent buildings where people cannot sleep to be included in the definition of burglary where nonpermanent dwellings would be excluded.

Stitt rejects the United States’ assertion that the definition of burglary ought to take the structure’s use and points to the way in which the Taylor Court had the opportunity to adopt such a definition at the suggestion of the petitioner in that case, but did not do so. Stitt asserts that the Taylor holding explicitly differentiated between the first-degree or aggravated burglary and generic burglary for the purposes of the ACCA because of the former's increased risk of harm to victims. Stitt contends then that to use the United States’ definition of burglary based on potential harm would directly contradict Taylor, and thus asks for the harm-based definition to be rejected. Sims, arguing in the alternative, contends that the odds of harm are lower for burglaries of mobile structures than with standing homes because the owners are less likely to be present. Sims claims Congress only intended to group offenses of a similar risk level in the ACCA, and that therefore nonpermanent and mobile structures should be excluded.